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It certainly takes a village to raise child, and this clichéd idiom very much is true of a 
graduate student undertaking a dissertation as well.  When I was a child growing up, I always 
had a distinct interest in geography and history, but in college, I ultimately had to study one or 
the other. I am deeply thankful that I was able to combine these interests in graduate school and 
study these fields simultaneously. Really, I simply wanted to research and write a thesis that 
would allow me to travel and look at a lot of maps. I have been so excited and humbled that I had 
an unending amount of support and interest from so many people in this endeavor. I would not 
be the person I am today without it. Of course the errors are my own, but this document reflects 
an experience I would not trade for another because of all the people mentioned here. 
My committee was supportive from the start. I am so grateful to say that each of you 
were instrumental in my education and an inquisitive mentor. I appreciate every moment of help 
and patience with my work and all the careful, constructive criticism. I first met Roger Launius 
at SHOT in Cleveland in 2010. He always asked point blank the tough questions and told me 
how to write a dissertation in a straight forward way. Roger was also crucial to meeting several 
people who led me to the resources I needed to write this dissertation. It was truly a pleasure to 
work for him as an intern and later a fellow at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum. 
I am especially thankful to Roger for making my time in Washington as rigorous as it was 
enjoyable. Kristie Macrakis first triggered my interest in Earth observation satellites. In my first 
graduate course ever, she encouraged me to read about the Corona spy satellites and intelligence. 
While I did not pursue Corona, it was not long after that I was obsessed with studying Landsat 
and the intelligence community. She tirelessly read this dissertation in its entirety offering the 
most detailed feedback making this revision enjoyable. Dr. Jenny Smith provided valuable 
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insight encouraging me to think about Landsat and its data in different ways and I am very 
thankful for her instruction and support through my comps in environmental history. While at a 
conference at University of Pennsylvania, I met Dr. Neil Maher who became an invaluable 
member of my committee. I thank him for his support, encouragement, and brilliant reading of 
my work that challenged me to write about Landsat in compelling, creative ways. Dr. Doug 
Flamming is another member of HSOC who was especially helpful as I prepared for my comps 
but even more inspiring as someone whom I learned how to teach from. Most of all, I most 
graciously thank John Krige for his unending patience, charisma, and brilliance that inspired me 
to pursue this dissertation. He often says that to complete a dissertation, such as this one, it takes 
passion. His passion for history that inspired me to attend Georgia Tech and his challenging 
questions, support, and enthusiasm for his graduate students that kept me inspired. John Krige 
fought hard to make sure all my intellectual goals happened, whether it was studying in France, 
winning fellowships, or attending conferences as far away as Vancouver and Copenhagen, I am 
forever thankful for his efforts making my goals a reality. I am forever indebted to him and will 
always appreciate his time, effort, and commitment to making me into the scholar I envisioned I 
could be. 
While dissertations are written independently, I shared this experience and learned from 
so many others. The graduate community of HSOC (well, to me it was HTS) helped me grow 
and I owe them a lot of appreciation for letting me talk endlessly about space, Landsat, 
bureaucracy, and the like. In particular, Dr. Hyoung Joon An, Dr. Liang Yao, Jonah Bea-Taylor, 
and Amanda Domingues are especially due thanks. They lent their time, intellect, and patience 
(and even sometimes their couches to sleep on!) and offered insights into my work I often left 
unseen. As I go forward, I wish them the very best and am proud to say they are more than just 
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colleagues, but friends. I have had the pleasure of meeting students in other departments as well, 
I appreciate Ruth Rand of University of Pennsylvania (now University of Wisconsin) for 
bringing me up to Philadelphia for WHEATS as well as Emily Margolis of Johns Hopkins for 
reading over one of my chapters. 
 At times, this dissertation seems to be an alphabet soup of government agencies. Behind 
those strings of letters are hardworking civil servants who helped bring this dissertation to life. 
At NASA, Steve Garber, Jane Odom, Colin Fries, and Liz Suckow worked hard to make sure I 
had all the records necessary to understand the intricate details of the Landsat program. These 
individuals also made it an enjoyable and stimulating visit to the space agency. Also within 
NASA at the Goddard Spaceflight Center, I appreciate Jim Irons’ help and time talking about 
Landsat’s agricultural applications. I also visited the U.S. Geological Survey Headquarters in 
Virginia and its Earth Resources Observation and Science Center (EROS) in South Dakota 
where I met and talked with John Faundeen, Thomas Holm, Kristie Kline, Eugene Fosnight, 
Steve Labahn, and Tom Loveland. Each of these individuals showed me around EROS and truly 
brought Landsat to life for me showing how Landsat data is gathered and used. I am very 
appreciative for their time and insight. At USGS HQ back in Virginia, Raymond Byrnes was 
extremely helpful and kind offering his time and office to help me. His experience working with 
Landsat from the very beginning and for EOSAT added an invaluable perspective on Landsat 
documents could not reveal. I also appreciate James Baker’s time and assistance as the former 
NOAA Administrator. Others from industry I must thank for their time is James Zimmerman and 




While at Georgia Tech, I applied for a couple fellowships I thought would be helpful and 
would let me live in the Washington, D.C. area. I was already both personally and professionally 
attracted to the bustling center of power upon the Potomac. I am thankful to the American 
Historical Association and NASA for awarding me the Fellowship in Aerospace History which 
allowed me to move to and conduct research in the DC area. I then moved onto the Smithsonian 
National Air and Space Museum, where I interacted some of the most highly supportive and 
smart scholars in history of technology. In addition to the valuable help of Roger Launius, Paul 
Ceruzzi, James David, David DeVorkin, Hunter Hollins, Thomas Lassman, Jennifer Levasseur, 
Mike Neufeld, Matthew Shindell, and Margaret Weitekamp, whose insight and comprehensive 
knowledge of aerospace history helped hone this dissertation and its conclusions. I also give 
huge thanks to the American Historical Association, particularly Dana Schaffer, for awarding me 
the AHA/NASA Fellowship in Aerospace History which allowed me to meet so many of the 
people mentioned here. 
 Lastly, my friends and family have been an unwavering source of support, 
encouragement, and love. My two best friends, Hunter Scales and Jeff Elkin, encouraged me 
from the very beginning asking some of the toughest questions and always encouraging me to 
keep going. During several research trips to DC, I am thankful to Jeff for letting me stay with 
him. My parents, Michael and Melissa, thank you for always pushing me hard to do my very best 
at everything I set my mind to. This dissertation represents the determination and passion you 
inspired in me to pursue my goals. My sister Allison, who understands the scientific and 
technical aspects of remote sensing far better than I as she received a Masters in the subject, also 
was a huge source of encouragement and love since we share a passion for understanding our 
planet’s beautiful and fragile environment through remote sensing. Countless times I enjoyed our 
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conversations about the challenges and breakthroughs she made in her job as a remote sensing 
specialist in the Everglades and it helped me think more about how Landsat imagery was both a 
challenge to work with and how it helped her understand more about the planet. It was also truly 
a privilege to go out on the front lawn with my grandfather’s binoculars and watch the Space 
Shuttle lift off over the beaches of Florida with my family. These fond memories resonated as I 
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In July 1972, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) launched the 
Earth Resources Technology Satellite-A, later renamed Landsat, which was the first of its kind. 
NASA launched seven more Landsats with one failure. The satellites orbited north to south 
covering the entire Earth while its instruments gathered imagery across several spectral bands at 
medium resolution of the Earth’s terrestrial and coastal surface. Using archival materials, 
government documents, and informal interviews, my dissertation argues in an introduction, four 
chapters, and a conclusion that the use of Landsat imagery changed over time and that 
international law and domestic policy deeply affected its availability despite a commitment by 
the US government to non-discriminatory access. My first chapter argued that agricultural 
applications became the first major application of Landsat data and later adopted by the 
intelligence community to conduct economic espionage on the Soviet Union. Using documents 
from the United Nations and American National Archives, one chapter demonstrated how these 
institutions deliberated over and configured international law and domestic policy such that 
Landsat data would be available to developing countries for use. My last two chapters describe 
how Landsat became a commercial entity which ultimately failed and the government recovered 
the program and committed to its continuity. Since Landsat’s development in the late 1960s, the 
satellite program began as a publicly run experimental project, commercialized into a private 
operation, and later became a public-private partnership. 
 This study has the following major contributions and findings. My dissertation covers the 
history of the Landsat program from its origins in the 1950s to open data access in 2008 building 
upon previous studies of Landsat. I also argued that there are four major periods of Landsat’s 
history. These periods reflect the differing use and availability of Landsat throughout its history. 
xv 
 
My thesis found that the commercialization of space technology, a fast growing trend, was a 
highly political process that pushed Landsat from the public to private sector and led to cost-
prohibitive data that drove away the user community. Similarly, the US government attempted to 
foster a strong foreign user base through ground stations and development programs and 
experienced success as well as difficulty given trade and export policies to certain countries. 
Lastly, Landsat, despite being a civilian program, was used heavily by the intelligence 
community in studies of natural resources in America’s Cold War adversaries. Overall, the 
various applications of Landsat data and the various laws and regulations put into place by the 
US federal government deeply affected Landsat data availability and ultimately made it more 
difficult to access throughout much of its history until the 2000s. 
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Introductory Chapter: “The Time is Now Right and Urgent:” Reconnaissance 
to Remote Sensing, 1957-1972 
 
In January 1975, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Administrator 
James C. Fletcher claimed that “if I had to pick one spacecraft, one Space Age development to 
save the world, I would pick ERTS.”1 Administrator Fletcher, speaking amidst oil embargoes, 
acute crop shortages around the world, the passage of several pieces of major American 
environmental legislation, and the famed ‘Blue Marble’ image taken from the Apollo-17 flight in 
December 1972, to name a few, predicted that the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS, 
later renamed Landsat) and follow-on satellites offered a modern, space-age solution to human-
induced environmental degradation as well as a mechanism for more efficient use of Earth’s 
limited natural resources. Since Fletcher’s prediction in 1975, seven Landsat satellites have 
produced millions of images of the Earth continuously and routinely for over forty years and 
contributed to myriad scientific investigations in a wide range of fields such as agriculture, 
biology, geology, urban-planning, among many others. In addition to the scientific community, 
the military also had a stake in Earth observation having used satellites to gather strategic 
intelligence. Industry also explored the use of Landsat data for mineral extraction, agricultural 
production, land development, and software development among many. Over time, as other 
countries became capable of using imagery from Landsat, scientific investigations expanded 
globally. The community of people who used Landsat data and imagery2 for scientific, military, 
or industrial purposes undoubtedly increased and expanded over four decades. However, this 
                                                          
1 ERTS-B Press Kit, 14 January 1975, NASA History Office, Washington, D.C. 
https://mira.hq.nasa.gov/history/ws/hdmshrc/all/main/Blob/42690.pdf?w=NATIVE%28%27KEYWORDS+ph+is+
%27%27%22landsat%22%27%27%27%29&rpp=20&order=native%28%27SERIES%27%29&r=1&m=2 date 
accessed: 25 November 2013 
2 Throughout this dissertation I use the terms Landsat data and Landsat imagery. Landsat data refers to unprocessed 




process proved incredibly complex politically and economically and experienced resistance from 
several forces in both the domestic and international domains. 
My thesis addresses political history and history of science and technology of the U.S. 
federal government’s ERTS/Landsat Earth observation satellite program. The Landsat program 
is currently in its forty-fourth year of existence and has seen the launch of seven satellites, each 
with increasingly powerful scanners capable of mapping global environmental change. The 
satellite program, launched at the height of the Cold War, was a civilian effort of the U.S. federal 
government that evolved from an experimental program into a commercial venture, and then 
transforming yet again into a public-private partnership over the forty years of the program’s 
lifespan. In the midst of these governmental changes, the satellite’s community of users, I 
contend, grew from a few specialists in the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture 
(USDA) into an international user base of data consumers. For the purposes of this thesis, a 
‘user’ is an individual or a community of individuals who derive and create new knowledge of 
the Earth from Landsat imagery. The problem I will address directly is Landsat’s changing 
structures of governance and how these changes affected the use of the satellite domestically and 
internationally. By shedding light on this problem, I will assess how the U.S. federal 
government, with particular attention to its Executive Branch and federal agencies, develops, 
governs, fosters, and eventually commercializes science and technology during the late Cold War 
and beyond. In essence, this thesis will demonstrate how the United States governed and 
transformed scientific and technological programs from the 1960s to the present.  
My intellectual goal is to contribute a new study of Landsat which assesses how the U.S. 
federal government, particularly the Executive Branch, developed, governed, fostered, and 
eventually commercialized remote sensing technology from the 1960s to present for use both 
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domestically and internationally. I study both how laws and policies affected the availability, 
whether more broad or restricted, of Landsat data and how that data came to be used such as how 
and by whom. Fundamentally I am guided by three questions: What is the relationship between 
technology and the state and how does it change over time? How does the use of a technology 
change over time? How do state policies change the nature of technology-in-use over time? 
 
From Pigeons to Processors: A Century of Earth Observation 
 Humans have longed for a better view of the world in which they live. Earth observation, 
which I broadly define as the viewing and mapping of Earth through aviation or space-based 
technological means, began to quickly evolve in the late 19th century. The Union Army used hot-
air balloons to photograph battlefields during the American Civil War. In 1889, Arthur Batut 
attached a camera to a kite and photographed Labruguiere, France. In Germany, Julius 
Neubronner fitted pigeons with cameras leading to the Bavarian Pigeon Corps in 1903. However, 
it was around World War I and the beginnings of aviation that humans began to see the Earth 
more routinely from above. Aerial photography served as a dominant method for gathering such 
image based data, most commonly for military purposes. Military officials used cameras onboard 
aircraft to gain strategic advantage through reconnaissance. 
Reconnaissance became the term for cartographic intelligence gathering via aircraft for 
military use. The development of the airplane significantly contributed to military 
reconnaissance for strategic planning with its ability to photograph terrain. Italians first used 
fixed-wing aircraft for aerial photography, that is, reconnaissance, during the Italo-Turkish War 
in 1911, and most powers practiced reconnaissance during the World Wars. Amron Katz, a 
RAND Corporation photogrammetric specialist “estimated that about 80 percent of the 
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information secured on the Axis powers and their activities during World War II resulted from 
aerial reconnaissance.”3 Such heavy emphasis on reconnaissance during the war preceded 
improvements in remote data gathering afterward. Reconnaissance involved the use of airplanes, 
and later satellites for strategic intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition. By the 1940s, 
both aircraft and rocketry served as platforms for reconnaissance. 
The end of the Second World War led to the acquisition of many scientific and 
technological resources for the United States which later contributed to its Earth observation 
efforts. American interest in satellite reconnaissance began as early as 1941 “when the concept 
of a surprise attack on U.S. territory became a vivid reality,” after the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor.4 Germany’s defeat in 1945 secured a great many scientific resources for the U.S. (and 
the Soviets), particularly the knowledge gained from the Peenemünde engineers.5 Shortly after 
obtaining scientists, rockets and materials at war’s end through Operation Paperclip in 1945, 
military, scientific, and institutional interests brought together a civilian panel “composed of an 
informal group of activists and scientist-entrepreneurs who designed experiments for the 
missiles.”6 Both the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the Applied Physics Laboratory at 
Johns Hopkins University (APL) were powerful participants that attempted aerial photography 
with V-2 rockets. Initially, scientists at APL were interested in rocket behavior but a photograph 
                                                          
3 John Cloud “American Cartographic Transformations during the Cold War” Cartography and Geographic 
Information Science (2002) Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 263 
4 Dwayne Day et al. Eye in the Sky: the story of the Corona spy satellites, (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution 
Press, 1998), pg. 29 
5 There is an expansive field of work on German rocketry science and technology, particularly during the Third 
Reich. See: The Rocket and the Reich by Michael Neufeld. Rocketry, as well as an exhaustive history of applications 
satellites and their origins, is beyond the scope of this thesis. See also: Science with a Vengeance by David H. 
DeVorkin concerning American adoption of V-2/A-4 into upper atmospheric research and military use. 
6 David H. DeVorkin, “Organizing for Space Research: The V-2 Rocket Panel” Historical Studies in the Physical 
and Biological Sciences Vol. 18, No. 1 (1987), pg. 1-24 
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of Earth from 104 kilometers caught the attention of the American newspapers.7 The detection of 
a tropical storm in 19478  alluded to practical application for the Weather Bureau, who also sat 
on the V-2 Panel. Despite their participation on the panel and the efforts of the NRL and APL, 
little interest followed since the V-2 launches did not promise consistent data. Meteorological 
studies, as much as military reconnaissance, required data continuity, a capability requiring 
access to space through Earth-orbiting satellites via rocketry. 
German rocket engineers informed Clark Millikan and Hsue-Shen Tsien, both of the 
California Institute of Technology, of “the possibilities opened by their rocketry: artificial earth 
satellites.”9 Shortly after, the Navy, later collaborating with the Army Air Force (AAF) and the 
RAND Corporation, formed the Earth Satellite Vehicle Program (ESVP) in 1946. RAND 
produced a report suggesting delivery vehicle specifications, military value, but placed great 
emphasis on the scientific applications.10 These included both scientific such as meteorology, 
earth physics, and astronomy, and technical, such as communications and remote sensing 
applications. The AAF attempted to gain control of the ESVP, however disagreements with the 
Navy and military unification forced the project off the table. Congress passed the National 
Security Act of 1947, which reorganized the AAF into separated branches including the U.S. 
Army and the newly formed U.S. Air Force (USAF). This also led to the establishment of the 
Research and Development Board (RDB, built from the Joint Research and Development Board 
of the AAF and Navy). A year later in 1948, the Navy canceled the ESVP project all together 
                                                          
7 David H. DeVorkin, Science with a Vengeance: How the Military Created the U.S. Space Sciences after World 
War II, (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992), pg. 145 
8 David H. DeVorkin, Science with a Vengeance: How the Military Created the U.S. Space Sciences after World 
War II, (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992), pg. 145 
9 Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985), pg. 101 
10 Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985), pg. 102 
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due to President Truman’s funding cuts and high costs of the program.11 The Navy’s “attempts to 
go beyond preliminary investigations with satellite proposals continued to be frustrated.”12 The 
cancellation of the ESVP and the recommendation from the RDB favored the USAF which 
“eventually became ‘the only service authorized to expend defense department funds on studies 
of satellite vehicles’.”13  
 
Cold War from Above 
The Cold War brought about an ideological bifurcation of world politics, culture, and 
economics inspiring rivalry among superpowers that only enhanced the imperatives of national 
security in the wake of World War II. The capitalistic democracies of the West began to clash 
with the communist authoritarian regimes of the East in contests to best each other in scientific 
and technological feats. These competitions produced in a highly militarized standoff between 
the United States and Soviet Union. President Dwight Eisenhower felt compelled to assess the 
Soviet Union’s strategic capabilities. Thus, the U.S. defense and intelligence community began 
the development of a reconnaissance satellite program. The origins of reconnaissance from space 
lie in defense mapping interests with the particular involvement of the USAF and the CIA. The 
military strictly controlled remote sensing for its use in reconnaissance. 
The USAF contracted with RAND Corporation, a California based think tank, as well as 
others to study how to implement a satellite reconnaissance platform. Project Feedback 
employed a team consisting of “Westinghouse, RCA, and Lawrence R. Hafstad, recently of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) R & D Board [Department of Defense Research and Development 
                                                          
11 Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985), pg103 
12 Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) pg. 28 
13 Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) pg. 28 
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Board]” to study necessary hardware.14  By 1954, Feedback “received high-level support within 
the Air Force,” and its goal to assess the enemy capabilities through targeting “airfield runways 
and future intercontinental missile launch sites.”15 The USAF and the CIA developed these 
capabilities and corresponding technologies between 1956 and 1959 eventually launching the 
Corona program, which is discussed in greater detail in the next section. Meanwhile, the USAF 
and CIA moved ahead with another reconnaissance program utilizing high-altitude aircraft. 
The CIA and the USAF contracted with Lockheed Martin to design an aircraft capable of 
high-altitude reconnaissance. The U-2 spy plane entered service in 1955 because the US “needed 
to spy on the Soviet Union” in order to “attend to the technological problem of preventing 
another Pearl Harbor.”16 This spy plane program, authorized by President Eisenhower became an 
important intelligence gathering system over Soviet airspace for the CIA. The U-2 had necessary 
range and altitude providing for all-weather imagery. The U-2 assisted to accumulate imagery of 
Soviet military installations, airfields, ammunition sites, transportation routes and atomic 
production facilities. However, for the military to effectively maintain Soviet surveillance, it 
needed to be continuous as well as be able to target particular Soviet installations.17 Also, the U-
2 was not invincible, even with its great altitude; the USAF pilots flying them were at great risk 
to anti-aircraft defenses. The Soviet Union shot down U-2 pilot Francis Powers over Sverdlovsk 
after which he endured almost 2 years of imprisonment. Soviet officials used Powers to stage a 
“widely publicized public trial that was designed to embarrass the United States.”18 Thus, most 
                                                          
14 Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985), pg110 
15 Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) pg. 30 
16 Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985), pp. 115 
17 Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985), pg. 117 
18 Francis Powers Jr. “From U-2 to CORONA: 50 Years Later” Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly (2010) 
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concerning to the US government was the violation of Soviet airspace. The U-2 proved 
politically dangerous since “Soviet leaders viewed aircraft overflights as hostile incursions.”19 
The U-2 successfully returned data instrumental to intelligence, however, the U.S. government 
and military demanded greater Earth-viewing power. The U-2 program did not provide 
continuous data feedback; it provided little spatial and temporal coverage. The data only 
represented the time and flight path of the U-2 airplane. Such limited data sets came at a high 
risk due to anti-aircraft weaponry and international law. The U-2 program continued service, but 
compared to what satellite reconnaissance promised it was reduced to a “stopgap” while the US 
developed reconnaissance capabilities from outer space.20 These risks and data concerns 
effectively encouraged the development of new remote sensing apparatuses to counteract these 
concerns. For remote sensing, data continuity and spatial coverage were of highest concern, just 
such capabilities satellites promised to improve.  
Communist expansion into Eastern Europe, instability in Greece and Turkey, the Berlin 
blockade, and Soviet nuclear weapon acquisition led to an “American inclination to assume the 
worst about Soviet intentions.”21 Further, the outbreak of the Korean War solidified American 
policy manifesting in NSC-68. This highly classified report led to increased military spending, 
coordination of Western militaries, and advocated containment of Soviet influence.22 Despite the 
shift away from satellites as a priority, the USAF and RAND sustained the view that satellites 
could provide a means of intelligence gathering through earth observation. RAND’s continued 
                                                          
19 Howard E. McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination, (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 
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21 Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985), pg. 91 
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study of reconnaissance satellites revealed a glaring error. The US (and the Soviets) had the 
capability to place satellites in space, yet no legal precedent existed for orbital flight over foreign 
soil. 
 Freedom of space became an issue at the outset of the space age. The Americans, 
especially when Eisenhower took office in 1953, insisted on legal mandate protecting the 
freedom of space. The Soviets, however, recognized American intentions, effectively 
filibustering United Nations (UN) legislation on freedom of space for 10 years. International law 
disallowed overflight by aircraft unless previous agreements among heads of state were in place. 
However, orbiting satellites around the earth “raised the question of the international law of 
territorial waters and airspace, in which individual nations controlled those territories as if they 
were their own soil.”23 The Eisenhower administration pushed for space “to be recognized as 
free territory not subject to the normal confines of territorial limits.”24 Opposition, led by the 
Soviets, suggested that state territorial borders extended into space. In July 1955, the US and 
Soviet Union held a summit in Geneva, Switzerland concerning the freedom of space access 
issue. Eisenhower presented his “Open Skies” policy, which Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev 
outright rejected. US Ambassador to the UN Henry Lodge presented a 
“plan of controls whereby ‘future development in outer space would be directed 
exclusively to peaceful purposes and scientific purposes’ by bringing ‘the testing of 
[satellites and missiles] under international inspection and participation.”25 
 
This situation presented three courses of action for Eisenhower. First, continue to pursue legality 
either through the UN or precedence via a peaceful, scientific satellite (hoping no other state 
                                                          
23 Roger D. Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing 
Company, 1994) pg. 19 
24 Roger D. Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing 
Company, 1994) pg. 20 
25 Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, (New York: Basic 
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objects). Second, the Eisenhower administration used the Soviet launch to argue that Sputnik set 
freedom of space precedence. Third, the US pursues a covert reconnaissance program without 
regard to international law. Eisenhower found he could have all three. 
 The implications of space legislation and satellites signaled the beginning of the space 
age. The US, as well as the USSR, had institutions in place to address the new technological era 
hopefully without implying deepening Cold War tensions. The US government hoped a 
commitment to science and peaceful uses of space may not signal belligerence. In 1950, a group 
of scientists suggested a worldwide, yearlong research initiative mirroring the International Polar 
Years of 1882 and 1932. Five years later after funding discussions with the National Science 
Foundation and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the US government saw the 
benefits of earth satellites and global science. However, “unbeknownst to the IGY 
people…establishing legality for overflight as well as being first into space,” were the 
administration’s real motivations.26 Nonetheless, the US emphasized peace and science in space. 
That same year, 1955, the National Security Council (NSC) approved the IGY and ensured its 
lack of involvement with military programs during the year from July 1957 until December 
1958. The US and the Soviets committed to launching satellites during that time. The NRL 
proposed Project Vanguard as the American contribution to the IGY. The Vanguard project 
however faced both technical and managerial problems, all the while remaining a second priority 
to the Polaris missile, among other IRBM projects. Vanguard’s upper stage boosters proved inert 
and the system ultimately failed. American hopes to reach space did not materialize with 
Vanguard, nor did the US achieve orbit first. Before Vanguard’s eventual failure, the Soviets 
successfully placed Sputnik into orbit on 4 October 1957.  
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 The American public and press reacted with great panic to the Soviet launch. For the US, 
Sputnik supposedly expressed Soviet superiority.27  The Soviet accomplishment gained 
worldwide congratulations shortly after launch, which the Soviets, indeed Khrushchev, used as 
part of his political agenda. The Pravda pushed the propaganda campaign domestically, despite 
its initial lack of interest. After 9 October, the Pravda had published world responses of praise 
and launch details.28 The satellite, as Launius argued, was the result of Sergei Korolev’s efforts 
and reaction to American space efforts.29 Korolev was one of the Soviet Union’s top rocket 
engineers and led the project to build Sputnik. The American reaction to Sputnik “demanded that 
the United States reassert the superiority of American technology by surpassing the Soviet Union 
in space exploration.”30 While prestige played a key role in defining the Cold War space race, for 
Eisenhower it was merely a superficial phenomenon. Further, prestige only provided a bi-state 
analytical lens of a widely more complex and internationalized spaceflight narrative. American 
interest in the international legal precedence of overflight remained a critical issue on the 
Eisenhower administration’s agenda.  
The Soviet launch of Sputnik alarmed the American public while the President and 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles kept a calm demeanor as Eisenhower’s second 
course for freedom of space materialized. The Soviet launch lent President Eisenhower the 
leverage he needed for subsequent satellite-based cartography. For Eisenhower and achievement 
of freedom of space access, it was an absolution. The Soviets and Sputnik prima facie resolved 
the issue of freedom of space. Soviet satellites crossed international boundaries without 
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diplomatic protest, thus the Soviets unintentionally provided the means for Eisenhower to press 
ahead with the launching of reconnaissance satellites.31 Sputnik provided the US the precedence 
it needed to pursue applications satellites for observance while the US continued to seek formal 
legality through the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Quarles summed up 
the positive suggesting the “Russians have in fact done us a good turn,” establishing freedom of 
space.32 
 
Observing Earth from Space  
The U.S. continued to pursue stronger national security in 1959 as they had in 1941. 
Eisenhower realized that Soviet military might prove more powerful and unpredictable than 
anticipated; he therefore mobilized American resources to prevent another first strike disaster 
like Pearl Harbor.33 His administration along with the CIA and DoD expanded the 
reconnaissance program beyond that of the precarious U-2 program. Thus, the US government 
began to invest in a system capable of capturing photographic intelligence from space over the 
next thirteen years. The highly classified satellite reconnaissance program, run by the CIA and 
operated by the USAF, became known as CORONA. 
In 1959, earth scientists and CIA officials converged on a top secret military mapping 
project. Corona addressed the “emerging importance of strategic intelligence to national security 
policy” while making “contributions to advancing space technology.”34 The Corona project, a 
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classified program, was devised to monitor Soviet and Chinese military movement via strategic 
reconnaissance satellites with CIA and DoD funding. The USAF launched and recovered 
satellites while the National Reconnaissance Office, established in 1961 as a top secret covert 
agency, managed reconnaissance and interpreted data. Essentially, the USAF carried out 
operations, while the DoD, CIA, and NRO formed the user community. The project came under 
a similar management regime as the U-2, under the CIA and USAF. Eisenhower placed Corona 
directly under Richard Bissell at the CIA who “formed a close, high-level, informal working 
partnership”35 with Undersecretary of the Air Force Joseph Charyk. Project Corona however, 
provided more continuous data without risk to American pilots as U-2 had. Corona utilized low 
Earth orbit satellites with 60cm focal length cameras which produced high resolution (about 2 
meters) grayscale imagery. This project grew out of cartographic specialty and CIA-industry 
linkages. The CIA signed contracts with Lockheed, Eastman Kodak and Itek Corporation 
(formerly part of Boston University) to research and develop cameras and sensors. One such 
employee of Eastman Kodak, Donald L. Light, who also had experience with the US Army Map 
Service and the United States Geological Survey (USGS), assisted with “topographic 
information systems based on co-registered geodetically-rectified image pixels derived from 
photography.”36 Essentially Light’s work improved the interpretation of imagery without 
revealing the source of the photography. If CORONA photographs fell into the hands of 
America’s Cold War rivals, they would reveal little detail about the capabilities of Corona’s 
cameras without sacrificing Americans’ ability to conduct photointerpretation. Thus, while Light 
assisted the military with cartographic literacy, he masked the devices that captured the data. 
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John Cloud described the Corona program as one in which earth scientists and others converged 
to not only provide an alternative to aerial photography gathered from U-2 flights but also to 
address the prospect of nuclear war defense, and one that “eroded the nominal separations 
between the ‘civilian’ and ‘classified realms of American government and science.”37 Cloud 
essentially argued that civilians played a crucial role in a highly classified, military funded 
program. 
Further many participants in the Corona program had military experience. I suggest that 
the erosion of nominal separations suggested by Cloud is a moot point given the nature of the 
Corona program. The military and military officials not only maintained the program but 
segregated its governance from other federal outfits. Corona’s user community, however, 
included civilian sector individuals but their functions benefitted the military, even when the 
NRO began absorbing CIA duties. The military handled many of Corona’s operations as well. 
 The military handled delivery via Thor-Delta rockets and recovery of capsules 
containing photographic data via USAF cargo planes or Navy vessels in the Pacific. The data 
returned to Earth in a capsule which detached from the platform in Earth orbit, deployed a 
parachute, and was recovered by the military, then shipped to the civilian mapping interpretation 
centers on the East Coast. The interpreters were well-trained geodesists (mapping based on 
ground surveys) and photogrammetrists (mapping based on aerial photographs). These 
interpreters, many having formal training in geography and mathematics, cognitively processed 
the data. The CIA trained interpreters to visually read Corona photographs and identify locations 
of interest. For example, interpreters learned to distinguish Soviet and Chinese missile sites or 
tank depots from the surrounding environment. Day et al.’s work recounted the work of four 
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such interpreters whose job was essentially to “put the cross hairs on the target.”38 Their work 
led to the identification of Soviet military installations which would potentially be strike points 
for American ICBMs and aircraft. These interpreters developed innovative cartographic-
interpretive techniques that contributed to geodesy and photogrammetry laying the foundation 
for global mapping datums. Corona data tied together continental-scaled datums across ocean 
basins while resolving sea-level undulation, that is, the mathematical process using a form of 
least squares regression to determine the mean elevation of the Earth’s surface.39 These 
cartographic developments improved missile guidance and strategic targeting through the 
creation of coordinate systems layered over the Earth’s surface. Further, the Corona imagery 
provided to the Eisenhower administration and intelligence community allowed him to deny a 
‘missile gap’ and better gauge Soviet military capability. 
Succeeding presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon likewise used Corona data to 
“assess and defuse a variety of dangerous situations” such as the Chinese nuclear detonation at 
Lop Nur and enforce arms limitations treaties.40 Dwayne Day et. al hailed Corona as the program 
that “helped keep peace in the nuclear age” and “a triumph of American technology.”41 The U.S. 
government strictly controlled the clandestine Corona program and its technological capability as 
a military reconnaissance program with clear operators (military) and users 
(military/intelligence) in the political context of Cold War national security. The Corona 
program successfully flew throughout the 1960s and came to a formal end in 1972. At that time, 
merely by coincidence, space-based Earth observation became a civilian enterprise after the 
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launch of Earth Resources Technology Satellite-A (ERTS). We see then that a varied set of 





Chapter 1: Launching Landsat 
 
Situating Landsat 
This thesis contributes to the fields of history of science and technology and to space 
history and federal history in particular. Also, I situate Landsat within America’s Cold War 
struggle for global supremacy which positioned science and technology as state instruments. 
This thesis contributes to history of technology as I consider how governance structures and 
policies affect how technologies are used.  My study of Landsat contributes to space history, 
particularly studies of NASA and its applications satellites in the international domain, by 
contributing a new analysis of Landsat that extends from its prelaunch years into the 
understudied 1990s and 2000s. In addition to the Cold War, I characterize Landsat’s historical 
moment as one of political transformation given the federal government’s efforts to cut federal 
spending and invigorate the economy during the 1980s. By the 1990s, NASA entered an era in 
which it focused on cheaper, more focused missions. Throughout the dissertation, I trace how the 
use of Landsat changes over time, drawing from literature in history of technology. 
The history of technology has concerned itself strongly with studies of innovations and 
inventions. Yet Ruth Schwartz Cowan moved the field towards users of technology. Cowan’s 
work, using a largely feminist lens, demonstrates how the interaction of users and technologies 
produced unintended consequences.42 Cowan argues that focusing on the user and ensuing 
unintended consequences produced by use highlights the successes and failures of a particular 
technology.43 She also introduced the ‘consumption junction’ in which users choose among 
technologies in a market. For Cowan, this notion is “the place and time at which the consumer 
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makes choices between competing technologies,” suggesting the user is also a consumer.44 Both 
of these notions are useful in that this thesis seeks to argue how many uses of Landsat emerged 
and a number of unintended consequences did as well such as national security concerns over 
data misuse, international backlash over economic espionage, and a skeptical user base. By the 
mid-1980’s, Landsat commercialization and foreign competitors created a market in which users 
chose among remote sensing products forming a consumption junction in which Landsat was no 
longer the sole civilian Earth observation apparatus.  
David Edgerton critiqued the innovation/invention trend first by considering how 
innovative technologies such as bicycles, automobiles, and aviation were used, rather than 
invented. Secondly he proposed ten theses to draw the field’s attention towards how technologies 
are used.45 His ten theses argue that technology-in-use generates a better understanding of the 
relations between technology and society and that “we should not conflate the history of 
invention and innovation with the history of technology.”46 Edgerton argues that innovation has 
a narrower geography and chronology than does a use-based approach. Innovation and invention 
is spatially confined to where the research and development takes shape, namely within the 
nation-state. He demonstrates how use has international components since technology transfers, 
indeed flows, across borders. A technology-in-use framework “can be genuinely global. It 
includes all places that use technology, not just the small number of places where invention and 
innovation is concentrated.”47 In Shock of the Old, Edgerton considers how technology transfer 
facilitated the use of various technologies, namely the rickshaw, the sewing machine, the bicycle, 
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among several others. In essence, innovation-based history is far more limited than is use-based 
history. Sociologists of technology also addressed technology in use. Nellie Oudshoorn and 
Trevor Pinch gave definition to the user-technology relationship as one that is subject to co-
construction since “users of technologies do not arrive de novo.” 48 Thus, it is vital to resolve and 
define the contours of the user-technology interface. For the purposes of my research, users are 
social and political actors who employ Landsat data during scientific projects to produce new 
truths about the Earth’s terrestrial environment.  
As self-conscious user groups, users are generally associated with a U.S. government 
agency, university or research institution, foreign government, or a private industry. Individually, 
users commonly have a university education ranging across many disciplines, typically in 
agriculture, engineering, physics, or the earth sciences49. Also, there are two other classes of 
actors who facilitate co-construction: designers and policymakers. Designers are those actors 
who recommend specifications, design and build the Landsat satellites, and place them into orbit. 
A majority of the actors in this class are associated with NASA and its contractors but also the 
USDA and the USGS. Policymakers are those that enable or impede the transfer of Landsat data 
from NASA and USGS -governed data reception centers to users. This class is generally actors 
working for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the State 
Department, NASA administration, Congress, the White House, and to a lesser extent, the DoD 
and CIA. Some actors cross these boundaries given the various bureaus within the executive 
departments and the expertise of certain individuals enables them to design, use, and/or dictate 
policy. Furthermore, Oudshoorn and her collaborators recall that “there is no one correct use for 
a technology,” but rather that a single scientific or technological practice can have myriad users 
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interested in it.50 Landsat and the imagery it produces is no exception. NASA policy as well as 
political rhetoric toward Landsat framed the satellite and its data as a scientific instrument for the 
benefit of humanity. Thus, this thesis takes an interest in the changing relationship between 
Landsat designers, civil remote sensing policymakers, and Landsat data users, both domestic and 
international. It is also interested in the changing nature of Landsat use and it argues that use 
broadened from agricultural purposes to a wide range of environmental applications in which 
many user communities employ Landsat imagery in their investigations. 
For this thesis, communities are groupings of users within a state while users are 
individuals or singular agencies which employ the terrestrial cartographic data produced by 
Landsat to carry out scientific investigations which produce new knowledge of the Earth. A 
singular individual or agency such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture denotes a user while a 
community of users denotes a consortium of users which employ Landsat for a number of 
scientific investigations. The Department of Agriculture as well as the Laboratory for 
Agricultural Remote Sensing at Purdue University (LARS) and NASA’s Johnson Spaceflight 
Center is a user community, all of which took part in agricultural experimentation with Landsat 
technology. Similarly, a community extends internationally, as this thesis will demonstrate the 
participation of foreign Landsat users in a community of investigators. Subsequent examples 
include the Canadian Centre for Remote Sensing’s participation in Landsat data collection, the 
process by which China acquired a Landsat ground receiving station, and African participation in 
remote sensing. 
My study of Landsat contributes to space history as well, which is a subdiscipline that 
draws strongly from themes in history of science and technology and is characterized by the 
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Cold War. Akin to history of technology, space history has focused strongly on the innovative 
aspects of spaceflight, rocketry, and instrumentation. From an institutional perspective, space 
history strongly focuses on studies of NASA.51 Moreover, NASA projects such as the Apollo 
program and the Space Transportation System (more commonly known as the Space Shuttle) 
have received considerable attention.52 The space sciences and astronomy have also been 
explored in space history.53 In addition to human spaceflight and the space sciences, space 
history also includes a growing literature that focuses on applications satellites, which refers to 
uncrewed spacecraft that gather, downlink, and relay information to Earth. These systems 
include communications satellites, navigation, global positioning, and Earth observation.54 Earth 
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observation satellites include both military and civilian satellites that collect imagery of the 
terrestrial surface, oceans, and weather through remote sensing or photography. Remote sensing, 
a term which carries a civilian scientific connotation, refers to the gathering and processing of 
scientific data using a device that is not in physical contact with the object or objects under 
investigation.55 Earth observation for military and intelligence purposes is usually represented by 
the term reconnaissance which is addressed in the following sections in greater detail as it forms 
the backdrop of Landsat’s origins. 
 This dissertation focuses on the civilian Earth remote sensing satellite Landsat, which 
primarily gathers imagery of the Earth’s terrestrial surface. I situate Landsat’s history within the 
wider literature on the history of Earth observation beset within the context of the Cold War. My 
thesis on Landsat compliments and contributes to space history in several ways. First, it adds a 
new analysis of applications satellites both in a domestic and international domain and considers 
their legality and uses by an international user community. This dissertation is a contribution to 
studies of NASA that analyzes its role in Earth science missions and adds to space history by 
considering the participation of federal agencies such as USDA, USGS, and NOAA, who are not 
traditionally associated with spaceflight. Also, this thesis analyzes how data gathered by a 
spacecraft is used by a user community and how that use is guided by policy. Moreover, I 
present here the four different eras of Landsat history that consider both the domestic and 
international domains by contributing a new analysis of Landsat that extends from its prelaunch 
years into the understudied 1990s and 2000s. 
 
A Brief Historiography of Landsat 
                                                          
55 This definition is derived in part from the one used by the American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote 
Sensing, see: https://www.asprs.org/organization/what-is-asprs.html, date accessed: 5 September 2016 
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On 23 July 1972, NASA launched ERTS-A (the satellite series was renamed Landsat 
later in 1975 and henceforth referred to as Landsat) into a sun-synchronous orbit and became the 
first of its kind; a satellite used for mapping that produced data available to the public.56 The first 
three Landsat satellites (Landsat-1, 2, and 3) carried an operational Return Beam Vidicon (RBV) 
and an experimental Multispectral Scanner (MSS) which scanned the Earth’s terrestrial surface 
and returned the data to ground based signals receiving stations, or simply ground stations. 
However, the construction and operation of the satellites became deeply politically contentious. 
Pamela Mack’s work on Landsat addressed the experimental stage of the program and how 
Landsat became a product of bureaucratic politics because NASA failed to effectively market 
Landsat’s capabilities to an already suspicious market. NASA was neither motivated to develop a 
commercially viable system nor was it fully vested in training users to utilize Landsat data. Mack 
draws upon the social construction of technology perspective to demonstrate how “a community 
of interested individuals and organizations negotiates a definition of the character and goals of 
the new technology.”57 The various agencies involved with Landsat, including NASA, the 
USDA, Defense (DoD), and the DOI and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) often 
disagreed over the technical specifications to be implemented on Landsat. NASA failed to 
effectively convince potential users in universities, industry, state and local governance, as well 
as abroad. In essence, Mack depicts a program predicated upon development and 
experimentation hoping to achieve routine use but ultimately falls short of expectations due to 
bureaucratic contention, confusion, and an uncommitted user base. Pamela Mack’s work is 
                                                          
56 NASA launched ERTS-A and ERTS-B, which will be referred to as Landsat-1 and Landsat-2 respectively. When 
a satellite number is not specified, I am referring to Landsat as a program. 




definitive and convincing in this light yet focuses too strongly upon NASA’s efforts to build a 
user community and difficulties building the scanning devices. 
I depart from and build off of Mack in several key ways. I depart from Mack’s social 
constructivist framework and instead analyze Landsat through recent scholarship on technology-
in-use, to be discussed below. Also, I demonstrate how policy changes over time expanded and 
constricted Landsat data use over time. I also depart from Mack’s argument that NASA failed to 
convince potential users of Landsat’s value. Rather, NASA built partnerships with federal 
agencies and other countries to foster a domestic and international user community. Lastly, 
whereas Mack focused on the construction of the Landsat satellites and scanning devices, I 
emphasize the effect of policy change on Landsat data use. My work complements Mack’s work 
by building off her work on the history of Landsat’s agricultural applications and its use abroad. 
Also, I address the period of commercialization and post-commercialization with newly available 
sources since Mack published Viewing the Earth. Since Mack’s book, several dissertations and 
master’s theses also addressed Landsat’s history.  
Donald T. Lauer completed his dissertation, “An Evaluation of National Policies 
Governing the United States Civilian Satellite Land Remote Sensing Program,” at University of 
California, Santa Barbara’s Department of Geography in 1990. His work identified several 
critical policy gaps in the American space remote sensing program and offered four options 
intended to improve the program such as commercialization, public/private partnership, 
amalgamating military and civilian programs, and accelerated international cooperation. He 
concludes that for America to sustain its technical remote sensing leadership, a single agency 
should manage the Landsat program, that it should cooperate internationally, and eventually 
commercialize the remote sensing system in order to build and sustain a successful civil remote 
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sensing program. Gerald B. Thomas’s dissertation from 1998, “Analyzing Environmental Policy 
Change: U.S. Landsat Policy, 1964-1998,” at Colorado State University’s Department of 
Political Science uses the Advocacy Coalition Framework to analyze policy changes in the 
Landsat program. Thomas emphasizes the influence of policy conflicts, policy learning, and 
political events on policy changes through ACF. More recently, Kenneth Thompson’s 
dissertation completed at Virginia Tech’s Department of Science and Technology Studies in 
2007 is a political history of commercial remote sensing. He addresses knowledge voids in the 
policy making process from 1984 to 2007. James Allen and Shanaka De Silva published a brief 
overview of Landsat’s history in a 2005 edition of Quest which outlines and highlights 
significant moments in the program. Catherine Rayner provides an international perspective 
having completed an M.Phil. thesis at Australian National University on a history of remote 
sensing in Australia from 1971 to 1989. She focuses on the role of Landsat in developing 
Australian capabilities in remote sensing. In NASA in the World, Ashok Maharaj recounts Indian 
efforts to utilize and eventually launch the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite as both a 
modernizing and internationally cooperative effort. Rayner and Maharaj’s contributions offer 
non-American analyses of Landsat’s use abroad. Also of relevance, Rebecca Johnson’s What It 
Took: A History of the USGS EROS Data Center demonstrates the history of the United States 
Geological Survey Earth Resources Observation and Science Center (EROS) in Sioux Falls, 
South Dakota where Landsat data is processed and made available to users. My dissertation 
draws from and contributes to this growing body of literature. Moreover, I situate Landsat within 
a wider historical literature that addresses the uses of air and space borne cartographic imagery 




Major Actors in Landsat History 
 There are many individual actors throughout Landsat’s 40-plus year history across the 
federal government, private sector, and among the elected officials who played a part in 
legislation and those who use Landsat imagery. While there are many significant individual 
officials from the Landsat program highlighted here, this dissertation largely focuses on the 
institutions that shaped Landsat’s complex political and policy history. Within the federal 
government, the primary actors are NASA, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
USGS and its parent agency, the DOI. These agencies played a central role in the 
experimentation, management, and operations of the Landsat satellites. 
 NASA is a very large independent agency of the U.S. federal government with 
laboratories, flight centers, and management outfits spread across the United States and satellite 
communication centers around the world. Its mission is to conduct research and development in 
the areas of space science, aeronautics, astronautics, Earth science, and human spaceflight, 
among others. Among NASA’s many offices and flight centers, the principal actors include 
NASA’s Headquarters in Washington, D.C., Goddard Spaceflight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland 
(GSFC), and the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas (JSC). NASA Headquarters is largely 
a managerial and decision making outfit which coordinated policies and policy making with 
other federal agencies. GSFC conducted research and development, built, and operated the 
Landsat satellites. JSC’s role was experimental and is documented in Chapter 2. When I refer to 
‘NASA,’ I am referring specifically to NASA Headquarters. NASA as an institution is a crucial 
actor throughout this dissertation. 
 USDA is also a very large executive agency of the U.S. federal government that played a 
critical role in Landsat’s history as a user and initially as a player in research and development. 
27 
 
Within USDA, there are several key offices and bureaus that conducted formative studies using 
Landsat imagery which is detailed in Chapter 2. 
 The USGS and DOI both played a crucial role in Landsat’s operational history. The idea 
of an earth resources satellite did not originate at NASA. Rather, the DOI took the space agency 
by surprise on 21 September 1966, when Secretary Stewart Udall announced the Earth Resources 
Observation Satellites program. The program, “aimed at gathering facts about the natural 
resources of the earth from earth-orbiting satellites carrying sophisticated remote sensing 
instruments,” would “provide data useful to civilian agencies of the Government such as the 
USDA who are concerned with many facets of our natural resources.”58 Even though NASA 
carried out a number of feasibility studies with USGS to explore the possibility of such a 
satellite, DOI “became impatient with NASA’s lack of progress toward defining a satellite 
system.”59 Despite the DOI’s lack of budgeting for a satellite program, or even experience with 
satellites, the political gambit captured NASA’s attention and the agencies began to work 
towards developing the first instruments flown on Landsat which is detailed in later chapters. 
 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and its parent agency 
the Department of Commerce (DOC) played a critical role in Landsat management. NOAA 
assumed managerial responsibility for Landsat in the late 1970s and DOC facilitated the transfer 
of Landsat from a publicly run experimental project to an operational program and later 
commercialized its operations. This process is closely detailed in Chapter 3. Each of these actors, 
NASA, USGS/Interior, NOAA/Commerce, and USDA played critical roles in the formation and 
trajectory of Landsat’s history. Several more federal government actors played more specialized 
roles in the shaping of the satellite program. 
                                                          
58 Department of the Interior Office of the Secretary news release, “Earth’s Resources to be Studied From Space,” 
21 September 1966, courtesy of Raymond Byrnes, US Geological Survey, Reston, Va., 14 January 2015 
59 Pamela Mack, Viewing the Earth, (MIT Press, 1990), pg. 58 
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Other agencies enter Landsat’s history and play more specialized roles which are detailed 
later in this dissertation. In particular, the Department of State and the DoD play regulatory roles 
with regards to the development of Landsat’s use aboard and its capabilities. DoD also became 
one of the largest users of Landsat imagery for defense mapping. Similar to DoD, the 
intelligence community, in particular the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National 
Reconnaissance Office, and National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, become significant users 
of Landsat imagery for intelligence gathering and often played an advisory role with regards to 
Landsat’s instrument capabilities. As I will detail in Chapter 2, USAID partnered with NASA to 
assist with the expansion of Landsat data use in the developing world. Lastly, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) also plays a budgetary role in Chapter 3 during the process of 
Landsat commercialization. Each of these agencies impacted Landsat’s history in different ways, 
but so too did a number of private sector firms and universities, in several cases via government 
contracting, who are also profiled in this dissertation at various points in the program’s history. 
As such, I argue there are different episodes of Landsat history, which I broadly define into four 
periods, described below. 
 
Eras of Landsat History 
The genesis of Landsat began in the mid-1960s when NASA and the USDA began 
experimenting with multispectral scanning technology to be placed aboard an orbiting satellite, 
however, the various techniques and methods for gathering and interpreting land imagery were 
developed in the 1950s. Landsat’s history spans nearly five decades and during that time, several 
government agencies and private companies conducted Landsat’s various technical and 
managerial operations. Also, there have been eight launches in the Landsat series including one 
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failure; Figure 1 below details each satellite’s sensor array and operational years. Many of the 
satellites’ operational years overlap and therefore it is less useful to divide Landsat’s history 
alongside the satellites themselves, but rather upon the regimes that operated them as dictated by 
policy. Thus I employ turning points, defined by Roger Launius as “an event or set of events 
that, had it not happened as it did, would have prompted a different course in history…and are 
representative of the dominant culture in which they are situated,” to distinguish Landsat’s eras 
apart from each other.60  
While the satellites produced more data at higher quality over time, several key turning 
points characterized by policy changes in the form of Presidential decision making and 
Congressional legislation in Landsat history significantly altered the ways in which the federal 
government and its commercial contractor distributed data. Thus, these turning points serve as 
organizing moments for this dissertation but also, I propose, more broadly for understanding the 
trajectory of Landsat’s history.  
 The first era, the Pre-Launch Years ranged from 21 September 1966 to 29 July 1972. 
During this time, NASA and its partners developed and built the first scanners to be placed 
aboard the experimental satellites. After months of discussion between Secretary of the Interior 
Stewart Udall and his USGS Director Dr. William Pecora and his colleagues, Udall’s Office 
published a news release announcing the Earth Resources Observation Satellites, “a program 
aimed at gathering facts about the natural resources of the earth from earth-orbiting satellites 
carrying sophisticated remote sensing observation instruments.”61 It was a bold political gambit 
by DOI since the agency had no experience with operating satellites nor did it have funding to do 
                                                          
60 Roger Launius, “What Are Turning Points in History, And What Were They for the Space Age?” in Steven J. 
Dick and Roger Launius, eds., Societal Impact of Spaceflight, (NASA History Office, 2007) 
61 News Release, Department of the Interior Office of the Secretary, “Earth’s Resources to be Studied from Space,” 
21 September 1966, courtesy Raymond Byrnes, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, VA 
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so but the seemingly untimely news release reflected very strong support from DOI for a civilian 
Earth observation satellite program. The announcement amounted to no more than a “total bluff” 
to twist NASA’s arm into cooperating in the project.62 NASA, DOI, and USDA, began a series 
of experiments to develop and test the scanners placed aboard the first three Landsat satellites. 
NASA launched Landsat-1 on 29 July 1972 from Vandenburg Air Force Base in California. The 
following chapter addresses this era. 
 I entitled the second era the Experimental Years which range from July 1972 until 
November 1979. The Landsat satellites were flown and operated by the U.S. federal government 
exclusively as an experiment of NASA with the USGS archiving the data. In particular, the 
multispectral scanning sensors aboard the Landsat 1, 2, and 3 satellites were experimental in 
nature, hence the name of the era. This era is characterized by NASA sponsorship of and 
participation in numerous experiments utilizing Landsat data to monitor natural resources, 
understand hydrological and geological processes, and improve cartographic capabilities. NASA 
partnered with U.S. government agencies to facilitate international usage of Landsat data through 
grant programs. In addition, NASA negotiated with the UN to legitimize Landsat as a beneficent 
program as well as foreign space agencies to build ground stations abroad to directly receive 
Landsat data from the satellites. During this era, the U.S. government, prompted by President 
Nixon, adopted a policy requiring non-discriminatory data access to all potential users, foreign 
and domestic. Accordingly, NASA and its partners attempted to make Landsat data widely 
available but experienced many difficulties which is covered in Chapter 3. In November 1979, 
the Landsat program underwent significant changes. President Carter released NSC-54 which 
                                                          
62 Rebecca L. Johnson, What It Took: A History of the USGS EROS Data Center, (The Center for Western Studies, 
Augustana College, 1998), pg. 7 
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called for NOAA to assume Landsat operations and to eventually commercialize the program. I 
cover this era in Chapter 2.  
NOAA operation and later commercialization by contracting with EOSAT characterizes 
the Commercial Years, the third era of Landsat’s history which spans from November 1979 until 
October 1992. This era, covered in detail in Chapter 4, begins with three PD/NSC documents in 
which President Carter identified Landsat as an operational, rather than experimental, program. 
Thus, in November 1979, NOAA assumed a managerial role of Landsat. When President Reagan 
assumed office, he charged NOAA with finding a suitable commercial operator for not only land 
remote sensing, but the weather and ocean sensing satellites in orbit as well. In 1984, Congress 
passed the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act and the DOC awarded a commercial 
contract a year later in September 1985. The process proved long and fundamentally altered 
Landsat data availability since the Reagan Administration reneged on its commitment to 
subsidies for Landsat and EOSAT began to suffer from falling data sales. During the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, funding for Landsat ran out each fiscal year and it became apparent that Landsat 
commercialization had failed to foster an enterprise. Congress once again passed sweeping 
legislation in 1992 that withdrew the Landsat program from the private sector, though EOSAT 
continued to operate Landsat 5. 
 The final era, the Partnership Years, is distinguishable by the partnership that NASA and 
the USGS formed to manage the Landsat program in October 1992 and ensure data continuity 
which eventually came to fruition in 2008. Commercialization precipitated major budgetary and 
managerial issues that prompted the federal government to reassume control of Landsat. In 1992, 
Congress passed the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act and a joint USGS/NASA effort began to 
ensure data continuity. However, this did not necessarily mean new satellites in the Landsat 
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series. Landsat 6 was the last proposed satellite which EOSAT built and launched in late 1993. 
However, due to a hydrazine manifold rupture, the doomed satellite crashed into the Indian 
Ocean. By 2008, DOI announced its decision to make Landsat data free of charge and open to all 
potential users. I argue this monumental policy change was both originally conceived in a speech 
by President Nixon to the UN General Assembly and represented the scientific value of Landsat 
data due to its wide range of uses developed over its forty-year history. 
My dissertation addresses each of these eras with particular attention to how federal 
government policy changes affected data continuity and accessibility. These four eras of Landsat 
history informed how I chose to organize this dissertation, described further below. Given the 
broad coverage of Landsat’s history and its various agencies, I utilize a mixed methodology. 
 
Methodology 
 My dissertation draws from each of these scholarly perspectives on the Landsat program 
while also drawing heavily from several archival sources, government documentation, a few 
interviews, periodicals, the Congressional record, and web-based sources. 
 This dissertation is primarily built upon federal government agencies, whose records I 
gathered from several archives, government repositories, and agency headquarters. NASA 
Headquarters in Washington, DC houses the NASA Historical Reference Collection (NASA 
HRC) which is an archive of NASA technical reports, press releases, memoranda, Congressional 
documents, and policy documents, among other forms of records. I consulted their numerous 
record groups related to Landsat. 
I also consulted the National Archives and Record Administration (NARA) facilities in 
College Park, Maryland and Fort Worth, Texas for federal government agency records. Also 
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under the NARA umbrella are the presidential libraries of Lyndon Johnson, Gerald Ford, Jimmy 
Carter, and Ronald Reagan each of which provided perspectives from the White House on 
Landsat through memoranda, press releases, and meeting minutes. I visited the Jimmy Carter 
Presidential Library in Atlanta and requested records via mail from the other aforementioned 
libraries. These records informed the White House perspective on Landsat and the broader issues 
affecting the program. 
A major interest of Chapter 3 is to understand the international dimensions of Landsat 
imagery use. I utilized resourced from the UN Archives in New York City to understand the 
adoption of laws and policies that reflected the international community’s interest and opposition 
to Landsat and the imagery it produced. The documents there also provided me with a sense of 
how other interested countries made use of Landsat imagery. 
In order to better understand the scientific community and the applications of Landsat, I 
consulted the archives of the National Academies and National Research Council in Washington, 
D.C. The records located there strongly informed my understanding of the development of Earth 
remote sensing both scientifically and technically. Moreover, they were highly valuable in 
Chapter 2 discussing the applications of Landsat imagery to agriculture. 
In addition to NASA, I went to the USGS Headquarters in Reston, Virginia to obtain both 
public records and hold informal interviews with Landsat officials there. Raymond Byrnes, who 
worked at EROS, the Earth Observation Satellite Company (discussed later), and USGS 
Headquarters shared his wealth of institutional and technical knowledge with me. Byrnes also 
linked me with EROS where I later visited and gathered more public records and conducted 
informal interviews with Landsat officials. 
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I also used a few web-based repositories to draw Landsat-related records from. 
WikiLeaks, the George Washington University National Security Archive, and the National 
Technical Information Service each has records that related to various aspects of Landsat’s 
history that populate different sections of this dissertation. 
As a secondary method, I conducted informal interviews and discussions with several 
individuals who worked on different aspects of the Landsat program, either managerially or 
technically. Since Landsat remains an ongoing effort of NASA and USGS, many of these 
individuals were still active either with the federal government or private sector. During my 
aforementioned visit to USGS EROS, I spoke with several individuals there including John 
Faundeen, Thomas Holm, Eugene Fosnight, Kristi Kline, Steve Labahn, and Tom Loveland. 
Each of these people gave me exceptional insight into the managerial and technical history of the 
Landsat program from the USGS perspective. I also informally interviewed D. James Baker, 
former administrator of NOAA, for a higher level perspective on Landsat management from 
DOC and NOAA perspective. Similarly, I spoke with Jim Irons of GSFC and Darrel Williams, 
formerly of NASA as well for the NASA perspective. I am also indebted to James Zimmerman 
formerly of NASA, Raymond Byrnes of USGS Headquarters, and James David of the 
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum who shared their personal collection of public 
Landsat documents with me. John Faundeen and Thomas Holm of USGS EROS also shared 
many USGS public records and statistics with me. I appreciate the time and effort each of these 
individuals contributed to the completion of my research, the errors of course are my own. I used 
informal interviews, rather than formal interviews given the time constraints on many of these 
people. All of the aforementioned individuals are active in their careers. The combination of 
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primary, archival records with informal interviews, allowed me to gather the broad narrative of 
Landsat’s history while also understanding the technical and managerial nuances of the program. 
 
Landsat in Use: Technical Details 
When describing Landsat as a satellite program, I am referring to all actors involved with 
the research and development of instruments and applications, data reception, processing and 
dissemination, as well as program management. While actors come and go, the term Landsat 
program, refers to all those actors involved in those activities as well as in programmatic 
decision making. Generally, NASA, USGS, NOAA, and their private industry contractors 
comprised the Landsat program. Some of these activities were muted at times, such as research 
and development or building a new satellite, but since 1972, there was consistent data gathering, 
reception, and dissemination. Prior to 1972, there was a significant amount of experimentation 
and research and development on Landsat instrumentation that became vital to the satellite later. 
As mentioned, this dissertation is focused on the politics and policies of Landsat and its 
use, however, the various technical details of Landsat shape the types of data available to users 
and require at least brief discussion here. A distinctly technical history of Landsat is outside the 
scope of this dissertation.63 However, there are a number of technical details worth presenting to 
the reader for context and clarity such as Landsat’s various instruments and their capabilities, 
satellite operations, and data applications. 
                                                          
63 Pamela Mack’s Viewing the Earth: The Social Construction of the Landsat Satellite System, (MIT Press, 1990) 
provides great detail regarding the construction of the Landsat sensors and processing systems. Also, a group of 
NASA civil servants are compiling a forthcoming technical history of Landsat entitled The Landsat Legacy Project. 
Other technical details of Landsat can be found at www.landsat.usgs.gov, www.landsat.gsfc.nasa.gov, and through 
the American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing’s journal Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote 
Sensing.   
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The Landsat satellites orbit the Earth in a sun-synchronous pattern, returning to the same 
point on the planet’s surface roughly every sixteen days achieving global coverage. Several types 
of sensors have flown since Landsat 1, including the multispectral scanner (MSS), return beam 
vidicon (RBV), thematic mapper (TM) and its more advanced iterations (TM, Enhanced TM, 
Enhanced TM Plus), the operational land imager (OLI), and the thermal infrared sensor (TIRS). 
These instruments capture light reflected from Earth across several bandwidths which enables 
users to analyze land cover characteristics and change otherwise undistinguishable to the human 
eye. As the Landsat satellites orbit and the instruments scan the Earth, data collects aboard the 
satellite’s recorder and gets downlinked to ground stations around the world or via the Tracking 
Data and Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). Ground stations collect data through antennae and 
TDRSS is a constellation of communications satellites capable of relaying data to Earth. Ground 
stations and TDRSS will be discussed in greater detail later. Once Landsat data reaches the 
ground, it is archived by the USGS’s Earth Resources Observation Science Data Center (EROS) 
located near Sioux Falls, South Dakota as well as ground stations around the world operated by 
USGS international cooperators such as the European Space Agency, the Brazilian National 
Institute for Space Research, the Canadian Centre for Mapping and Earth Observation, among 
many others. At centers such as these, raw Landsat data is digitally processed by computers and 
converted into digital imagery that can be acquired by users in digital or printed form. A value-
added industry emerged after Landsat’s launch offering data analysis services and tools that 
enhance Landsat data for specific applications. The following chart lists the evolving instrument 












Each of the Landsat satellites fly in a sun-synchronous orbit at an inclination of roughly 98 
degrees and an apogee/perigee median of just over 700 kilometers. The spacecraft fly north to 
south and circle the Earth in about 98 minutes. Within this orbital trajectory, a single Landsat 
spacecraft returns to a specific point on Earth every 16 days, since the Earth rotates below the 
satellite’s orbit. Thus, a single Landsat satellite gathers multispectral, infrared, and (on later 
platforms) hyperspectral data across the entirety of the Earth’s surface. This data is then 
downlinked to ground stations for processing, archiving and distribution. 
 
Defining Landsat data 
I define Landsat data as any imagery collected by any of the seven Landsat satellites. The 
various instruments collected data across several spectra at resolutions of roughly 30 meters with 
a land cover of 185 square kilometers per image. Not all data is particularly useful due to 
atmospheric disruption, cloud cover, and technical difficulties but nonetheless millions of 
Landsat images became available. Given the spectral coverage, large land area, and resolution of 
Landsat, its data became very widely used by government, industry, and academia alike due to 
Satellite Sensors Sensor Manufacturer Operations 
Landsat 1 MSS, RBV GE Space Division 1972-1978 
Landsat 2 MSS, RBV GE Space Division 1975-1983 
Landsat 3 MSS, RBV GE Astrospace 1978-1983 
Landsat 4/D MSS, TM Fairchild 1982-1993 
Landsat 5 MSS, TM GE Astrospace, Hughes 1984-2013 
Landsat 6 ETM Hughes 1993* Failed 
Landsat 7 ETM+ Hughes 1999-Present 
Landsat 8 OLI, TIRS Ball Aero, NASA 2013-Present 
38 
 
its vast array of applications. The chart below depicts several broad categories of applications 
that Landsat data supports as defined by USGS. 
Table 2: Primary Applications of Landsat Imagery 
Table is drawn from “Users, Uses, and Value of Landsat Satellite Imagery- Results from the 2012 Survey of Users,” 2013, 
U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, VA, https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1269/pdf/of2013-1269.pdf 
 
In 2013, USGS surveyed 11,190 Landsat data users to understand how the imagery was used.64 
They utilized these nine categories, selected for the purpose of USGS’s analysis, incorporated 
numerous individual applications. For example, the environmental sciences category included 
applications such as climate science, ecosystem management, wildlife science, and geology, 
among others. Other categories were more specific such as education, which includes 
applications such as using Landsat imagery for instructional purposes, and agriculture, for 
purposes such as crop forecasting which I dedicate a chapter to in this dissertation. Human needs 
                                                          
64 Holly Miller, Leslie Richardson, Stephen R. Koontz, John Loomis, and Lynne Koontz, “Users, Uses, and Value of 
Landsat Satellite Imagery- Results from the 2012 Survey of Users,” 2013, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, VA, 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1269/pdf/of2013-1269.pdf, date accessed: 6 September 2016 
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included emergency and disaster relief and legal/security refers to purposes of defense and 
national security as well as environmental law and regulation enforcement. Energy refers to users 
who prospect for oil, natural gas, and minerals. Services and goods include culture resource 
management, real estate, and Landsat imagery use in software development. The bar graph above 
shows that among the 11,190 Landsat user respondents, nearly 50% of them stated 
environmental sciences was the primary application of Landsat imagery in their particular 
investigations.  
How Users Acquire Data 
 Users had to acquire their data first from NASA through Goddard Spaceflight Center in 
Greenbelt, Maryland (GSFC). For NASA, “users are defined to be either individual investigators 
or agencies which have been approved by the NASA/ERTS Project Office for receipt of ERTS 
data.”65 GSFC housed a User Services Section at the Data Processing Facility (NDPF). For 
Landsats 1, 2, and 3, users could acquire data in one of two ways from the facility. A user 
requested data by mail or telephone from the NDPF and placed a standing order and/or a data 
request. NDPF designed the standing order as a way for users to request data that did not yet 
exist. The facility would notify a user when a particular requested scene had been scanned by 
Landsat and would ship it. NDPF shipped orders immediately for data requests of imagery 
already processed. Users had to specify particular longitudes and latitudes, a maximum 
percentage of cloud cover, quantity of images, which spectral bands as well as resolution, tone, 
and granularity specifications. These specifications were imperative since each image was, 
drawn from the archive, uniquely processed, and prepared for the user. Once NDPF received 
these specifications for a scene, they could process the order and then the requested data and 
                                                          
65 “NASA Earth Resources Technology Satellite Data User Handbook,” 17 November 1972, courtesy of Mr. 
Raymond Byrnes, USGS, Reston, VA., pg. 4-1 
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finally provide the user with Landsat data. NASA and later USGS provided a catalog as well as 
the “Landsat Data User Notes” series for users to specify which data would be best for their 
particular investigation. In addition, these periodicals kept users apprised of new data products as 
Landsat 1, 2, and 3 data amassed in the data archive at GSFC. NDPF’s role processing and 
distributing data was short-lived however, as the USGS readied a more capable and robust 
facility in South Dakota.  
Data processing and distribution moved to southeastern South Dakota where the DOI 
assumed the operation. The USGS established the Center for EROS, based in Sioux Falls to 
receive, process, and distribute Landsat imagery in 1971 and construction completed in 1973. In 
addition, EROS began to maintain a data archive on its campus where it collected all Landsat 
data. The facility also became a repository for aerial photography, cartographic resources, 
scientific data from other Earth observation satellites, declassified DoD and CIA reconnaissance 
imagery and the like. There were two types of products initially available to users. NDPF and 
EROS processed data into printouts of maps, also called scenes. Users could also acquire 
computer compatible tapes which contained the digitally corrected data requested by users and 
could be analyzed using computer software. The types of products and how they were priced is 
covered in detail in the following chapter. NDPF and EROS were the central nodes of Landsat 
data distribution throughout the 1970s. Even as ground stations emerged around the world, none 
rivaled the data output of EROS in particular. These various applications and processes discussed 
above emerge throughout the history of Landsat, which is laid out in this dissertation in four 







 As mentioned, I describe four eras of Landsat history which are broadly captured in four 
chapters in this dissertation. As I argue, Landsat imagery and data use changed over time to 
include more applications and users, yet the laws and policies that governed the Landsat program 
did not necessarily facilitate this vision. The four eras reflect both this argument and the layout 
of the following four chapters of this dissertation. 
Chapter 1 traces the pre-launch years of Landsat into the experimental years describing 
how agricultural purposes, such as mapping and predicting crop yields, became the first major 
application of Landsat imagery. Many of the early instruments that eventually flew aboard the 
first three Landsats  
 Chapter 2 demonstrates how Landsat data use expanded both in the number of 
applications and to users abroad. However, Landsat and the data it produced was a contentious 
issue among the international community. Records from the UN Archive demonstrate that 
several key countries took issue with Landsat since it potentially compromised that particular 
country’s sovereignty. Many more states supported the use of Landsat data for its environmental 
applications and ordered data sets from NASA and USGS. As this legal contest played out in 
New York, NASA and USGS grew Landsat’s international presence through ground stations, 
technical seminars, and aid packages. NASA and USGS expanded Landsat data use through 
agreements with several countries that downlinked imagery directly to foreign ground stations. 
However, exporting such technology was deeply contentious among several agencies in the U.S. 
federal government. I demonstrate these difficulties through the case of the Chinese ground 
station that took years to build, as opposed to months in the case of Canada. With the help of 
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USAID and several contractors, NASA and USGS also sponsored training seminars via aid 
packages in several developing countries that facilitated broader use of Landsat data, specifically 
in Africa. This chapter demonstrates the constraints and difficulties of broadening Landsat data 
use in an international context. 
 Chapter 3 explains the domestic complexities of expanding Landsat data usage and 
narrates the third era of Landsat history when the program became a commercial entity. In 1978, 
President Carter brought the experimental years to a close and set the program on a trajectory 
towards commercialization. This chapter details this process and the consequences that befall the 
government, the contractors, and the satellite program itself. In this chapter, access to Landsat 
data effectively constricts due to the cost prohibitive pricing of Landsat imagery and sales 
precipitously drop. 
 Chapter 4 describes the process by which Landsat decommercializes and becomes a 
government operation once more. USGS assumed a larger role in Landsat operations and 
alongside NASA adopted a mission committed to ensuring data continuity. These agencies 
explored and adopted various means to expand Landsat imagery use. This chapter analyzes this 
effort which became known as the Landsat Data Continuity Mission manifest in several 
initiatives such as data acquisition agreements, Department of Defense participation, data 
repatriation, and the eventual launch of Landsat 7. As mentioned, the 2008 decision to remove 
prices on Landsat imagery greatly expanded Landsat data use. 
The concluding chapter reviews these chapters, evaluates the argument posed in this 
introduction, and offers an epilogue that covers the launch of Landsat 8, which occurred as I 
conducted research on this dissertation. I will also address the international aspects of Landsat 
data availability as well as their first significant applications to agriculture. This combination of 
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case studies provides broad coverage of Landsat’s history and addresses how use of the satellite 









 As early as the 1930s, the United States’ government began to explore ways in which it 
could increase agricultural output and predict those outcomes successfully through aerial 
photography, the forerunner to remote sensing. Pam Mack demonstrated that “Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration engineers and technicians made and updated maps of agricultural 
land use so that the federal government could regulate production and locate abandoned 
farmland in need of erosion control.” The Tennessee Valley Authority made use of aerial 
photographs to control flooding.66 By 1934, the practice of producing and analyzing aerial 
photographs became professionalized with the establishment of the academic journal 
Photogrammetric Engineering and the American Society of Photogrammetry was formed.67 
After the onset of the Cold War and the subsequent “space race,” the U.S. Government sought 
more advanced technology and methods for monitoring agriculture, both domestically and 
internationally. The NAS and National Research Council (NRC) sponsored studies of methods 
for improving what was then referred to as photo-interpretation through multispectral 
technology, the first experimental remote sensing of agriculture. Photointerpretation involved 
training an individual to identify land cover variables (such as water, vegetation types, urban 
structures, etc.) and distinguish them from each other, a process called classification. The Navy 
and University of California carried out these experiments in California, Oklahoma, North 
Dakota and a few others. NASA, Purdue University, and University of Michigan later developed 
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computers that could classify images automatically, in particular that could classify forms of 
vegetation from remotely sensed images of the American Midwest. NAS encouraged NASA and 
USDA to conduct research and development towards new technology capable of inventorying 
crops from the air using multispectral imaging technology by the 1960s as global food supplies 
hung in the balance. Agriculture became a critical arena of the Cold War as massive crop failures 
in the Soviet Union, India, the African Sahel, among others, characterized the decade. To 
policymakers in Washington, it became imperative not only to survey crop yields, but to predict 
them. NASA and USDA, and later the CIA, conducted a series of experiments to that end 
worldwide. From the 1950s through the 1970s, widespread agricultural failures resulted in 
famine and destabilized global markets. 
In this chapter, I trace the origins of remote sensing applications to agricultural 
experiments in the 1950s sponsored by the NAS, the Navy, and the University of California on 
instrumentation and development of interpretation techniques. In late 1966, DOI, USDA, and 
NASA began developing instruments for the Landsat platform and chose to test them in the 
Midwest over wheat and corn fields. Along with the University of Michigan they conducted a 
series of experiments designed to test these instruments and to monitor and eventually predict 
crop growth. In the 1970s, into the 1980s, NASA and USDA carried out two ambitious 
transnational crop yield prediction experiments. Simultaneously, the CIA used these experiments 
as a model for gathering economic intelligence in the 1970s and 1980s. Accordingly, remote 
sensing of agriculture evolved from a formative scientific experiment into a component of 
American national security. I argue that Landsat in particular became an instrument of America’s 
Cold War surveillance imperative to monitor global crop yields and bring greater legibility to the 
volatile global wheat market. Moreover, the Landsat program emerged from a perceived need to 
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understand, monitor, and manage Earth resources. Among the myriad applications of Landsat 
and the data it produced, agriculture became one of the most significant. This chapter further 
discusses how the U.S. government fostered use of Landsat, in this case through agricultural 
applications. In particular, continuous, routine multispectral scanning of crop fields enabled users 
to monitor crop growth and health over the course of a growing season and ultimately predict 
and forecast crop yields.  
 
Cold War Agriculture and the ‘Surveillance Imperative’ 
 Cold War scholarship has focused increasingly on the nexus of agriculture and 
technology by historians of technology and American foreign relations historians alike. Nick 
Cullather’s work demonstrates how food and technology became a critical front of Cold War 
diplomacy between the U.S. and developing states in the 20th century.68 He followed the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s efforts in Mexico and, more closely, India to innovate agricultural 
science for the development of high-yield varieties of wheat and rice which would ultimately halt 
the spread of famine. For American development policy makers in the 1950s and 1960s, this 
Malthusian-informed modernization theory contained communism by defeating hunger and 
poverty. The U.S. feared India’s largely peasant population would submit to communism as 
China did under similar conditions and sought to stifle communist revolution with a “Green 
Revolution.” Ron Doel and Kristine Harper address U.S.-India foreign policy similarly. They 
show how the U.S. secretly undertook Project Gromet, a military weather modification initiative 
meant to end the Bihar drought in 1966 and 1967. The military experiment required the seeding 
                                                          




of clouds with silver iodide to artificially stimulate rainfall.69 Biologist John Perkins argued that 
“wheat breeding was linked to national security planning and to the need for countries to manage 
their foreign exchange.”70 Among those countries were the U.S., Mexico, India, and Great 
Britain which he included as case studies. For the United States, wheat breeding became part of 
its Cold War effort to contain the Soviet Union through managing exports and foreign exchange 
whereas for the British wheat breeding was part of the transition to a post-imperial economy. 
India and Mexico sought greater autonomy from potential threats to its population. The literature 
demonstrates how agriculture became a significant theater of the American Cold War effort to 
contain communism, with particular attention to the Green Revolution in India.  
 This chapter moves beyond the Green Revolution to show how space technology became 
an instrument of American Cold War agricultural efforts. The launch of Sputnik led “chiefs of 
governments and their scientific advisers to envisage modern forms of global surveillance and 
helped to establish the geosciences in Cold War strategic planning.”71 Turchetti and Roberts et. 
al. demonstrated how Cold War sensibilities convinced the Cold War West to establish Earth 
observation detection systems after the IGY which “simultaneously demonstrated the power of 
the geosciences to understand the whole earth (and its environs) and showcased competition as 
well as cooperation between the superpowers.”72 
Landsat, the data produced, and the ground stations that emerged around the world 
became a global scientific surveillance program during the Cold War akin to those mentioned by 
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Turchetti and Roberts that came to benefit the United States. However, I depart from their work 
in a few ways. Foremost, I contend that agriculture, certainly as much as the geosciences, was an 
arena of Cold War surveillance by both the civilian scientific communities as well as the defense 
and intelligence community. In addition, where Turchetti and Roberts focus strongly on the 
sciences themselves, I sustain focus on agriculture as a science as well as the technology and 
techniques of surveillance. Further, I demonstrate how it was civilian scientists at universities, 
NASA, and USDA, rather than the military or intelligence community, which first conducted 
agricultural surveillance. The Army and Navy played a crucial role in funding and overseeing 
several early experiments, but it was NASA, USDA, and university scientists that led several key 
experiments. This chapter argues that it was remote sensing scientists whose experiments 
showcased the capabilities of multispectral scanning and of Landsat itself. Meanwhile, the 
intelligence community later came to value crop inventorying. 
In the early 1950s, the National Academy of Sciences encouraged the USDA and several 
universities to gain a greater understanding of crop inventorying capabilities. The outgrowth of 
interest in what became photo-interpretation of agriculture led to several major investigations 
that empowered America’s ability to monitor natural resources. This chapter describes how 
several federal government agencies and their contractors experimented with Landsat data to 
monitor and attempt to predict crop yields around the world. NASA, USDA, and their partners 
carried out a series of agricultural monitoring experiments to demonstrate Landsat’s capabilities 
from the late 1960s into the 1980s. During this period, the world food market became volatile as 
a result of numerous crop failures precipitating famines in Asia and Africa. I argue that in 1971, 
a major shift in the agricultural market precipitated by Soviet grain failures prompted the U.S. 
government to enroll Landsat data in its surveillance imperative. Shortly after Landsat’s launch, 
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NASA and USDA as well as CIA embarked on large scale agricultural monitoring programs 
using the satellite data. As Landsat came to fruition, agricultural surveying evolved from a 
scientific experiment into a surveillance imperative. This chapter broadens Turchetti and Roberts 
et. al.’s work on geosciences surveillance during the Cold War to also include agriculture in 
addition to extending Cold War agriculture scholarship into the 1970 and 1980s. 
 
National Academy Promotes Agricultural Applications, 1952-1961 
In the early 1950s, the NAS began to investigate crop monitoring capabilities and photo-
interpretation from aircraft. Several committees and subcommittees assumed this task including 
the NAS-NRC Agricultural Board Committee on Plant & Crop Ecology, which over saw the 
Subcommittee on Geography & Vegetation Analysis (Colwell Subcommittee) and the 
Subcommittee on Plant Diseases and Pests in 1952 through 1953. These committees became 
active sponsors of scientific research in photo-interpretation of crops.  
Dr. Robert N. Colwell, who chaired the Colwell Subcommittee, became a leading 
researcher in multispectral remote sensing research and its agricultural applications. A graduate 
of University of California Berkeley in Forestry, he went on to earn a Ph.D in plant physiology 
from University of California at Davis. Thereafter, he became a professor of forestry at UC 
Davis, and served as a silviculturalist with the USDA Forest Service at the UC Davis 
Agricultural Experiment Station. During World War II, Colwell served as an air combat 
intelligence officer, using aerial photography to map and help plan the Okinawa and Guadalcanal 
military campaigns.73 He returned to Berkeley to teach and research new applications for aerial 
photography and, later, remotely sensed satellite data. In mid-1952, the NAS’s Committee on 
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Plant & Crop Ecology sponsored a joint University of California-USDA-Department of the Navy 
study to “develop techniques for differentiating between diseased and healthy cereal crops on 
aerial photography.”74 Colwell played a major role conducting this research which took place in 
the Central Valley of California from April to September, 1953. The Navy allowed Colwell use 
of the Naval Air Station at Oakland which conducted twelve flights between April and June. In 
September, Colwell focused his investigation on cereal crop health near Davis. He and his 
associates at UC Davis inoculated crops with black stem rust and photographed the diseased 
crops from aircraft on September 1, 12, and 22 and again later in October. These flights flew up 
to 10,000 feet in altitude and carried an infrared filter camera and a black and white camera. 
While the black and white camera did not return useful data, the infrared camera successfully 
detected the diseased crops.75 Colwell also indicated that similar experiments in North Dakota 
and Oklahoma yielded similar results. In particular, the North Dakota experiment used a 
helicopter to photography crops at high quality from altitudes of 50 to 100 feet, even at oblique 
angles. 
Colwell’s experiments pleased both the NRC and the Navy. He had been funded by the 
Navy, Bureau of Standards, USDA, and to a small extent, by the National Research Council 
(NRC). Throughout 1953, Colwell reported to Everett Davis, the Executive Secretary of the 
Committee on Plant and Crop Ecology who relayed Colwell’s progress on to the Office of Naval 
Research and the newly formed USAF. Davis reported that Colwell’s work “will have far 
reaching applications from the standpoint of national defense as well as in establishing new tools 
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for the use of agronomists and plant pathologists.”76 The military had a significant presence 
throughout Colwell’s experiments beyond use of the Oakland Naval Station. At a 13 November 
1953 meeting in Maryland, Davis shared Colwell’s data for evaluation by the Army Navy, and 
Air Force, as well as USDA, the Weather Bureau, and the Smithsonian. One of the topics of the 
meeting was to discuss and evaluate “the classified nature of the photographic interpretation 
project”77 The Navy conducted the aforementioned North Dakota and Oklahoma experiments in 
order to “develop techniques for differentiating between diseased and healthy cereal crops on 
aerial photography…[which] would have very important military applications.”78 These 
experiments contributed to national defense and civilian science but also simultaneously inspired 
international collaboration.  
In December 1952, the USDA’s Division of Forest Economics requested “information on 
the possibilities of an exchange of information between Canadian and USA sources in the field 
of photo-interpretation of vegetation.”79 Everett Davis of the NRC proposed coordination of the 
USDA Forest Survey and the Canadian Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, the Joint 
Intelligence Bureau, and Department of Defence. Davis and the Forest Survey sought to assess 
Canadian efforts of unclassified photo-interpretation of crops from aerial photography including 
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geographic locations, resulting publications, and potential for research channels.80 The USDA 
among several other agencies put forth this request for exchange to the NAS Committee on Plant 
and Crop Ecology. They recognized the lack of knowledge of Canadian activities in crop photo-
interpretation which had been under way by several research outfits in Canada. Also, there was 
no international committee or singular governmental agency in either the U.S. or Canada that 
received communications or publications. There was no coordination of civil and defense 
interests either, with the lone exception of the Interservice Committee on Photo-Interpretation 
Research Keys and Techniques, headed by Colwell. This Interservice Committee gave “its 
attention chiefly to methodology and to the standardization of techniques, rather than to the kind 
of helpful coordination and survey requested of this Committee.”81 Thus, Davis reached out to 
the Canadians. 
In January 1953, Davis contacted a promising young British meteorologist, Dr. Kenneth 
Hare of McGill University’s Department of Geography. After earning his B.S. from King’s 
College London and serving with the British Air Ministry, Hare received a PhD from Université 
de Montréal and a professorship at McGill. While Hare was not actively involved with remote 
sensing, he was an ardent environmentalist that expressed enthusiasm for the technique as a 
method for understanding the planet’s surface. Hare and Davis both worked towards a scientific 
relationship between the U.S. and Canada in crop photo-interpretation. Davis hoped to “establish 
channels for the exchange of unpublished information in the field of photographic interpretation 
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of vegetation with several Canadian groups.”82 However, little came of the correspondence and 
while the relationship between the U.S. and Canada remained in its infancy, it would play a 
significant role in the advancement of agricultural remote sensing in the 1970s. The National 
Academies continued to play a role encouraging new agricultural remote sensing applications. 
 
Mitigating Losses from Above, 1959-1974 
 In 1959, the National Academies-NRC Agricultural Board Committee on Agricultural 
Pests recommended that the Board form a subcommittee that would foster research in using 
aerial photographic surveying to mitigate damage to crops caused by diseases, insects, and other 
flora. The NRC and Navy sponsored a 1956 study conducted by Colwell that successfully 
detected cereal rust. Cereal rust is a form of fungus that killed crops in the American Midwest, 
which is an issue I return to in this chapter. Colwell’s successful experiment encouraged the 
NRC to continue supporting and funding such research. The NRC sought to reduce crop losses 
using aerial surveys and set up a subcommittee headed by J.R. Shay, a plant pathologist at 
Purdue University. The Aerial Surveys Subcommittee included members from academia such as 
Colwell, industry, and the defense community. One of the members, Dr. Marvin Holter, Head of 
the Sensory Device section at University of Michigan’s Willow Run Laboratories would play an 
important role developing multispectral scanning devices later used on Landsat. His research in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s focused on the “use of the longer wavelength infrared rays in non-
military applications of aerial detection.”83 With members able to speak to advances in industry, 
defense, and academia, the Executive Committee of the Agricultural Board (Ag Board) formed 
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the subcommittee in December 1960 with Colwell, Shay, and Holter as members to “develop 
plans for strictly exploratory studies to determine the possible usefulness, as well as limitations, 
of aerial survey for identifying and evaluating damage to crops caused by diseases, insects, 
nemas, weeds, and nutritional and topic conditions.”84 
 Quickly, it became apparent to the Ag Board that the newly formed subcommittee’s 
mandate was very broad. In February 1961, the NAS established under the Ag Board in its 
Division of Biology and Agriculture the “Committee on the Use of Aerial Photographic Surveys 
in Agriculture” known informally as the Shay Committee, given its chair, J.R. Shay mentioned 
above. Within two months of the former subcommittee’s formation, it increased its status and 
became a committee. The Shay Committee planned its first meeting in Washington for 
September 1961 in which it discussed a research proposal involving the Army Engineers 
Research and Development Laboratories in Virginia, Purdue University’s Research Foundation, 
USDA’s research facilities in Beltsville, Maryland, and the National Science Foundation. The 
proposed research involved using a portable reflectance spectrophotometer for detection of crops 
such as grain, soybeans, and corn. Army Engineers noted that the main issue with crop detection 
was that “choice of film and filter has hampered these efforts and has interfered with the securing 
of quantitative data on the validity of the technique.”85 Effectively, when researchers flew the 
spectrophotometer over a crop field, different spectral filters provided different, and often 
inconsistent, data sets. Thus, the Shay Committee scientists had a difficult time training its 
instruments to identify different crops whether they were grains, soybeans, or corn. Army 
Engineers Lab Basic Science division chief Charles Johnson continued to carry out experiments 
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and gather data with the spectrophotometer at the USDA Agricultural Research Service (ARS) 
Plant Industry Station in Beltsville, Maryland the following April and May 1962.  
 By August 1962, the ARS and Army Engineering Research and Development Laboratory 
(Army ERDL) jointly conducted spectrophotometer flights in Beltsville that began to reveal 
differences in grasses and broad-leaf plants, specifically to understand how wheat and soybean 
signatures reflected differently. The ARS and Army studied several plant species to compare 
reflectances of different field plots.86 This work was critical to classifying land cover variables 
and distinguishing crops from each other. Johnson worked closely with fellow Shay Committee 
member H.A. Rodenhiser of ARS on these experiments through 1963. 
 The Shay Committee also sought funding and assistance among government agencies and 
from industry. The committee submitted a proposal for $7,000 from a then four year old NASA 
to support the committee and develop a further proposal for a laboratory. Shay’s 1963 proposal 
requested permission from the Governing Board of the Academy to seek $20,000 in funds and 
assistance from USDA, DoD, the Universities of California and Michigan and Purdue 
University, which the NRC and NAS approved in December 1963. 
 In the proposal, Shay laid out benefits of remote sensing applications to agriculture, 
current research in the area, and potential improvements to the existing techniques. Shay argued 
that agricultural remote sensing “may improve the accuracy and reduce the cost of enumerative 
and mailed surveys for collection of agricultural information,” specifically regarding cattle in 
rangelands, fruit and vegetable acreage measurements, and better predict losses from crop 
damage.87 Shay also described how using infrared and ultra violet spectral regions yielded 
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“important types of agricultural information not previously obtainable.” 88 This current research 
conducted by Shay and his colleagues at USDA, Michigan, California, Purdue, and DoD 
revealed several research needs going into 1964. Shay sought to explore variations in other 
spectral regions using existing spectrophotometers, map soil moisture distribution, and better 
detect ground temperatures. The proposal also stated a strong need “for basic research on the 
spectral reflectance and emissivity of plants in health and disease and soils under various 
conditions.”89 He urged that remote sensing research needed to be done in all major spectral 
regions so scientists could better classify land cover variables. The major components of the 
proposal included the collection of aerial spectrophotometer data using a DC-6 aircraft, fly a 
similar instrument on a Gemini crewed mission, and then generate standards and procedures with 
the ground and flown data. Shay recognized and advised strong coordination between the 
participating institutions which included ARS, several DoD offices, as well as the 
aforementioned universities. Shay’s proposal to sustain funding for the Committee on Research 
on Remote Sensing for Agricultural Purposes (I shall now use ‘Shay Committee’ to refer to this 
body) under the Agricultural Board at NAS was accepted and would continue its review and 
advisory role in the field.  
 Alongside the acceptance of funding, the Committee changed its named to include 
‘Remote Sensing’ rather than ‘Aerial Photographic Surveys’ suggesting a recognition of the field 
of remote sensing. Shay secured funding for remote sensing activities for three years beyond 
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February 1964. The goal of this newly rechristened committee was to “take the lead in designing 
experiments and in obtaining the funds, personnel, land, equipment, and instrumentation needed 
to do the work with the help of interested agencies.”90 In early 1964, NASA provided $7,000 in 
support of the committee but not for experiments. The committee began to plan further remote 
sensing experimentation as tests continued on multispectral instruments at the University of 
Michigan overseen by Holter, who also held a position on the Shay Committee. Holter and Shay 
addressed the primary concern of the committee: which government agencies should lead in 
remote sensing research? While the committee had strong support and a committed membership, 
it had no formal government agency to carry out its recommendations and proposed experiments 
after it reorganized. 
 
Organizing for a Satellite Program 
However, the Committee, which changed its name to the Committee on Research on 
Remote Sensing for Agricultural Purposes, could not locate a funding agency until late 1963 
when NASA began contracting grants with NAS. The committee took on a larger role than 
initially planned, it was “prepared to act as an advisory committee to whoever might want its 
advice” since no Government agency “nor any combination of agencies, has established a broad 
research program on remote sensing for agricultural purposes.” Therefore, the Committee 
recognized “that if progress is to be made it must take the lead in designing experiments and in 
obtaining the funds, personnel, land, equipment, and instrumentation needed to do the work with 
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the help of interested agencies.”91 The goal of the Committee was to promote “research in the 
use of remote sensing, in the broadest context of that term,” due to the value of natural 
resources.92 In a series of meetings that took place in 1964 into 1965, the Shay Committee 
fostered a dialogue between NASA and USDA to explore experimentation in remote sensing 
techniques such as multispectral sensing, spectrophotometric studies, thermal sensing, among 
others to better understand crop density and health, soil, and water composition.93 These 
discussions began to lead to action in 1965 which I return to in the section below. As these 
meetings occurred however, DOI took NASA and USDA by surprise in September 1966. 
 
“But it worked!”: Interior’s Political Gambit, 1966 
 The idea of an earth resources satellite did not necessarily begin at NASA, USDA, or 
NAS. Rather, DOI took the space agency by surprise on 21 September 1966 when Secretary 
Stewart Udall announced the Earth Resources Observation Satellites program. The program, 
“aimed at gathering facts about the natural resources of the earth from earth-orbiting satellites 
carrying sophisticated remote sensing instruments,” would “provide data useful to civilian 
agencies of the Government such as the USDA who are concerned with many facets of our 
natural resources.”94 Even though NASA carried out a number of feasibility studies with USGS 
to explore the possibility of such a satellite, DOI “became impatient with NASA’s lack of 
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progress toward defining a satellite system.”95 Dr. William Pecora, a geologist by training, 
received his Ph.D from Harvard University and eventually became Director of USGS in 1964. 
Immediately, he began advocating for a remote sensing program capable of gathering 
information about Earth resources. Pecora and two of his USGS scientist colleagues, Charles 
Robinove and William Fischer urged Secretary Udall to act boldly on the earth resources satellite 
issue. Glenn Landis, former Chief of the Earth Resources Observation Systems Data Center 
(EROS), said “they [Robinove, Fischer, and Pecora] convinced Udall to basically twist NASA’s 
arm…it was a total bluff. But it worked!”96 
The gambit by USGS prompted a long partnership with NASA which precipitated serious 
research and development that resulted in Earth Resources Technology Satellite A (ERTS-A, 
later renamed Landsat 1). In a 1969 letter from Pecora to NASA, he expressed the Survey’s 
support of Landsat as “a means of acquiring on a national or worldwide scale data specifically 
designed to be useful for the widest variety of resource-related activities.”97 Alongside USGS, 
USDA also partnered with NASA to encourage a civil remote sensing program. 
NASA, USGS and the USDA, with advice from the National Academy of Sciences “initiated 
research to investigate the feasibility of assessing agricultural conditions with automated remote 
sensing techniques.”98 Pecora alongside Dr. Archibald Park of the USDA committed their 
institutions to Landsat as users. Dr. Archibald Park served as head of remote sensing research. 
Park made recommendations to NASA for Landsat specifications, in particular on resolutions 
necessary to view vegetation, on behalf of USDA. NASA responded by offering grants for 
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further study of agricultural applications. NASA and USDA began collaborative experiments to 
study agriculture from space. In addition, NASA awarded a grant to Purdue University to 
establish LARS, in 1966. NASA also awarded a contract to the University of Michigan’s Willow 
Run Laboratories in Ann Arbor. 
 
Viewing Vegetation: NASA-USDA Experimental Collaboration, 1965-1971 
In the mid 1960s, NASA began working with the USDA to develop scanners and 
techniques which could map vegetative land cover and be able to distinguish between various 
species of flora. In order to do so, these agencies and their university partners, mentioned below, 
had to produce imagery from multispectral scanner data and build algorithms that could identify 
types of terrain, such as forest, grassland, or rocky surfaces, among others. This process became 
known to the remote sensing community as classification, as mentioned earlier, whereby 
scientific investigators distinguish different land cover variables from each other. With the NAS 
advising and coordinating efforts, NASA, USDA, and a few universities developed technologies 
and experiments to classify crops and track their maturation over a growing season using 
multispectral scanners. The agencies attempted to perfect an algorithm that could help scientists 
watch from afar as crops matured and also identify which crops became diseased or infested with 
parasites. NASA and USDA conducted several experiments in the late 1960s and 1970s to this 
end that also became the first major application of Landsat imagery and led to its first expansion 
of use in the mid 1970s by government users. 
On 19 February 1965, the first major interagency agricultural remote sensing partnerships 
and experiments materialized. The ARS required new ways to identify crops from high altitude 
aircraft and satellites. NASA and USDA formally agreed to a partnership in remote sensing of 
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agriculture and forestry. Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman and NASA Administrator 
James Webb signed the “Interagency Task Statement of Agreement between the USDA and 
NASA For Joint Research and Development Activities to Define Manned Earth-Orbital 
Experiments in Agriculture and Forestry.” The ARS oversaw the program, which sought to 
“characterize the reflectance and emission signatures of different land covers (crops and range) 
that would permit their identification using sensors on aircraft and satellite platforms.”99 
Throughout 1965 into 1966, ARS used ground observations and aircraft to identify crops near 
Weslaco, Texas; a site chosen for its year-long growing season. The ARS experiment sought to 
test different spectral bands and instruments to determine which best identified crops. It was 
critical to NASA and USDA scientists to resolve which spectral signatures particular crops 
reflected. However, the difficulty was that as crops matured, they gave off different spectral 
signatures. NASA also had to build an instrument which had spectral bands that covered a 
significant portion of the green portion of the spectrum. The ARS Weslaco experiments made a 
significant contribution towards configuring the specifications of Landsat-1’s sensor array.100 
NASA also carried out similar research collaboratively with universities. 
 
 
Through this committee, the NAS began working with USDA and NASA. As mentioned, the 
University of California had played a role in aerial remote sensing research and manual 
interpretation technique development under the direction of Colwell, but two more universities 
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began to make contributions towards a high altitude and space-based apparatus. NASA and ARS 
offered grants to University of Michigan and Purdue University to establish laboratories for 
research in agricultural remote sensing.  
 
Willow Run and LARS 
 As mentioned, the University of California played a crucial role beginning investigations 
into agricultural remote sensing, yet with the help of grants from NASA and USDA, Michigan 
and Purdue became major players in the development of what became the scanners aboard 
Landsat. NASA and several university scientists used the multispectral scanner data to 
distinguish crops from other land cover variable. Essentially as the satellite flew over terrain, the 
scanning device translated geographic features such as lakes, forests, and cropland into color 
schemes to produce a map. For example, bodies of water appear dark blue, forest as dark red, 
and corn as bright pink. In the 1960s, NASA and ARS awarded grants to Purdue University and 
University of Michigan to build a multispectral scanning device capable of distinguishing 
vegetation from other land cover variables. In addition, the two laboratories in Ann Arbor and 
West Lafayette also developed methods for processing the Earth imagery and conducting 
detailed studies of crop maturation and disease. 
In 1966, grants from NASA and ARS allowed Purdue University to establish the LARS. 
LARS drew several professors from Purdue’s School of Electrical Engineering and Department 
of Botany and Plant Pathology as well as from IBM Corporation. Three individuals in particular 
played a crucial role at LARS, Ralph Shay mentioned above moved from Oregon State 
University to Purdue University, Purdue Electrical Engineering professor David Landgrebe, and 
LARS Technical Director R.B. MacDonald who had come to Indiana on leave from IBM. 
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Shay helped to organize the laboratory and recruited talent to Purdue in addition to his 
aforementioned responsibilities at the National Academies. Landgrebe, a Purdue educated 
electrical engineer who had experience with Bell Labs and Douglas Aircraft Company and had 
served on NRC and NASA advisory committees became one of the key researchers and director 
of LARS. MacDonald, another Purdue graduate went onto a career with IBM’s Advanced 
Systems Research group in New York but returned to West Lafayette and later would go onto 
NASA as a leading expert in land remote sensing research.101 Under the direction of Shay, 
Landgrebe, and MacDonald, LARS realized several major breakthroughs in agricultural remote 
sensing. In 1966, LARS demonstrated multispectral pattern recognition methods permitting the 
identification of individual crop species.102 Over the next three years, LARS realized methods 
for classifying land cover variables, constructing multitemporal data sets, calibrating data 
processing and data compression, and built algorithms that could identify the best spectral bands 
for investigations of certain crops.103  The sum of LARS’s research from 1966 to 1971 produced 
the knowledge necessary not only to map crops from high altitudes and space, but to track their 
maturation over a growing season.  
Under Shay and Landgrebe’s direction, LARS identified and resolved several key issues 
in agricultural remote sensing within its first five years. The laboratory demonstrated the first 
algorithms capable of multispectral pattern recognition that classified individual crop species, 
developed a digital image registration system, and developed methods for identifying soil types, 
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water quality, and forests.104 These accomplishments provided the scientific and processing 
capabilities to study agriculture from space. Meanwhile, Willow Run conducted the 
technological research and development producing the first multispectral scanner for land remote 
sensing. 
In addition to LARS, Willow Run Laboratories at University of Michigan also worked to 
develop agricultural remote sensing capabilities. The university acquired the laboratory after 
World War II and carried out contract work for the American military but moved towards 
civilian applications developing a reputation for its work in radar, infrared, acoustic, and optical 
remote sensing.105 Dr. Marvin Holter, a University of Michigan professor who became a Willow 
Run Deputy Director, served as head of the Infrared and Optical Sensing Laboratory. Holter 
collaborated with Shay at the National Academies on Ag Board subcommittes as well. The lab 
began experimenting with the use of electromagnetic scanning devices aboard aircraft. It 
developed the forerunner to Landsat’s multispectral scanner, the M-7 instrument. Its spectral 
coverage ranged from ultraviolet to near infrared and thus was capable of distinguishing 
vegetation, but the scanner itself was not enough. The development of the M-7 and later 
multispectral scanners enabled scientists to differentiate vegetation from other land cover 
variables since “green vegetation foliage produces a stepped reflectance, with low visible and 
high near infrared reflectance, a result of pigment absorption in the visible region and strong 
light scatter from cell walls in the near infrared.”106 Effectively, chlorophyll reflected distinct 
signatures that multispectral sensors and data processors could help data users distinguish. A 
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Landsat data user could then index areas of vegetation within an image. This concept became 
known as the Spectral Vegetation Index (SVI) which recorded “high values for land surfaces 
covered with green foliage and low values for non-foliar land surfaces”107 Between 1966 and 
1971, scientists and engineers at several universities and at NASA improved both the SVI 
technique and the multispectral scanner, discussed later in this chapter. Despite its success 
developing the M-7, Vietnam War protests enveloped Ann Arbor creating friction between the 
university and its laboratory. 
Willow Run and the University of Michigan itself found themselves engulfed in turmoil 
due to protests against American aerial bombing campaigns and resistance to weapons 
development. In addition to its research in civil remote sensing, Willow Run conducted research 
and development on ballistic missile guidance systems which drew protest from the community. 
The criticism reached its boiling point in the first two years of the 1970s and forced the Michigan 
Board of Regents to reevaluate its relationship with Willow Run. 
Campus-wide criticism focused on research and development that “translated directly 
into such things as remote sensor technology for locating and targeting vehicles and troops on 
the ground and laser guidance for so-called ‘smart’ bombs.”108 Pressure from the student body, 
the university’s board of regents, and state legislature forced three major moves. First, University 
of Michigan separated itself from Willow Run. Second, the laboratory became an incorporated 
non-profit and renamed itself Environmental Research Institute of Michigan (ERIM) since the 
organization looked to move into civilian projects despite its strong DoD patronage. Lastly, the 
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state legislature still wanted the laboratory to maintain its stature as a leading remote sensing 
R&D outfit as well as support industry jobs and bring in revenue. Thus, the Michigan state 
legislature appropriated $2 million in loans in June 1972 for ERIM’s transition period. In 
addition to state funds, the Board of Regents allowed all Willow Run contracts and equipment 
titles (technically owned by University of Michigan) to transfer to ERIM. In essence, University 
of Michigan quelled campus protests by severing ties and ERIM became an independent non-
profit research institution and a major player in remote sensing research and development. I 
discuss ERIM further in later chapters. 
Michigan and Purdue continued to research agricultural applications of remote sensing 
meanwhile cultivating a relationship with NASA and USDA. By 1968, NASA and USDA 
decided to include a multispectral scanner on the ERTS platform to be launched in 1971 and 
used the Apollo IX mission to simulate this proposed payload and study the data it gathered. 
Having established methods for identifying crops from high altitude aircraft using reliable 
multispectral scanners, those at Michigan, Purdue, NASA, and USDA hypothesized that it was 
possible to monitor and even inventory certain crops from above. In 1971, these institutions 
tested that hypothesis over the American Midwest. 
 
Cultivating Inventory: Corn Blight Experiment, 1971 
In 1971, disease ravaged corn crops in parts of the Midwest where agriculture was the 
chief economic driver, especially in Indiana where LARS had conducted many of its remote 
sensing experiment. Thus, crop inventorying became the next application of agricultural remote 
sensing. The multispectral scanning technology was still undergoing testing yet the problem of 
crop disease provided a salient case study. NASA and the USDA first applied the technology to 
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crop inventorying during the 1971 Corn Blight Experiment (CBE) using multispectral scanners 
aboard aircraft to manage diseased crops in the Midwest Corn Belt which included Indiana, 
Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, Nebraska, and Minnesota. For NASA, this project was a critical test of 
the multispectral scanner designed for Landsat and for USDA it was an opportunity to address a 
major crop yield problem. As for Michigan and Purdue, the CBE was a chance to continue their 
research and development. 
 The American Midwest witnessed prolific shortfalls in corn production in the 1970 and 
1971 growing years. Indiana experienced the most acute losses. Agricultural specialists at the 
USDA predicted a 4.82 billion bushel yield in 1970. The fungus which afflicted the corn, known 
as southern corn leaf blight (SCLB), destroyed 15 % of the 1970 crop, western Indiana alone 
losing 95 million bushels.109 Much of the fungus survived the winter of 1970 and again affected 
crops the subsequent year. The USDA and NASA realized this possibility and designed an 
experiment alongside the University of Michigan and Purdue University implementing 
multispectral scanners to observe SCLB and using computers at the aforementioned universities. 
The CBE used the multispectral scanners to classify stages of SCLB fungus infestation.  
 Plant pathologists discovered SCLB proliferating through windborne spores that lived 
best in warm, humid conditions generally attacking the lower portions of corn stalks first. SCLB 
also flourished due to the widespread, large-scale monocropping of corn in the American 
Midwest. The pathologists sought to understand how the disease infected the plant in order to 
build a system by which to classify light to severe infection. Disease-ridden corn stalks 
progressively changed from green to tan as chlorophyll died out. This allowed remote sensing 
investigators to design their experiment according to six levels of disease infection. The USDA 
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now could classify corn blight from imagery and then select test areas for sampling in the Corn 
Belt, where it was worst. 
 Initial visits by scientists on the ground provided the basis by which to not only 
implement the aforementioned classification levels but also select sample segments. The 
Statistical Reporting Service of the USDA sent ground observers to 10 corn fields for ground 
truthing in conjunction with sensor overflight.110 Segments were divided in to 1mile by 8 mile 
samples. Indiana received particular attention from both multispectral and photographic 
technology flown in planes. The USAF provided a RB-57F aircraft for high altitude (60,000 feet) 
flight, while University of Michigan provided a C-47 aircraft for low flight. Color infrared film 
was used to detect SCLB111, which NASA reviewed before agricultural experts classified the 
imagery against the six levels with red being vigorous vegetation while light pink or gray 
indicated diseased crops. Throughout 1971, flights over the test areas took place in three phases.  
 These three phases provided greater temporal resolution, providing imagery in April 
(Phase I), May (Phase II) and June through September (Phase III). Each phase also contributed to 
the objectives of the experiment. During Phase I, the USDA collected black and white data while 
scientific personnel performed corn field visits for baseline information on crop-use mapping. 
Phase II implemented the high altitude flights for infrared imaging to evaluate soil conditions. 
Phase III used low and high altitude flights with false color infrared film for vegetation detection 
and Michigan’s scanner with 12 multiband data channels for terrain. The field visits undertaken 
by agricultural experts corroborated what the interpreters saw in imagery regarding the spatial 
distribution of blight. The interpreters played the next significant role in identifying blight.  
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 NASA, USDA, and University research scientists classified sections of maps according 
to land cover, namely healthy crops against partially and fully diseased crops. These techniques 
allowed LARS to assess the spatial distribution and severity of SCLB in the Corn Belt. By the 
start of Phase III in July 1971, the summer had been unusually cool and dry which inhibited the 
disease severity significantly as the CBE was carried out.112 Photointerpretation against field 
observations produced a regression of 0.77 at low blight severity while high blight severity had a 
correlation of 0.67. Each had a sample population of 30 fields using stratified random sampling 
for field observations. Correlations of MSS against field observations had significantly higher 
correlations of 0.94 for low blight severity and 0.92 for high blight severity, suggesting that MSS 
data provided considerably better detection. LARS concluded that while the blight was very 
widespread, manifesting most strongly in Indiana and parts of Illinois and Missouri, many of the 
infections were not severe. While the CBE successfully detected infestations in corn, it could not 
forecast yields of corn. NASA and the USDA began just such an experiment three years later 
that built upon the corn blight experiment utilizing the same technologies.  
 The Corn Blight Experiment in the early 1970s was a critical, formative episode which 
suggested that the U.S. government possessed the resources to pursue agricultural inventorying 
on a larger scale. The CBE was a yearlong experiment that successfully tested multispectral 
scanning technology, to be launched on ERTS in 1972 (the launch was delayed from 1971). The 
experiment also suggested that crop growth could not only be inventoried, but also predicted. 
Thus, USDA would become one of the largest users of ERTS data after its launch in 1972. The 
CBE and preceding experiments produced knowledge and technology in a precarious moment 
characterized by Cold War rivalry and a volatile global agricultural market. In mid-1972 as 
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NASA readied the Delta rocket to place ERTS into orbit, the Soviet Union would clandestinely 
secure the largest wheat purchase in history throwing destabilizing the U.S. food supply. 
 
 “The Great Grain Robbery,” 1971-1972 
 Soviet farmers across the Ukraine and Volga River valley planted wheat as usual in late 
1971 hoping to reap a large winter wheat crop in 1972. However, the fields and weather of the 
Eastern Bloc had other plans for the Soviets. A long, cold winter destroyed much of the crop and 
forced the Kremlin to dispatch two individuals to New York City to negotiate the purchase of 
one quarter of the 1972 American wheat crop in addition to barley, corn, oats, rye, and 
soybeans.113 The ensuing deal struck between the U.S. government, Soviet purchasers, and 
several grain companies became known as the Soviet Wheat Deal, or more notoriously described 
by Martha Hamilton and James Trager as the ‘Great Grain Robbery,’ a reference to the 1903 film 
The Great Train Robbery about outlaws who stole loot from a train in the American West.114 
The deal involved several major grain companies including Cargill and Continental, the USDA, 
Soviet brokers. The implications of the Soviet Wheat Deal were far-reaching as the wheat deal 
suggested to the American public that the USDA was more concerned that the “grain trade was 
served by the sale rather than American farmers or taxpayers.” As a result, USDA came under 
fire from the American public and from Congress. As the Soviet wheat deal came to light in July 
1972, NASA successfully launched Landsat-1 into orbit that same month. 
 The stakes were incredibly high when it came to the shrouded agricultural markets and 
crop yield prediction. Dan Morgan, an investigative journalist in the 1970s wrote of the deep 
secrecy in which grain firms operated describing the sheer difficulty of obtaining interviews with 
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executives and, at that point, the lack of information available.115 With information so difficult to 
obtain from both the American and Soviet side, crop yield prediction required immense detail 
and time. One American agricultural attaché to Moscow stated “it’s a task that takes everything 
you can find, from weather reports to a line out of a newspaper, and it takes 18 hours a day. And 
then you go to bed, wondering if you’re right.”116 
The USDA looked to utilize Landsat as a control mechanism exerted upon the world 
agricultural market. As NASA prepared Landsat 1 for launch, drought and unusual global 
temperatures prompted worldwide wheat crop failures during the 1971 growing year. 
Notwithstanding the emergence of détente between the U.S. and Soviet Union, the Soviets 
aggravated the American wheat market through what the USDA called a “grain grab” that year. 
Failed wheat crops in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic led to a shift in Soviet agricultural 
policy from export to import, placing a heavy demand on the market. Unaware, American 
agricultural officials did not realize Soviet intentions because initially the Soviets expressed “a 
great interest in US corn and soybeans when it was wheat that was really critical.”117 
Furthermore, several American grain companies, namely Cargill Incorporated based in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota and Continental Grain headquartered in New York City, controlled a 
large share of the world trade in grain through their secretive demeanor and production of grain 
seed and fertilizer.118 In mid-1972 shortly before the grain deal, these companies pressed the 
USDA to obscure the proposed deal in order to maintain higher prices. Nonetheless, the Soviets 
effectively secured vast amounts of wheat under this guise at low prices, on the order of 440 
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million bushels for $750 million. Congress claimed negligence in the deal “but the real 
negligence of 1972 had as much to do with long-standing policies as with the conduct of officials 
in power,” namely policies assumed during the Kennedy administration such as reducing surplus, 
humanitarian aid, and economic self-interest.119 For the Soviets however, the government sought 
to avoid famine and improve Soviet diets through a transition to import. 
The Soviet Union’s altered import policy precipitated further shifts in the world food 
market as it cut its exports to Eastern Europe. The policy also affected importers such as China, 
Japan, and Western Europe. These global shifts caused by the “massive Soviet grain purchases in 
1972-1973 were the principal factor in the decline of carryover stocks in the major exporting 
countries,”120 which caused a sharp increase in grain prices on the world market and acute 
shortages in the Soviet Bloc. With little to no accurate information from the Soviet Union on the 
wheat yield collapse in Russia and Ukraine, the USDA did not anticipate Moscow procuring 
such a massive grain crop. Thus, it turned to NASA for assistance in developing the ability to 
inventory and predict crop yields around the world. 
 The aforementioned testing of scanners over agricultural fields and the potential of a 
space-based platform led many at NASA and USDA to believe that it was possible to inventory 
crops worldwide. Both domestic pressure from the American public and Congress as well as 
Cold War sensibilities came into play in 1971 as the U.S., especially USDA, urgently sought to 
achieve the surveillance imperative and bring greater legibility to the volatile global food supply. 
 
Legitimizing LACIE 
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  From 1972 to 1974, NASA tested Landsat data reception and quality and collected a 
global environmental database. Multispectral scanner experiments over agricultural fields 
alongside the successful launch of Landsat encouraged the development of the Large Area Crop 
Inventory Experiment or LACIE. The USDA, NASA, and some contributions from the NOAA 
for long term weather patterns developed LACIE as a predictive algorithm for crop production 
over vast tracts of land. Also, NASA launched a second Landsat satellite in early 1975. While 
NASA did not launch Landsat-2 solely for the LACIE project, the experiment held significant 
weight deciding launch date. Data collection and continuity deeply concerned NASA since it 
expected Landsat-1 to only operate for one year.121 NASA Administrator James Fletcher pressed 
the White House to move Landsat-2’s launch earlier. Fletcher wrote to Assistant to the President 
for Economic Policy George Schultz to “reschedule the ERTS-B satellite [later renamed 
Landsat-2] from 1976 to 1974, within available resources” citing the generally positive reception 
the satellite received from the global community. Fletcher stated that the “international 
community has responded enthusiastically to the new technology and…a national program of 
continuous global data acquisition, whether described as experimental or operation, provides a 
meaningful new instrument of foreign policy.”122 That stated, Fletcher insisted that Landsat-2’s 
launch be moved earlier in order to also provide data for grain forecasts of the 1975 growing 
year. Fletcher nearly succeeded as NASA placed Landsat-2 in orbit on 22 January 1975, one year 
ahead of schedule. With one satellite in orbit, another scheduled, and cooperation with NOAA, 
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NASA and the USDA carried out the project in three phases which also involved predictions of 
Soviet production. 
 The aforementioned market shift caused by the perceived ‘grain grab’ likewise distressed 
the U.S. government as it moved closer to crop inventorying capability. The LACIE prompted 
considerable interest as a technological mechanism in the U.S. government. The experiment 
originated from “a major problem faced by the United States in foreign trade decisions [namely] 
the lack of timely, accurate information on the potential resupply from new harvests overseas,” 
according to two chief scientists working on LACIE.123 The USDA derived its experiment data 
from NOAA meteorological information as well as “crop reports, which are made public as a 
routine service to the domestic and international agricultural community.”124 In much the same 
way that President Nixon promoted agricultural initiatives that became LACIE at the UN in 
1969, the U.S. government continued to promulgate the LACIE at a 1974 UN World Food 
Conference. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger hailed the experiment as “a promising and 
potentially vital contribution to rational planning of global production.”125 Effectively Kissinger 
set the stage for LACIE’s international implications as Landsat users at the USDA projected 
power via agriculture. 
  
International Agreements 
Furthermore, the U.S. government assuaged international concerns of ‘economic 
espionage’ resulting from American knowledge of foreign resource bases. NASA and the USDA 
positioned themselves and LACIE to reflect “the notion that because NASA’s programs are in 
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the experimental phase organizations responsible for that type of operation [crop forecasting] are 
not doing anything specific about predicting Soviet wheat production.”126 Rather, the U.S. 
entered negotiations for agreements in agriculture. Both the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture and 
the USDA sought to coordinate “research in the fields of farm crops and farm animals and the 
mechanization of agricultural production.”127 Over several months from 1972 to 1973, the U.S. 
and Soviet Union negotiated and eventually signed the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agriculture Research 
Agreement. Similarly, these negotiations resulted in the “Agreement on Cooperation in 
Agriculture,” signed 19 June 1973 by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and U.S. 
Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz. Article II of the agreement obligated both countries to 
“’regular exchanges of relevant information,’ including ‘forward estimation on production, 
consumption, demand and trade of major agricultural commodities,’” however the Soviets often 
complicated the agreement’s terms.128 For example, the Soviets refused to provide their reports 
and denied American inspectors from carrying out their trip itineraries. In 1974, American 
surveyors were denied access to Kazakhstan and the southern Urals while attachés were denied 
entry to the Volga River Valley. Moscow based attachés’ travel was also restricted. The US-
USSR Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation, meant to govern the exchange of 
information, failed to foster cooperation. Landsat became a viable option for inspecting crops 
from space. These international negotiations legitimized LACIE’s agricultural goals for the 
USDA but overflight and sovereignty remained an issue to be resolved at the UN.  
 The Soviet Union challenged American efforts to legalize satellite overflight. The 
Eisenhower administration pushed for space “to be recognized as free territory not subject to the 
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normal confines of territorial limits.”129 Opposition, led by the Soviets, suggested that state 
territorial borders extended into space. In July 1955, the US and Soviet Union held a summit in 
Geneva, Switzerland concerning the freedom of space access issue. The eventual launch of 
Sputnik in 1957 prima facie resolved the overflight issue, though it was later legally achieved in 
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Despite this, U.S. government continued to pursue agreements 
legitimizing the use of earth-observing satellites to assuage international concerns of military 
reconnaissance. The U.S. worked with the UN to attain international legitimacy for land remote 
sensing and assuage concerns of economic espionage, which I address in greater detail in the 
following chapter. 
Concurrently, NASA also entered negotiations with the Soviet Academy of Sciences to 
cooperate in remote sensing. The U.S. did not express a willingness to transfer hardware but in 
order to respect the “Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space for Peaceful Purposes,” signed 24 May 1972, the U.S. must maintain “the open 
availability and basically scientific nature of the information that NASA has exchanged and 
proposes to exchange.”130 The State Department confirmed that “there is no basis for concern 
with the implications of the cooperative program from the standpoint of our economic and 
commercial interests or with respect to its security and arms control implications.”131 The U.S. 
and Soviet Union also established a collaborative effort via the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperation in the 
Natural Environment working group which addressed not only remote sensing of agriculture but 
also geology and hydrology as part of the wider collaboration in science and technology. The 
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State Department, NASA, and the USDA allayed international concerns of American espionage 
and instead framed Landsat agricultural mapping as a beneficent international responsibility, 
which enabled the U.S. to undertake the LACIE by 1973. 
 
World Food Conference, 1974 
 As NASA began the LACIE, the UN addressed food security as a global issue in the 
wake of a brutal famine afflicting Bangladesh. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) hosted the first World Food Conference in Rome, Italy in November 1974 which brought 
together heads of state, ministers of agriculture, and diplomats to address world food security. 
Among the three broad security questions discussed was “global information and early warning 
system on food and agriculture.”132 The Conference recommended that such a system be put into 
place as a mechanism to warn against famine and crop loss. However, the delegations from the 
Soviet Union and China opposed the global warning system since it “could call in question the 
sovereignty of States, include the communication of information of a strategic nature and could 
also contribute to the speculative operations of the multinational companies.”133 These concerns 
reflected those the Soviets voiced in the aforementioned discussions with the U.S. regarding 
satellite overflight and reconnaissance, yet the Soviets found few allies in their resistance. The 
U.S. had effectively convinced the world community of the value of civilian Earth observation 
satellites and the data they produce. 
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In much the same way President Nixon promoted agricultural initiatives that became 
LACIE at the UN in 1969, the U.S. government continued to promulgate the experiment at the 
Conference. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger hailed the experiment as “a promising and 
potentially vital contribution to rational planning of global production.”134 Effectively Kissinger 
set the stage for LACIE to be part of his wider diplomatic vision to eradicate hunger within ten 
years of the Conference.135 Despite Kissinger’s vision for hunger eradication through 
technological potential, LACIE scientists at NASA and USDA experienced serious difficulties 
that made the idea of a global food warning system seem far less possible. 
 
USDA and NASA Select Wheat 
The USDA identified wheat as its crop of interest due to its significant presence in the 
global agricultural market. The U.S. pushed for cost effective wheat production in order to 
prevent a second Soviet grain grab. NASA’s Johnson Spaceflight Center in Houston, Texas 
(JSC) carried out the project through various USDA and NOAA data collecting field stations in 
the U.S. that contributed significant information regarding domestic crop statistics and 
meteorological patterns. Operationally, the satellite collected Earth surface data which receiving 
stations in the U.S. and Canada registered and sent to JSC and Goddard Spaceflight Center 
(GSFC) for processing and quality inspection. GSFC also governed the Landsat satellite itself, 
thus its role also included scheduling satellite operations and data acquisition (GSFC was a 
receiving station itself). From these two locations, NASA disseminated processed maps to the 
USDA and collaborating states. Domestically, the JSC team selected large tracks of wheat in 
Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota to classify wheat according to its maturation from greening, 
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to heading, to maturity as well as for two of wheat’s biological phases, emergence and 
jointing.136 At the time, Montana in particular had the largest monolithic wheat fields in the US. 
The USDA Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service recommended Montana for its 
diverse wheat fields to collect a comprehensive range of wheat signatures such as spring, winter, 
dryland, and irrigated wheat as well as assessing the signatures of competing cereal crops.137  
LACIE experimenters drew estimates of the spatial proportion of classified wheat pixels 
and compared it to all of the pixels in the sample.138 LACIE used a stratified random sampling 
scheme according to climate and political boundaries allocating 637 sample segments, each 
measuring 5 x 6 nautical miles. One Landsat frame measured 100 square nautical miles. LACIE 
premised its classification upon 4 acquisitions of wheat: crop establishment, greening, heading, 
and mature. Likewise, LACIE used a crop calendar composed of meteorological measurements 
provided by NOAA, namely of daily temperature, as well as USDA estimates of planting start 
dates. LACIE required international collaboration since the USDA and NASA needed wheat area 
reports and production reports from cooperating states in order to construct a crop calendar. 
These indicated stages of wheat growth during the year. The crop calendar correlated with 
Landsat data and the trained classification system provided a basis for gauging crop maturation 
to predict wheat yields. The approach to LACIE involved significant care in classification over 
very large land areas.  
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The Landsat MSS, which was 30-meter resolution data across 4 spectral bands) was the 
major source of remote sensing data for the LACIE. Each MSS viewed an area of the Earth of 
about 1.1 acres or 0.45 hectares, across a 185 km line. Along this line, measurements were 
recorded at 57 m increments forming pixels. Each MSS pixel represented light intensity captured 
across four spectral bands. Over three years from 1975 to 1978, the USDA, NASA, and NOAA 
implemented the LACIE in the American Midwest, the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan, 
Alberta, and Manitoba, as well as several Soviet oblasts to varying degrees of success. However, 
extreme weather patterns, especially wide variation of precipitation and temperature, skewed 
historical yield data and meteorological models over the four years of the LACIE. Similarly, 
LACIE scientists experienced greater difficulty distinguishing wheat from other grains than 
expected. Thus, ecological factors limited the effectiveness of Landsat technology. 
 
Constraining LACIE 
LACIE scientists experienced both ecological and technological factors which 
constrained the experiment. Three major constraints inhibited the project. One factor manifested 
technologically as scientists experienced difficulty distinguishing wheat from its surroundings 
and the other two ecologically as the environment hindered satellite data collection. 
Technologically, LACIE had difficulties in classification, image feedback, and operation. 
Despite LACIE’s organized classification for wheat, not all imagery was homogenous. The 
appearance of non-croplands, such as forests and urban areas obscured classification. Landsat’s 
resolution further inhibited the process as certain areas appeared highly heterogeneous making 
wheat identification, much less individual stages, difficult. Thirty-meter resolution as well as 
environmental variability affected the data feedback. A wheat field bordering a heavy forest 
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obscured that pixel’s accuracy. A LACIE scientist was unable to accurately classify that pixel, 
equivalent to a 30 square meter plot, as a forest or wheat. Since Landsat data indicated the 
presence of chlorophyll, vegetation with like chlorophyll signatures appeared the same or similar 
in Landsat imagery. As LACIE scientists discovered, sometimes Landsat data misrepresented 
wheat for soybeans or other cereals. The Landsat imagery was not nuanced enough to distinguish 
among vegetated land cover variables.  
Ecologically, the very imagery itself also constrained data as cloud cover impeded the 
MSS’s ability to scan the Earth, producing ‘holes’ in the imagery. Likewise, ‘noise’, or unwanted 
distortion in imagery which reduced useable information, also increased classification difficulty. 
Refraction and reflection affected Landsat imagery since moisture scattered and absorbed light as 
it penetrated the atmosphere and reached the Earth’s surface. As such, meteorology posed a 
major constraint on the LACIE project. Cloud cover rendered data opaque and therefore useless 
for crop identification. This concern heavily constrained the project throughout in all sample 
areas. Early in the project, scientists understood that “cloud cover over site in relation to ERTS 
passes we will not collect enough useable data in all areas to meet the four pass requirement.”139 
By the fall of 1974, LACIE scientists looked to implement ERTS-B data with full-frame 
registration, that is, fully implementing the satellite’s data with specified locations as opposed to 
raw data. This method presented an advantage for “reducing sampling errors introduced by the 
cloud cover problem” since “selection of the sample segments could be made in cloud-free 
locations.”140 
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Also, weather patterns likewise constrained LACIE through the meteorological models 
applied by NOAA. As NASA and NOAA initiated LACIE, Director of Earth Observation 
Programs William Stoney suggested a problem emerged at the interface of crop yield prediction 
from Landsat data and meteorological conditions modeled by NOAA. It became Director 
Stoney’s concern that neither agency addressed this “agro-meteorological problem” in great 
detail prior to 1974 because it presented a challenge to precisely modeling temperature, 
precipitation, and soil moisture over several countries.141 This precision was necessary since 
NOAA used “ground-based data to establish weather trends in various world regions and relate 
these conditions through statistical models to the yield of the crops in those regions.”142 
Furthermore, these statistical models served as a function within the crop predictive algorithms 
utilized by the USDA. The agro-meteorological problem rested on the practical issue of 
deviating weather conditions over four years and their effects upon wheat yields during those 
growing years. In a 1974 report, Director Stoney argued this problem required year to year 
measurements since crop production varied so widely that linear trends were too simple for 
understanding meteorological effects on yield. Also, production variability depends upon acreage 
and yield, the amount planted in the first place, since these factors changed each growing year. 
Director Stoney averaged yield, acreage, and production between 1948 and 1973 in the U.S., 
India, and Australia and revealed that U.S. production departed from its average trend 10% or 
more in 10 of the last 25 years, India departed 10% or more in last five years, and Australia 18 of 
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last 25 years.143 This high variation strained the correlations made between crop yield and 
meteorology.  
The U.S. government intended LACIE to be a global crop prediction experiment yet 
these constraints severely scaled the project back. NASA and JSC approached the LACIE as an 
eight country analysis applicable to several crops. However NASA ultimately retreated from 
such a broad project.144 Ecological and technological limitations rendered Landsat data 
intermittent due to atmospheric interruption, cloud cover, the inability to accurately distinguish 
wheat from other crops and vegetation, and insufficient meteorological models. These factors 
confined the American effort to predict global wheat yield available for human consumption. 
Thus, NASA continued its efforts with a LACIE follow-on and the intelligence community also 
began to monitor crops. 
 
AGRISTARS 
 In 1979, several federal agencies formed the Joint Program for Agriculture and Resources 
Inventory Surveys Through Aerospace Remote Sensing (AgRISTARS).145 The joint agencies 
intended for AgRISTARS to be the follow-on program to LACIE as a means of “extraction of 
agronomic information at a large, if not global scale, of a type and quality relevant to decision 
makers, and in an efficient and cost-effective manner.”146 NASA’s objective was “to provide a 
capability for the USDA to respond in a timely manner to factors which affect the quality and 
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production of economically important crops.”147 AgRISTARS had a specific division of labor 
among the agencies. NASA conducted research and development on new techniques and 
scanners for subsequent Landsats. NOAA also performed research and development on 
meteorological satellites and uses of weather data for agricultural purposes. USDA provided and 
applied agricultural data (such as soil and crop conditions), performed statistical tests based upon 
their data and that which was gathered by NASA and NOAA, and communicated with users. 
EROS facility continued to store, retrieve, and disseminate data for AgRISTARS. USAID 
evaluated developing countries for potential applications of AgRISTARS. ERIM served again as 
a contractor for NASA and it conducted research, development, testing, and system design. The 
above technical report listed three broad goals for the program: to design a system as a basis for 
technological development, address estimation issues and self-evaluation, and improve 
technology to be able to distinguish crops and estimate crop proportions.  
AgRISTARS built on LACIE in two particular ways to produce a more comprehensive 
natural resource inventory. First, it broadened the scope of LACIE to include crop yield 
predictions for several cereal commodities beyond wheat including barley, rice, soybeans, and 
corn in several countries. Also, AgRISTARS second main objective was to produce an ‘early 
warning system’ to “improve the objectivity, reliability, timeliness, and adequacy of information 
available to help USDA establish national agriculture and trade policies.”148 NASA and USDA 
proposed to monitor twelve crops across six countries to achieve improved forecasts 
operationally in the US and abroad. The crops included corn, soybeans, wheat, barley, sorghum, 
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rice, cotton, and sunflowers. Despite the marginal success of LACIE, AgRISTARS proved far 
more difficult to accomplish. 
Given the large scope of AgRISTARS, the project encountered several key issue areas 
centered on the difficulty of extracting “agronomic information at a large, if not global scale, of a 
type and quality that is relevant to decision makers, and in an efficient and cost-effective 
manner.”149 In a December 1979 technical report from ERIM, the contractor laid out the problem 
in three parts: conceptualization and area estimation, technological issues from processing to 
performance, and the technology itself.150 One of the main challenges was developing software 
advanced enough to distinguish and extract information from Landsat imagery that identifies 
different land cover variables. This required an adaptive system that could allow for labeling of 
such variables and allow for analysis over a very large area estimation. Again, AgRISTARS was 
ambitious in its goal to provide a mechanism for crop predictions worldwide. ERIM also 
proposed technology capable of “assigning crop labels to samples (called objective labeling) and 
that technology related to the efficiency of crop proportion estimation (called machine 
processing).”151 NASA, ERIM, and USDA worked towards resolving these issues as the project 
progressed. 
 The Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas carried out AgRISTARS and 
received roughly $16 million in FY1980 with another $33 million planned for FY1981.152 In 
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1980 into 1981, JSC conducted several different image analyses using Landsat data from 18 
different states across the US. Project scientists sought to build and train software to process 
Landsat data and identify and label the aforementioned crops within the imagery. In addition to 
crop estimates, AgRISTARS emphasized soil as well, as it was a key determinant of crop health. 
In the American West, snowpack provided a means of irrigation and water supply forecasting 
became another application of Landsat imagery. Thus, AgRISTARS scientists evaluated “remote 
methods for predicting both the areal extent and depth of snow pack.”153 By late 1982, 
AgRISTARS began to end operations as it was planned for four years. During several informal 
interviews with NASA and USGS officials, they stated that increased Landsat data pricing in 
1982 made the project more expensive and more difficult to budget for. Since the project drew 
heavily upon vast amounts of Landsat data, costs ballooned for federal agencies whose budgets 
for AgRISTARS remained static or even decreased. I discuss this change in pricing and the 
consequences in Chapter 3. 
 
Other Experiments: Mitigating Pests from Space 
NASA continued to explore ways to mitigate agricultural losses by detecting pests from 
space. In March 1974, scientists from both JSC and the Mexican Comision Nacional del 
Espascio Exterior (CNEE) finalized a plan to assist the Mexican American Commission for the 
Eradication of the Screwworm, a joint agreement of the Mexican and American Secretaries of 
Agriculture, in its mission to defeat a particular species of fly that had been destroying cattle and 
poultry. The small fly proliferated throughout much of northern Mexico and from California to 
Florida. USDA predicted annual American losses of livestock up to $200 million due to the large 
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number of screwworm infestations.154 With Mexico experiencing similar losses, both 
governments sought to eradicate the fly from central and northern Mexico also buffering the U.S. 
from infestation since the flies often migrated northward from Central America. The Life 
Science Directorate of JSC carried out the project using Landsat data to identify “soil 
temperature, moisture, and vegetative cover – all of which affect the breeding patterns of the 
screwwormfly.”155 Through Landsat data, Mexican aircraft pinpointed heavily saturated areas for 
distribution of sterile flies that would in turn reduce the screwworm fly population. NASA and 
CNEE selected a site near Cordoba, Mexico to experiment with Landsat data. A few years later, 
a similar experiment took place in Pennsylvania. 
 In 1980, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources sought the capability 
to monitor damage caused by gypsy moths. The gypsy moth caterpillar fed upon the hardwood 
forests, composed largely of oak and maple trees, heavily defoliating 178,062 hectares in 1980 
capping off nearly $32 million in losses over 10 years to the state’s forest industry. Pennsylvania 
foresters used Landsat “multispectral scanner data from NASA’s Landsat satellites to examine 
hardwood forests conditions before and after defoliation occurs” which allowed “forested areas 
exhibiting gypsy moth damage to be identified and located on the satellite image” and track 
forest damage over time.156 
 
CIA Crop Inventorying 
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 As demonstrated, the military played a role in crop inventorying through remote sensing 
since the Navy funded Colwell’s work in the 1950s. But by the late 1970s, the CIA began to 
monitor crops abroad using methods similar to those developed during LACIE and AgRISTARS. 
The methods used by NASA and USDA were adopted by the CIA which began to closely track 
crop growth in the Soviet bloc and various parts of the developing world. After the “Soviet Grain 
Grab” mentioned above, the CIA Bureau of Economic Research assumed a larger role in crop 
estimation. The Bureau neither trusted the Soviets who overstated its figures nor the USDA and 
began to revise its modeling “to reflect more complete data on the previous winter’s rainfall and 
soil moisture, and to utilize information in the first LACIE satellite pictures.”157 The CIA began 
to realize that Soviet crop yields were far lower than both their own reports and USDA’s 
estimates. Accordingly, crop inventorying by remote sensing became an imperative of the 
intelligence community to protect American farmers. 
 In the late 1970s into the 1980s, the Environment and Resource Analysis Center and in 
the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, in conjunction with the Office of 
Economic Research and Office of Soviet Analysis, both of CIA, produced reports on Soviet 
grain production using a algorithm similar to LACIE. The CIA coordinated this effort with the 
USAF’s Environmental Technical Applications Center and the Foreign Agricultural Service of 
USDA. Much like LACIE, CIA crop inventorying drew data from satellite imagery, 
meteorological data, historical and current crop estimates, fertilizer production, and crop models 
in addition to human intelligence and open, scientific literature. At times the Soviet Union’s 
Central Statistical Administration shared crop yield information with the U.S. federal 
government. CIA derived its production estimates “from crop models which are used to 
aggregate and compare both current and historical data. All intelligence data sources, including 
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satellite imagery systems” were used and analyzed by teams of “imagery analysts, agronomists, 
geographers, meteorologists, economists, and computer specialists.”158 Much of the growth 
tracked was in the Ukraine near the Black Sea, Kazakhstan, North Caucasus, Moldavia, northern 
Belorussia, and sections of the Volga River Valley. As LACIE drew to a close, the CIA began to 
closely monitor Soviet crop yields in the 1980s. 
 The Americans used Landsat imagery to better predict Soviet crop yields tracking several 
variables. Throughout the 1970s, the USDA tracked Soviet crop production and had general 
figures for average production which it shared with the CIA. As mentioned, CIA was skeptical. 
In the late 1970s, the Soviets experienced sporadic wheat production. In 1976, the Soviet Union 
produced a record 224 million tons of grain, considerably higher than their average of roughly 
210 million, tracked by USDA. While the 1976-1977 yield was successful, several years of 
below average yields plagued the Soviets. Moscow took action to try to resolve its growing 
pains. After three below average yields, the Soviets devoted more land to fallow. In 1982, Soviet 
premier Leonid Brezhnev introduced his Food Programme. The CIA interpreted Brezhnev’s 
goals for the programme as one that “reorganizes the management of food production, redirects 
investment resources between the farm sector and supporting industries, revises incentives for 
farm workers, and lists new targets for output of key agricultural commodities.”159 Among its 
principles, the Soviet government sought to cut back on hard currency expenditures on Western 
agricultural imports. CIA’s report on the programme viewed it as a continuation of past policies 
but the agency took a keen interest in it as it began using Landsat imagery to more closely 
monitor Soviet crop yields in the early 1980s. 
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 In 1983, the Soviets harvested its best crop in years. The USSR produced roughly 210 
million metric tons. CIA models of “weather, straw dumps, grain procurements, [redacted],” 
alongside “excellent crop vigor observed on Landsat imagery” suggested another successful crop 
for the Soviets.160 The CIA report for 1984, based on this model that used Landsat imagery, 
warned that American grain sales to the Soviets might drop off, yet an August 1983 agreement 
between the two countries committed to Soviets to buying American crops. The US-USSR Long 
Term Agreement required the Soviets to purchase 9 million tons of US grain in FY 1983, with an 
option for an additional 3 million. The CIA estimated that a large Soviet grain yield would deter 
it from purchasing an amount higher than the Long Term Agreement minimum and ultimately 
reduce the market for American farmers. With a higher grain yield, the Soviets fed more people 
as well as more livestock adding to the meat supply. CIA’s evaluation of a large crop year for 
1984 would allow the Soviets to cut back imports and save “nearly $2 billion in hard 
currency.”161 Through crop estimates, the Americans could better anticipate fluctuations in trade 
and pricing, despite the difficulty of producing crop yield predictions.  
However, the CIA report for 1984, expressed several uncertainties. A prolonged wet 
season threatened crops in several part of the Soviet Union. The report was also concerned the 
Soviets may harvest more of the corn acreage than they anticipated. The CIA tracked a larger 
than average use of fertilizer due to its availability by Soviet farmers in the northern oblasts 
which also received a high amount of rainfall. The Soviet Union also made several international 
moves to suggest they also anticipated a very large yield. The US Embassy reported to the CIA 
that the Soviets rejected a 2 million ton grain offer by Australians, refused to increase grain sale 
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contracts with Canada and Argentina, and lowered their purchases from France.162 The USDA 
also held in place a minimum 22 million ton sale which the Soviet Union had as an option to 
sustain and grow its grain reserves. These uncertainties and brokered deals held strong 
implications for both the U.S. and Soviet Union. 
 In 1984, the CIA tracked poor weather in April that it argued “eliminated Moscow’s 
chances this year for even an average grain harvest.”163 The report in 1984 stated that the Soviets 
would produce 185 million tons, well below its average and the previous year’s yield. Moscow 
purchased roughly 22 million tons in August 1984, which the CIA interpreted as either preparing 
for a low yield mixed with a need to supply its military given its ongoing combat operations in 
Afghanistan, discussed in more detail later. By the end of 1984, that 22 million more than 
doubled to 53 million tons of grain imports.164 The CIA predicted that the US would be in a 
strong position to export grain to the Soviet Union, despite this going against Brezhnev’s Food 
Programme. Yet, the 1985 crop for the Soviets vastly improved cutting the need for imports. 
Moscow produced nearly 200 million tons and would only import roughly 25 million tons which 
was less than half of the previous year’s imports. Within just a few years of crop monitoring, 
Soviet grain yields fluctuated from high import needs to very little at all. In each of these cases, 
the CIA used Landsat imagery, in much the same way NASA conducted LACIE, in addition to a 
number of other variables to predict Soviet crop yields and guard the American farmer from 
market volatility. 
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The Soviets never confirmed that either USDA or CIA estimates were correct. Bobby 
Spires, who oversaw crop estimates for USDA’s Foreign Agriculture Service Analysis Branch, 
confirmed both the difficulties and investment of using Landsat for crop estimates: “I [Spires] 
spent $7 million a year to get data, but that works out to less than 10 cents for every ton of wheat 
exported,” yet he was “confident we’re real close. I just wish I could get my hands on those 
numbers from the Soviet Union and prove it.”165 
 Despite the sheer difficulty in generating accurate crop yields, the CIA came close using 
Landsat imagery in part to predict and report Soviet grain yields in the 1980s and inform 
American decision making with regards to grain exports. Much akin to LACIE however, CIA 
crop yield predictions also fell short. Landsat imagery alongside other meteorological and soil 
data and crop models could not fully apprise the intelligence community of Soviet agricultural 
decision making. The Soviet Union held numerous agreements with other countries, sought to 
use grains for livestock production, and did not readily report all potential variables necessary for 
crop prediction. These gaps complicated CIA’s ability to predict Soviet yields. The CIA also 
experimented with using Landsat imagery to inventory and predict illicit crop growth including 
narcotics in South American and Afghanistan. 
 
War on Drugs from Space 
 In 1971, President Richard Nixon announced an effort, which informally came to be 
called the ‘War on Drugs,’ to curb illicit drug use in the United States as it became a public 
health concern. However, the effort did not gain widespread traction as drug production and 
trafficking into America rose in the 1970s. The U.S. sought to stifle these activities at their 
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origin. In 1984, Congress passed the Hawkins-Gilman Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (the bill that created the USAID and administered economic and technical aid to 
developing countries) which had the goal of curtailing foreign narcotics production. The 
Hawkins-Gilman Amendment allowed Congress to block economic and military assistance “if a 
country does not make satisfactory progress in curtailing its drug business.”166 In order to make 
such an assessment, the U.S. narcotics control establishment at CIA, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), and the State Department had to assess and reduce the amount of acreage 
committed to coca cultivation abroad through crop eradication. This section also demonstrates 
how the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan fostered expanded opium production and 
trafficking, which CIA tracked with Landsat imagery. The Afghanistan opium estimate 
experiment informed the larger program of estimating coca production in South America: CIA 
“chose to apply the same imagery-based estimating technique that we have used successfully to 
estimate opium production in Asia.”167 The lessons of LACIE and related experiments addressed 
above proved crucial to CIA’s techniques. CIA coca estimates drew “heavily on methodology 
developed to estimate licit crop production in countries like the USSR.”168 In both cases, CIA 
implemented crop yield prediction techniques to address the burgeoning illicit drug trade in 
Afghanistan and South America; all of which were countries subject to the Hawkins-Gilman 
Amendment. 
 When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, it sparked a war between the Red 
Army and guerilla Mujahedeen fighters. The Soviet military appropriated the Afghan 
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government and installed a sympathetic regime under Babrak Karmal. With no state suppression 
of illicit drug trade or containment from neighboring Iran or Pakistan, opiate production and 
trafficking grew as the conflict persisted. The CIA, in conjunction with the Department of State 
and DEA, closely monitored the conflict and reported in 1985 that a major byproduct of the war 
was an expanded opium trade. 
 The CIA used a similar crop yield method to map and track the illicit opium trade in 
1985. The below picture, taken from a September 1985 CIA report, depicts crops and snowfall in 
the Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan.169 
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Figure 1: Landsat Imagery of Afghanistan 
 
Landsat Image of Afghanistan, March 1985, NARA, College Park, MD 
While depicted here in black and white, the Landsat image would have been in false color 
showing opium crops in red, snow in white, and exposed rock as a grey. The snowmelt was a key 
variable as it provided irrigation for crops and Jalalabad was the urban node of the opium trade 
in the region. CIA, DEA and Department of State used Landsat imagery to study and track illicit 
drug trade in Afghanistan and postulated that it would continue to expand. While the report 
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expressed little concern for Soviet or Afghan drug abuse and public health, CIA’s main concern 
was the Afghan opium market playing a larger role in the international narcotics market. 
 CIA use of Landsat imagery revealed an increase in acreage committed to poppy crops, 
in Nangarhar Province “approximately 50 to 70 percent of the cultivated fields are planted to 
poppy.”170 The crops were spread throughout rural mountain valleys in areas controlled by the 
insurgency, rather than Soviet or Afghan government controlled territory. Despite the conflict 
disrupting the irrigation infrastructure, CIA estimated that there was little crop loss since 
“destruction of crops and farms caused by military operations affects only a small portion of 
cultivated land, less than 1 percent of total farm crop areas observed on satellite imagery.”171 The 
CIA report argued that the Soviets and Afghan regime would not address the growth in narcotics 
production given its attention to the armed conflict. Rather, the report focused on containment of 
opium trade. 
 The satellite imagery revealed the origins of poppy seed cultivation as well as major trade 
routes and the locations of major conflict. From these variables, CIA and DEA deduced the 
movements of drug smuggling into Pakistan and Iran. Within Afghanistan, opium provided a 
means of revenue for insurgents, who often also had farms. The CIA and DEA, concerned with 
drug containment, argued that the only potential motivation to curb the narcotics production and 
trade would be if the Soviets “perceive that drug abuse threatens the performance of Soviet 
troops in Afghanistan or that drug sales finance the insurgent movement.”172 While CIA and 
DEA would not be able to contain drug trafficking, Landsat imagery played a crucial role in 
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revealing the increased opium trade in Afghanistan. As mentioned, the Afghanistan project 
informed the methods CIA used in South America. 
In 1984, CIA and State began to use Landsat imagery to uncover the widespread 
cultivation of coca as well as marijuana and opium. The Agency sought to “use imagery-based 
estimative techniques to give policymakers and drug enforcement specialists a more precise 
understanding of the extent of coca production in South America,” namely targeting Bolivia, 
Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela.173 By 1985, each of these countries began 
counternarcotics eradication programs. Meanwhile, the DEA worked to stem the flow of cocaine 
into the United States and sought to do so at its origin in South America.  
Coca cultivation was easily identifiable on Landsat imagery as it is a perennial crop 
planted in legible rows over several thousand hectares in each of the aforementioned countries. 
CIA and DEA “relied on Landsat data to delineate agricultural from non-agricultural areas – the 
first phase in sorting out likely coca growing areas from forests, mountains, and other 
uncultivated areas.”174 CIA also flew several U-2 flights over Bolivia and Colombia. From this 
space and aerial imagery, CIA estimated that a minimum of 140,000 hectares was under coca 
cultivation in South America in 1984 with the largest commitments of land in Bolivia and Peru. 
In July 1984, the Bolivian government sought the assistance of the U.S. military and began 
Operation Blast Furnace which was a coca eradication program predicated on locating illicit coca 
cultivation. The operation disrupted the infrastructure of processing laboratories and trafficking 
routes as well. 
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 Peru presented an even bigger challenge to illicit drug control. In July 1985, the Peruvian 
government agreed to eradicate 6,000 hectares of coca a year through 1989.175 President Alan 
Garcia charged the Guardia Civil and regional departments with ground truthing in areas more 
difficult to conduct surveillance and carry out crop eradication. From the Americans, the CIA 
analyzed Landsat imagery covering most all of Peru. In 1986, the CIA mapped “suspected coca-
growing areas with Landsat imagery to help evaluate Peruvian coca cultivation” in Peru’s upper 
Huallaga River Valley, Cuzco, and the Apurimac and Maranon River Valleys.176 However, one 
of the main technical complications in 1985 was cloud cover which blocked certain drug 
enforcement efforts.177 Another complication was labor, which Peruvian drug enforcements 
severely lacked to carry out eradication once the coca was revealed on Landsat imagery. 
 Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela also carried out drug eradication programs 
that attempted to use Landsat imagery as well as U-2 aerial photographs. However, regions of 
these countries proved more difficult to obtain imagery from in 1985 and 1986 given the highly 
frequent cloud cover and dense vegetation and rainforests where much of the coca cultivation 
was taking place. While Landsat imagery played a crucial role identifying coca cultivation in 
portions of South America it was not ubiquitously successful given the environmental 
conditions. Moreover, the efforts of the South American governments fell short of their coca 
eradication and interdiction goals and instead, coca cultivation increased over the two year study 
period aggregated over the six countries. 
 
Conclusion 
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 The backdrop of the Cold War and national security imperatives loomed large as 
scientists found new ways to look at Earth from above. One such critical imperative was 
surveillance, specifically of the planet’s geographic features. The fusion of the American 
scientific and intelligence communities buttressed and deployed the environmental sciences to 
gain strategic leverage over its Cold War adversaries. In this chapter, agriculture increasingly 
came under surveillance as the United States demonstrated greater abilities in remote sensing. 
Where Turchetti and Roberts focus on the sciences themselves, they pay little attention to the 
technology and techniques of surveillance. I demonstrated how the techniques of surveillance 
were developed and how the data obtained came to be used by the scientific and intelligence 
communities.  
Since the 1950s, the NAS, several universities, USDA, and finally NASA contributed to 
numerous experiments that applied remote sensing to agriculture. NASA, the Army, and the 
Navy supplied funding and oversaw several early experiments. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
federal government and their academic partners developed both the technology and scientific 
techniques to begin crop yield estimates domestically. By the 1980s, NASA had conducted 
international crop yield prediction which captured the attention of the intelligence community. 
CIA in particular adopted similar techniques to predict the crop yields of several countries and to 
understand and stifle the flow of narcotics. While there were tremendous technological 
difficulties, some of which were not resolved, the Landsat program essentially proved itself a 
useful scientific instrument to the U.S. federal government, which later sought to expand its use 
abroad. This chapter demonstrated how several federal agencies developed and expanded the use 
of remote sensing through agriculture. Cold War and national security, especially after the Soviet 
wheat deal in 1972, provided the not only the crucial backdrop for the first major use of Landsat 
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imagery but also the imperative for its use by multiple federal agencies. In the next chapter, I 
demonstrate how NASA and USGS made Landsat data available for the world to use, though the 





Chapter 3: “Demonstrating the Value of Remote Sensing from Space”: 
Fostering Use in the Experimental Years (1957-1984) 
 
Introduction 
 By the 1950s, scientific data began to globalize as several international initiatives 
encouraged the collection of scientific data from around the world. The International 
Geophysical Year in 1957-1958 inspired geologists, physicists, oceanographers, among others to 
gather data about Earth’s various phenomena. This worldwide scientific effort, the “IGY was 
distinguished by its emphasis on and the visibility of Big Data – a synoptic collection of 
observational data on a global geographic scale,” which precipitated the establishment of World 
Data Centers and the proliferation of scientific data.178 The IGY inspired later data collection 
programs including the International Biological Program and the Long-Term Ecological 
Research program. As Aronova et. al. demonstrated further, these programs “ultimately 
succeeded in providing a renewed legitimacy for synoptic data collection in biology.”179 As early 
as 1946, the U.S. military placed various instruments aboard V-2 rockets which it used to gather 
data from the upper atmosphere.180 The Soviet contribution to the IGY included the launch of 
Sputnik, which inspired data collection from space-based instruments. Throughout the 1960s, 
American meteorological satellites such as the Television and Infrared Observation Satellites 
(TIROS) and Improved TIROS Operational System (ITOS) collected low resolution imagery of 
the planet’s surface to study Earth’s weather patterns. Yet despite these growing collections of 
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biological and meteorological data, no synoptic, global scale program existed to gather scientific 
data of the Earth’s land masses. 
The USAF and CIA clandestinely gathered imagery of Earth’s terrestrial surface for 
intelligence purposes relying upon the academic geography community.181 Cloud also showed 
the contributions of Corona to cartographic science in the context of the Cold War.182 Dwayne 
Day et al. considered how Corona both played a role in the dire national security concerns of the 
Cold War while also advancing the burgeoning space capabilities of the U.S.183 However, the 
classified nature of Corona data made it impossible for the broader scientific community to use. 
The Department of the Interior and NASA saw the value of terrestrial satellite data, leading to 
the launch of Landsat in 1972 and the subsequent effort to build an archive of data for use by a 
global scientific community. 
In this chapter, I demonstrate how the U.S. government, NASA and USGS in particular, 
fostered Landsat data abroad in three ways simultaneously. First, it leveraged the UN into 
favoring such a program by assuaging concerns of espionage and building a global consensus. 
Second, NASA and USGS collaborated with foreign space programs to allow direct receipt of 
Landsat data through a network of international ground stations and through two working groups 
that maintained these relations. Third, the aforementioned agencies worked with AID to offer 
remote sensing data use training seminars and grants to developing countries. However, in each 
case the U.S. government experienced both domestic and international barriers to expanding 
Landsat data use. I argue that the U.S. government, beginning with President Nixon, envisioned 
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a non-discriminatory, open access Earth remote sensing data policy during Landsat’s 
experimental years (1972-1978) but it proved very difficult to implement due to international 
legal concerns voiced through the UN, domestic national security restrictions, and financial 
concerns. 
This argument proceeds in two parts: the first analyzes the slow proliferation of Landsat 
data ground receiving stations abroad and the policies that govern them as well as the 
applications explored through training seminars and seed grants provided by the U.S. 
government to expand the user community. In particular, NASA, USAID, and USGS played a 
central role in this regard. These agencies not only had to adopt domestic policies to allow 
international cooperators to receive Landsat data, they also had to build a legal framework at the 
UN. The UN had been the site of debate in the 1960s between not only the superpowers but the 
rest of the world with regards to international law in space. In the early 1970s, the UN General 
Assembly in New York, New York again dealt with the challenge space-based Earth observation 
satellites posed to national sovereignty. In addition, many countries needed to acquire the 
technology and expertise to use Landsat imagery for various environmental investigations. There 
were numerous countries, many in the developing world, who reacted to Landsat’s potential with 
enthusiasm, though others viewed it skeptically. In effect, Landsat data use does not simply 
appear uniquely of its own kind nor does it proliferate transnationally without a conducive 
political environment laden with technical expertise and legal mandates.  
 
Initial International Reaction to Land Remote Sensing 
 In September 1969, President Richard Nixon gave a speech before the UN General 
Assembly. The speech covered several aspects of world affairs such as America’s role in the 
104 
 
world, peace in Vietnam, strategic arms limitations, and peace-building. Among those divisive 
issues, Nixon introduced five areas which he argued should be unanimously supported including 
safe air travel, voluntary service, economic development, environmental protection, and space 
exploration. He spoke of great potential for space technology to benefit humanity, in particular, 
“we [the United States] now are developing earth resource survey satellites…capable of yielding 
data which could assist in as widely varied tasks as these: the location of schools of fish in the 
oceans, the location of mineral deposits on land, the health of agricultural crops.”184 Nixon 
further stated that “this program [Earth resource satellites] will be dedicated to produce 
information not only for the United States, but also for the world community.”185 The speech 
cannot be taken as hard policy, but this statement relates to NASA’s mandate that it should 
“provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its 
activities and the results thereof.”186 In addition, Nixon’s speech echoed the language of the 
Outer Space Treaty of 1967 which stated that the “use of outer space should be carried on for the 
benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development” and 
to “broad international co-operation in scientific” uses of space.187 Effectively both national and 
international law mandated that Landsat data was meant to be available to all potential users.  
Following Landsat’s launch, the UN conducted a survey of Member States which 
assessed the legality of remote sensing in countries around the world. The UN’s Request for 
Information solicited responses within three areas: laws that either allowed remote sensing or 
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disallowed foreign land remote sensing of domestic land, and, thirdly, countries that did not have 
any related laws. The results of the survey indicated an overwhelmingly positive response to the 
satellite’s capabilities, discussed later in this chapter, but a select few detractors raised a concern 
central to the very mission of the United Nations: that of sovereignty. 
 
Remote Sensing Resistance: Domestic and International Concerns, 1973-1975 
 Despite Nixon’s pitch to the UNGA and a generally positive international reception for 
Landsat and its applications, several UN Member States and U.S. government officials expressed 
concern regarding international use of Landsat data. For several countries around the world, 
State sovereignty, especially regarding domestic control of natural resource exploitation, became 
the chief concern. The UN Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites of the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) held a session from 29 January to 
10 February 1973 to address international concerns regarding land remote sensing. The Working 
Group  
“requested the Secretariat to compile ‘information drawn from international law and 
national legislation as well as practices that States consider relevant to environmental and 
natural resources surveying’ as well as ‘relevant existing legislation and practices in the 
use and dissemination of environmental and earth resources information.”188 
 
The Secretary-General’s office distributed the Request for Information to 94 Member States and 
7 Non-Members in December 1972 and began receiving responses in early 1973. The Scientific 
and Technical Sub-Committee, under COPUOS, assessed the responses in May 1973 to 
understand Member states’ legal objections to a system such as Landsat. Many countries stated 
they had no established domestic legislation or regulatory machinery relevant to land remote 
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sensing for resource surveying.189 Others used this Request for Information to express their 
support of land remote sensing systems for earth resource surveying. Jamaica, the Philippines, 
and the Netherlands each announced the formation of government outfits to use Landsat data for 
environmental analyses. Norway was in the process of establishing a remote sensing laboratory 
under its Ministry for Environmental Affairs. Jamaica in particular established a Remote Sensing 
Laboratory under its Ministry of Mining and Natural Resources. Jamaica’s Mission to the UN 
argued that Member States should be able to maintain sovereignty over their natural resources 
and should have the right to access the findings of earth resource surveys. In their view, “the 
study of earth resources through the techniques of remote sensing satellites shall be based on 
international co-operation for the benefit of all mankind.”190 Throughout the Request for 
Information process in 1973, several Member States expressed concern over sovereignty of 
natural resources. 
 Satellite overflight became generally accepted after the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and 
formalized in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 after a protracted legal battle between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. However, Landsat and the promise of open access to its data raised 
a serious sovereignty question for UN Member States. For example: if an American used 
Landsat data to discover mineral resources in Oman, Great Britain, or Jamaica, does the 
American have the right to exploit those resources? Several countries including Sweden and 
Australia strongly defended national sovereignty against foreign exploitation of domestic natural 
resources. 
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Sweden also framed sovereignty as a concern for Landsat coverage. Swedish 
Ambassador to the UN Olof Rydbeck expressed concern that international law in 1973 did not 
adequately address land remote sensing since “States will not be able to see with equanimity that 
such information is being gathered about their territories if they have not ascertained that they 
have complete access to it and, perhaps, the right to deny its use to anybody else unless prior 
consent has been given.”191 First, Rydbeck addressed ‘international areas’ covered in Landsat 
imagery, such as oceans which lie outside national jurisdictions. As an example, Sweden argued 
that nations capable of mapping the seabed gained an economic advantage in fisheries. For 
Sweden and fishing, “it is easy to see that those states which would have at their disposal up-to-
date information might gain important advantages.”192 The Swedish Ambassador stated how the 
Outer Space Treaty legitimized weather satellites, but contended that land remote sensing 
satellites presented more direct economic issues. Rydbeck called for ‘new concepts’ in 
international law such as legal mechanisms that protect observed states from observing states 
through distribution and use regulations. While the ambassador did not provide specifics, he 
urgently advocated for legislation and coordination from the UN and COPUOS in particular. The 
Australians voiced a similar concern. 
 Australian Representative to the Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by 
Satellites Dr. L.M. Gillin responded to the RFI with a statement he made to the Working Group 
in January 1973. Gillin expressed concern over the economic benefits that Landsat promised to 
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countries that received data regarding minerals extraction. Gillin posed the question regarding 
Australian legislation to the Working Group:  
“exploration rights in an area are exclusive to the holders of a permit in respect to that 
area. What are we to do, then, about a situation in which any company can obtain, from 
an agency outside Australia [EROS], information about a part of Australia to which, in 
Australia, it would have no legal right and no means of gaining access?”193 
 
For the Australian delegation, remote sensing technology posed a serious concern to national 
legislation. Under Australian law, any form of prospecting for mineral resources required a 
permit from the government. However, Landsat data provided users the means of prospecting, 
defined by the Australians, to any Landsat data user from anywhere in the world since EROS 
provided data openly. In essence, Landsat data privileged mineral prospectors outside Australia 
even though they would not have the legal right to potential discoveries. For the Australians, 
Landsat data compromised Australian sovereignty over natural resources and indeed their 
national laws. Accordingly, the Australians also interpreted the Outer Space Treaty differently. 
The Australian delegation did not interpret Outer Space Treaty Article I194 to permit land remote 
sensing. As discussed, the United States viewed land remote sensing as permissible under the 
Treaty as a civilian activity. Gillin expressed optimism however.  
Despite these concerns, Gillin stated his enthusiasm for Landsat by noting the “excellent 
cooperation between NASA and the Australian Committee for ERTS [ACERTS].” Established in 
1971 by the Australian government, ACERTS became the national coordinating committee for 
Australian use of Landsat for scientific investigations. Australia’s Bureau of Mineral Resources 
first gained experience with earth imagery taken of Amadeus Basin from NASA’s Gemini V 
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spacecraft and conducted later investigations with USGS which “set the stage for Australia to 
take full advantage of data from satellite-based systems.”195 Gillin understood the benefits of 
remote sensing and sought to resolve land remote sensing legal and political issues he brought 
forth in response to the UN RFI. 
  The American response to the RFI was brief. It stated that data is widely available from 
EROS and encouraged developing countries to review its Landsat data. The U.S. held “the view 
that the principles embodied in the Outer Space Treaty clearly apply to the activities of states in 
remote sensing of the earth by satellites,” but that the U.S. sought to “facilitate the maximum 
international availability and effective utilization of data.”196 The United States reiterated 
Nixon’s promise from his 1969 speech to the UNGA that data will be made available to all 
potential users which helped to assuage concerns about national sovereignty and disproportionate 
economic advantages. 
Several Member States raised salient concerns regarding national sovereignty yet none 
expressed outright disapproval of the Landsat satellites. Nearly all respondents to the UN RFI 
mentioned above sought to use Landsat data in some experimental fashion. Sweden and 
Australia raised key legal concerns that the United States addressed through policies that made 
Landsat data internationally available through ground stations abroad and non-discriminatory 
sales at EROS. Due to these concerns, Sweden and Australia become two of the first countries to 
establish Landsat data receiving ground stations so as to have access to, and thus control over, 
data collected of their countries. Canada became the first country to build a ground station which 
set the precedent for others to follow. 
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Building a Ground Station 
 In order to operate a satellite and acquire data from its instruments, NASA needed 
ground-based facilities to communicate with objects in orbit. These installations, commonly 
referred to as ground stations, had numerous on site antennae to uplink and downlink with 
Landsat satellites. Only one station can uplink to the satellites, the Goddard Spaceflight Center 
(GSFC) in Greenbelt, Maryland. The satellites also transmit data to ground stations through 
downlinks. After GSFC, EROS, and their International Cooperators (ICs)197 received raw 
Landsat data, these sites used processing equipment, such as large IBM or Sperry Univac 
computer systems, to convert the data into imagery. These ground stations stored and archived 
the satellite data on large mainframes with huge memory space for the time. From the 1970s 
through the 1980s, Landsat imagery came in two forms: a film-based map or in digital form on a 
Computer Compatible Tape (CCT). A film-based image was either a paper map or a 
transparency whereas a CCT was a large disk with embedded imagery. Prior to Landsat’s launch, 
NASA designated Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in Maryland, the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory-Goldstone NASA facility in California, and the Poker Flat Research Ranger near 
Fairbanks, Alaska as Landsat ground stations to receive data. GSFC had two special 
responsibilities, commanding the Landsat satellites and disseminating data. GSFC became (and 
remains) the only station capable of controlling Landsats in orbit which includes maintaining 
stability by commanding the satellites to fire its hydrazine-powered boosters to change its pitch, 
yaw, roll, or altitude. Also, GSFC served as a data dissemination facility for all gathered data; 
Goldstone and Fairbanks gathered data, loaded it onto tape recorders, and sent it to Maryland for 
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dissemination. In 1973, USGS established a receiving and dissemination ground station near 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota named EROS which coordinated with NASA.198 In order to gather 
more data and more readily disseminate Landsat imagery around the world, NASA, and later 
with USGS, negotiated for ground stations around the world.  Ground stations are not unique to 
Landsat; NASA maintained agreements around the world to sustain several satellite initiatives. 
 The notion of the ground station, or more broadly research stations in general, served 
many scientific disciplines. The purpose of such facilities was to gather scientific data about 
distinct geographic locations. USDA and Rockefeller Foundation established remote agricultural 
research stations throughout the U.S. and Mexico to observe crop growth199 The National 
Science Foundation and United States Navy built and sustained stations in Antarctica to gather 
biological, geological, and meteorological data for polar research.200 Andrew Butrica et. al. 
argued that ground stations form a ‘global village’ through the government and commercial 
establishment of a communications satellite constellation.201 This literature suggests that ground 
stations played a central role not only in gathering scientific data but also disseminating it. I 
situate Landsat within this literature arguing that they established an American presence abroad 
that facilitated and fostered Landsat data usage. 
Shortly after the Landsat-1’s launch, NASA began coordinating with other countries to 
establish data receiving ground stations abroad. Three broad technologies comprised a ground 
station: receiving antenna(e), an archiving computer which stored data, and a data processing 
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unit. With these three components, an International Cooperator (IC) could receive data in the 
form of X-band downlinks from the Landsat satellites. The data archiving computers stored the 
received data and processing units made the data useful. For example, when data downlinked, it 
was initially subject to atmospheric disruptions and data was often skewed since the scanning 
device swept back and forth. The processing units received data in the form of long strips of 
Earth imagery and converted them to 185 x 185 kilometer images. The storage computers pieced 
strips of imagery together to form an image, a method termed geometric correction. Several 
images placed together formed a county or state as desired by the user, a process called 
mosaicking. These three broad technologies were required to receive and effectively use Landsat 
data. 
 The U.S. government, including NASA, did not provide any of this equipment to 
potential ICs. Rather, ICs approached NASA with a proposal for a Landsat ground station and 
ICs had to acquire antennae, processors, and archiving computers on their own generally through 
domestic hardware suppliers or through American companies such as GE, IBM, or Sperry. None 
of these items fell under International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in the 1970s, a point 
explored later in this chapter. The Canadians, through the newly formed Canadian Centre for 
Remote Sensing, developed their own equipment to their own specifications and had superior 
turnaround time to the GSFC systems.202 I will discuss the Canadian efforts in greater detail 
below. Other stations such as Iran ordered their equipment from America through Sperry. In 
addition to technical requirements, NASA also abided by a specific set of guidelines established 
by its Deputy Director of International Affairs, Arnold Frutkin. Once the IC had the requisite 
equipment in place and recognized NASA’s terms of cooperation, the IC negotiated a 
                                                          




Memorandum of Understanding with NASA and after 1973 with EROS. ICs worked completely 
independent of NASA, though remained in dialogue with the agency and USGS through 
international annual symposia mentioned below.  I detail this process below using several 
different cases. 
 
Ground Control: Building Ground Stations Abroad 
 Negotiations for ground stations began between an international cooperating agency, 
such as a foreign space agency or public-private firm, and NASA’s Office of International 
Affairs (NASA/OIA). Frutkin helped formulate guidelines for international space programs 
during his NASA tenure.203 Accordingly, his policies played an important role in establishing 
Landsat stations abroad. John Krige summarized Frutkin’s policies into five basic guidelines 
which each applied to Landsat ground station negotiations.204 In order for an IC to receive a 
station, they applied to NASA through a government agency or a contracted private entity. 
Domestically, each individual country selected a government agency, a public-private firm, or 
contractor which would correspond directly with NASA. Each of these agencies negotiated with 
NASA, who consulted the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense, for their respective 
ground stations. In addition, the potential IC must agree to conduct projects of scientific value, 
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acknowledge mutual interest, accept financial responsibility, and provide for the “widest and 
most practicable dissemination of results.”205 These details are discussed in greater detail below.   
In mid-1971 a year before ERTS-1’s launch, Canada became the first country to approach 
NASA about receiving Landsat data directly. Canada became interested in space technology, in 
particular communications and land remote sensing capabilities, given the vastness of the 
Canadian landmass.206 In particular, “geographically large countries such as Canada have a need 
for regional topographic maps…which may serve either as preliminary maps of regions not yet 
mapped by conventional methods, or as complimentary information to existing maps.”207 Dr. 
Lawrence Morley, a University of Toronto trained geophysicist, played a key role in developing 
Canada’s Landsat receiving capabilities. After receiving his Ph.D, he joined the Geological 
Survey of Canada and eventually became the Director of its Geophysics Branch. Through his 
influence at the Geological Survey of Canada, he convinced Natural Resources Canada 
administrators “to support a proposal to found a Canadian Centre for Remote Sensing (CCRS) 
that would receive data directly from Landsat and distribute it within Canada.”208 Upon the 
founding of CCRS in 1970, Morley became its first Director and built it into a premier data 
receiving and processing facility. The Ottawa-based Canadian Centre for Remote Sensing 
(CCRS), then under Natural Resources Canada, eventually established a station on site and two 
more ground stations later on in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan and Gatineau, Quebec. 
 CCRS developed processing technology differently from those found at GSFC. By 1971, 
the Canadians completed development, spending less on machines that could process data faster 
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than NASA. The Americans and Canadians both experienced technical problems with 
technology in the pre-launch testing phase using aerial surveys, “Canada had distributed 50,000 
copies of Landsat images, a respectable figure next to NASA’s 218,000,” by the end of January 
1973.209 The Canadians established a station at Prince Albert, Saskatchewan which had a vast 
coverage area from the Arctic Archipelago south to Mexico and Alaska to central Québec. 
Canada followed its own precedent by establishing a second station at Shoe Cove, 
Newfoundland on the island of Labrador which began processing data in 1977. This station 
provided nearly full coverage of Canada as the Shoe Cove station210 covered the whole of 
Atlantic Canada. Only parts of the Queen Elizabeth Islands and northern Baffin Island were not 
covered. Thus, CCRS provided nearly national coverage within 5 years of Landsat 1’s launch. 
Canada became the first country to establish a foreign ground station and began to use data from 
the Landsat program routinely. Following Canada’s Prince Albert station and CCRS’s 
impressive data output, considerable interest from international users convinced NASA to 
increase Landsat’s footprint globally. 
The Canadians set the precedent for international cooperation regarding Landsat ground 
stations between NASA (later USGS) and foreign space agencies. Several states followed 
Canada furnishing ground stations as well. Shortly after CCRS opened its doors, Brazil’s 
national space agency, Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE), also requested a ground 
station based in Cuiaba. Also, two stations emerged in Europe as a result of American ties.  
NASA relations with the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) and the European 
Launch Development Organization (ELDO) began to move towards greater cooperation in space, 
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yet simultaneously their reliance on NASA launch functions in the late 1960s undermined their 
independence from NASA.211 Both ESRO and ELDO experienced crises from lacking technical 
knowledge and financial instability. These crises combined with the desire for autonomy led to 
the reorganization of the European space programs into one European Space Agency (ESA). 
Much of Western Europe joined ESA (or had already been members of ESRO) with each making 
certain commitments and taking on responsibilities to Europe including “the provision of general 
facilities: platforms, satellites, launchers, and operations in orbit,”212 yet also was actively 
involved with international cooperation. Cooperation “evolved from an essentially exclusive 
relation with NASA,”213 which eventually broadened. Much of this exclusivity in relations came 
in the 1970s as NASA extended Landsat’s global reach. Fucino, Italy became the site of the first 
European Landsat station contracted in 1974, and then received data in 1975. Unlike the 
Canadians who built an in-house agency directly under the federal government, the Europeans 
used a different model. The Italians contracted Telespazio, a public-private telecommunications 
firm who operated the stations on behalf of ESA and the Italian government. In a similar 
contractual model, ESA added a second ground station through the Swedish Space Corporation’s 
Esrange Space Center near Kiruna in 1978. The Swedish and Italian stations covered a 
significant portion of the European landmass as well as a significant portion of the Arctic polar 
region. These relationships hinged on the negotiation of a mutually-beneficial Memorandum of 
Understanding.  
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Memoranda of Understanding and Misunderstanding 
As mentioned, an IC MOU was signed between either NASA or EROS, often with State 
Department consultation, and a government affiliated institution abroad. In December 1978, 
NASA signed a MOU with the Australian Department of Science for a ground station located at 
Alice Springs in the Northern Territory of Australia. The four and a half page MOU addressed 
the responsibilities assumed by both parties as well as joint priorities.214 The agreement stated 
that the United States and Australia would have access to each other’s data sets, designated 
technical representatives to coordinate functions, attend annual meetings of the Landsat Ground 
Station Operations Working Group, and stated that the MOU was void if Australia did not have a 
functioning facility within 15 months or if either side fell short of necessary funding. ICs had to 
acknowledge Landsat’s experimental nature and that it was subject to technical and 
programmatic modifications. Australia’s obligations included building and maintaining a 
receiving station in Alice Springs and an imagery dissemination center in Canberra. The 
agreement obliged Australia to conform to NASA’s non-discriminatory data access policy at 
reasonable data prices, ensure users their investigations are within range of the Alice Springs 
station, send NASA catalogs of data listings, and make data available to NASA free of charge. 
NASA’s roles included insuring Australia received data from Landsats 1, 2, and 3 as well as 
Landsat 4 planned for launch in 1982 as well as other technical requirements for downlinks. 
NASA held the responsibility for ensuring Australia received timely and useful data. For 
example, NASA saw to it that Australia’s antennae were properly calibrated and that its data was 
comparable in quality to American data. After the signing of the agreement, Australia began 
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construction on the station which was completed and began receiving Landsat downlinks in 
September 1979. The station remains in operation today. At this point, Landsat ground stations 
received data in Sweden, Italy, Brazil, Canada, Japan, and Australia. At that time, NASA was 
also engaged in discussions with South Africa, Iran, Zaire, and China to build new stations.   
As these stations materialized, several key similarities applied to all the above ground 
stations. NASA also discouraged potential ICs from proposing stations close to each other such 
that they had substantial overlap in coverage to avoid duplication of efforts. Also, an 
international cooperator could distribute data openly, as was the policy in the U.S., and charge 
comparable prices. There was no obligation to repatriate data to the U.S., however many stations 
did so on an irregular basis.215 Furthermore, NASA did not generally staff the stations, it simply 
‘flipped the switch’ once the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) became valid which meant 
the satellite began a downlink to the foreign ground station for data reception when it was in 
range. A station would only receive data within its antenna’s range. Furthermore, an international 
cooperator only received data specified in the MoU. For example, some ground stations only 
received MSS data from Landsats 1, 2, and 3. A new agreement was required if Italy or Canada 
wished to receive TM data from Landsat 4. Since NASA (or other agencies) did not have a 
permanent presence at any international ground stations, the international cooperator provided 
their own staff. For example, CCRS staffed its station with Canadian civil servants and 
Telespazio staffed the Fucino station with Telespazio employees. Eventually, ESA requested a 
second station based in Kiruna, Sweden, Geoscience Australia established a station in Alice 
Springs and the South African National Space Agency built a station in Hartebeesthoek. In each 
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case, stations cost $4-7 million to establish and build, $1-2 million per year to operate, and 
NASA levied an annual fee to ICs of $200,000 to receive data in July 1976.216 However, ICs 
could distribute data directly without U.S. government intervention. NASA, USGS, and their 
Landsat ICs set up an annual meeting series to discuss these particulars. On 13 June 1975, JSC 
hosted the first Landsat Ground Station Operations Working Group meeting (LGSOWG). 
The meeting dovetailed with NASA’s Earth Resources Survey Symposium, also held in 
Houston to display various projects Landsat data had been used in. Leonard Jaffe, Deputy 
Associate Administrator for Space Applications, chaired LGSOWG on behalf of NASA. 
LGSOWG’s purpose was to provide a “forum for the exchange of information on remote sensing 
problems and opportunities among nations operating LANDSAT data acquisition and processing 
facilities” as well as give ground station operators from each of the nations represented an 
opportunity to present a report summarizing their experiences in acquiring, processing, and 
disseminating LANDSAT data.”217 The key concern of the first meeting and of their cooperation 
was to respond to user community concerns. The meetings rotated around different ICs and also 
held meetings at either Johnson Space Center or at EROS in South Dakota. The first meeting set 
the precedent that NASA and USGS would share the ongoing activities of NASA and EROS 
operations of Landsat and proposed changes. Afterwards, each of the ICs presented their 
activities, shared user concerns, and discussed data availability and quality. For example, the 
Canadians discussed the progress of the Prince Albert station construction and discussed the 
heavy use of Landsat data by the Canadian Forest Research Agency. Zaire and Iran also attended 
the first LGSOWG as they hoped to build a Landsat ground station. Both countries announced 
plans for stations in Kinshasa and Tehran respectively but faced shortages of technical expertise 
                                                          
216 Press Kit, “Landsat C,” 22 February 1978, pg. 6, courtesy James David, Curator, NASM 
217 “Minutes of the Landsat Ground Station Operations Working Group Meeting,” Johnson Space Center, Houston, 
TX, 13 June 1975, documents courtesy of James Zimmerman, formerly of NASA 
120 
 
and funding. Zaire’s representative. Dr. Sendwe Ilung of the Office of the President expressed 
his hopes that a remote sensing training center and data reception would benefit all African 
nations.  
In 1976, Italy and Canada hosted the next two LGSOWG meetings in March and October 
respectively. At the Telespazio Headquarters in Rome, Jaffe again convened Canada, Brazil, 
Iran, Zaire, Italy, and new potential IC, Chile. The University of Chile began soliciting for 
proposals to build a ground station outside Santiago from suppliers to procure processing and 
receiving equipment. Frutkin and Jaffe updated the group on Landsat 1 and 2 as well as NASA’s 
progress towards launching Landsat 3 as well as making its data available. By the end of 1976, 
several countries approached NASA about ground stations. As mentioned, NASA sought to 
reduce the overlap of coverage of nearby ground stations. For example, Norway, Argentina, 
Brazil, and France each approached NASA about stations. At the third LGSOWG meeting in 
Ottawa in October 1976, Frutkin and his deputy James Zimmerman, Senior Applications 
Programs Officer of NASA HQ, encouraged ESA to coordinate remote sensing data sharing 
efforts among Sweden and Italy (with stations in place) with France and Norway (who sought to 
receive data). As a result, CNES and Telespazio agreed to a data sharing memorandum. In South 
America, Chile and Argentina built stations that would reduce overlap with Brazil’s station in 
Cuiaba, which began to receive data in May 1973. Just prior to the Ottawa LGSOWG, 
Zimmerman met with 18 African governments to coordinate ground station planning. The plan, 
further discussed at the Ottawa LGSOWG, proposed ground stations in Kinshasa, Zaire and 
Ouagadougou, Upper Volta as well as training centers in Kinshasa, Ouagadougou, Nairobi, 
Cairo, and Ile-Ife.218 The ambitious plan also proposed a remote sensing council to govern and 
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coordinate the network. While the U.S. kept ICs apprised of developments with new Landsats 
and technical information, the Ottawa LGSOWG began the discussions necessary to create 
continental remote sensing programs which continued at the next several LGSOWG meetings. 
Over the next several years, ESA and Telespazio built a European capacity for remote 
sensing data dissemination. ESA planned the Earthnet program with Landsat data as a crucial 
component. Earthnet became a data service that made Earth Observation data available to 
European scientific investigators. Between October 1976 and November 1978, Telespazio and 
the Swedish Space Corporation coordinated Europe’s remote sensing data gathering and 
dissemination efforts on behalf of ESA. During this time period the Kiruna and Fucino stations 
received data from all three Landsats in orbit and Telespazio distributed Landsat images in both 
paper and CCT form from its headquarters in Rome. The coordinated effort of SSC, Telespazio, 
and ESA resulted in “European-wide operations and the subsequent demand for data by ESA 
member countries” grew as a result.219 Elsewhere, data availability became more difficult to 
achieve. 
Two countries experienced major setbacks with regards to their Landsat ground station 
proposals: Chile and Zaire. In Santiago, the University of Chile completed a feasibility study 
meant to satisfy the government. The university proposed a ground station that would collect and 
disseminate Landsat data as well as information from NOAA meteorological satellites. 
Throughout 1977, the university failed to convince the Chilean government “of the importance 
of proceeding with funding for a Landsat station” yet continued to experiment “with the use of 
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Landsat for relay of data collection information.”220 The university continued these experiments, 
as well as others on crop inventorying and urban land use patterns without significant 
government funding in the following years. However, Chile never established a Landsat ground 
station. Zaire experienced similar struggles despite broader, more ambitious plans that had the 
support of the UN. 
As mentioned, Kinshasa led the way with bringing remote sensing capabilities to the 
African continent. The Zairian government proceeded with a data reception facility and training 
center located near Kinshasa. The government prepared technical plans but failed to procure 
funds to see the construction through. From 1977 into 1978, West Germany supported a 
feasibility study for Zaire and eventually financially support ground station construction.221 In 
addition, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) provided managerial support to help 
build the African remote sensing network mentioned above which could include ground stations 
and training centers. However, economic and political turmoil engulfed the young state 
complexifying the export of a Landsat ground station. Zaire gained its independence from 
Belgium in 1960. The First Republic of the Congo quickly fell into political turmoil and 
remained so until Mobutu Sese Seko rose to power in the 1960s, when the republic was renamed 
Zaire. The United States heavily courted the Mobutu regime as part of its anti-communist agenda 
for Africa since the Kennedy administration. The US provided development funds to the Mobutu 
government while Mobutu suppressed communism. Zaire became one of “Washington’s favored 
Third World allies,” as American banks enabled it to mortgage their “futures in order to secure 
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the short-term survival,” of Zaire’s Mobutu regime.222 Stable relations between the American 
and Zairian governments set the stage to negotiate a ground station. 
NASA’s agreement with Zaire made it the first state in Africa proposing a station. Zaire 
formed a government body of prospective users called ERTS-Zaire through which NASA 
negotiated. The station’s proposed coverage area extended north-south from Chad to South 
Africa and east-west from Côte d’Ivoire to Kenya. The station proposed to “produce both 
computer tapes and photographic imagery using data transmitted by the satellite.”223 The Zaire 
station hoped to gain knowledge of natural resource deposits and conduct agricultural research 
while providing a vast coverage of Africa. Yet these goals fell short of accomplishment. The 
contracting organization ERTS-Zaire signed the agreement in 1975 yet from the outset, 
witnessed acute funding problems. Landsat’s operating costs and data reception fees put the 
ground station out of reach for the African nation whose gross domestic product was far lower 
than other states proposing stations. In 1978, ground stations cost roughly $1.7 million in 
construction and $750,000 in yearly operation, which included a $250,000 annual fee paid to 
NASA for Landsat downlinks.224 Against these figures and realities, Zaire’s economy could not 
support a ground station, which never materialized. 
NASA and its ICs in Canada, Europe, and South America experienced little difficulty 
establishing stations while potential partners in Africa fell short of funding. The United States 
abandoned diplomatic relations with Iran, resulting in suspension of the negotiations for a station 
in Tehran after the storming of the American Embassy. By 1980, both Canada and ESA operated 
two stations and Australia, Brazil, and Japan operated a station each. India and South Africa 
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moved towards operations while Chile eventually dropped its plans for a ground station. NASA’s 
biggest challenge remained ahead as a new potential IC came to the table, the People’s Republic 
of China which had not been present at the first eight LGSOWG meetings. 
 
Landsat Mis-Use: Ground Station Export and National Security 
 NASA and USGS rode a wave of success in the late 1970s with three successful Landsat 
satellites in orbit returning data to ICs around the world. Each of the ICs who built stations 
enjoyed a privileged status under U.S. trade laws. In 1976, the U.S. government developed a 
constellation of unilateral trade restrictions on advanced technology. The Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976 and International Trade and Arms Regulation (ITAR) primarily emphasized items 
related to rocketry, especially ballistic missiles and satellites as well as remote sensing 
technology, though to a lesser extent. Under ITAR, the State Department issues a ‘proscribed 
countries list’ which restricts exports to particular countries such as China. These restrictions, 
discussed in greater detail below, complicated China’s proposal to receive Landsat downlinks to 
a ground station it sought to build outside Beijing. However, strained diplomatic relations and 
U.S. intelligence community concerns over Beijing’s intentions further complicated ground 
station negotiations despite Sino-American efforts towards normalized relations. 
In 1969, President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger revised 
American foreign policy to “reestablish international stability and American strength” due to the 
declining prestige of the United States and the global discontent of the 1960s.225 Nixon and 
Kissinger sought to strengthen American influence globally through détente which centered on 
eased tensions with the Soviet Union treating it “as an ordinary state with reasonable national 
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goals and interests,” promoted improved economic relations through trade and investment in the 
Eastern bloc, and placed greater value in state sovereignty for establishing greater international 
stability.226 A major corollary of the Nixon and Kissinger détente ideal was opening relations 
with the People’s Republic of China. Nixon paid visits to Beijing and Moscow, organized 
summit meetings, and ultimately oversaw the signing of arms limitation treaties which defined a 
period of détente between East and West. In what became known as the Shanghai Communique, 
the U.S. government and China “made clear that normalization of relations was their common 
goal” in 1972.227  President Gerald Ford continued Nixon’s normalization efforts, as did 
President Jimmy Carter who announced on 15 December 1978 his endorsement of the Shanghai 
Communique. President Carter and the new, far less radical Chinese regime under Deng 
Xiaoping “moved rapidly to establish full diplomatic relations between their two countries” as 
relations began to normalize having formally begun diplomatic relations following the Joint 
Communique, issued by both governments in December 1978.228 This meant sustained trade, 
amiable diplomatic relations and visits, and increased cultural exchange, among other diplomatic 
ties. The Beijing government under Deng Xiaoping sought to “develop its industrial and 
technical base, maintain an adequate standard of living for a population of over 950 million, and 
simultaneously build a credible military deterrent force.”229 The goals of the Chinese leadership 
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presented the U.S. government with several difficulties regarding the potential Landsat ground 
station export as negotiations began in the late 1970s. 
The Chinese ground station export case demonstrated the difficulties of building an 
international cooperator network and, moreover, of expanding Landsat use worldwide. The 
United States enacted legislation which prevented technology transfer to the communist world 
and established the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to 
ensure that its Western allies did likewise. Cold War tensions, in particular strained diplomatic 
relations, the arms race, and the ‘space race’ led Congress to pass legislation restricting trade of 
sensitive technologies to the communist world. The Export Control Act of 1949 and the Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA) levied restrictions against defense-related exports, 
effectively embargoing communist Asia and Cuba. The Department of State also regulated trade 
through International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) which specified items that cannot be 
traded on its United States Munitions List. More problematically, under ITAR and AECA, “all 
space-related items and technology are on the U.S. Munitions List” and therefore “denies the 
exportation of Munitions List items to all Communist controlled countries.”230 Yet despite these 
increased measures against military trading, the United States traded openly with China since 
restraints had been rolled back under the Export Administration Act of 1969 which relaxed 
regulations on non-military exports, previously conceived of under the Export Control Act of 
1949. COCOM, too, adopted eased regulations on non-military trading. Furthermore, the 
Secretary of State could sign waivers on particular technologies specified for export, since ITAR 
was enforced through State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. Essentially this legislation 
and regulation restricted military exports to the communist world but opened most trade with 
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China and, potentially, a Landsat ground station could be restricted or waived. China’s 
diplomatic tensions with the Soviet Union raised concerns in the U.S. intelligence community 
that a ground station might become a liability rather than an internationally cooperative project. 
 
Remote Control: Chinese Data Purchases and National Security 
The U.S. government became deeply concerned over Landsat technology transfer for two 
particular diplomatic reasons, the Sino-Soviet split and the border skirmishes that resulted and, 
more broadly, supplying a nuclear China with targeting coordinates. The diplomatic relationship 
between Moscow and Beijing deteriorated in the 1960s and the 2,738-mile-long border between 
the communist states increasingly militarized. In March 1969, Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
troops attacked a Soviet border station on Zhenbao Island later matched by a Soviet retaliation 
resulting in an exchange of artillery for several days. The Chinese perception that the Soviet 
Union controlled Chinese territory in addition to more potential border conflict prompted Beijing 
to expand its collection of cartographic resources along with its other military capabilities. 
Accordingly, NASA and CIA became concerned that the dual-use nature of Landsat technology 
might serve to benefit the communist military.  
In February 1971, the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology released a classified issue 
of Scientific Intelligence Digest that demonstrated how the “Chinese have been conducting a 
partially successful, accelerated collection program for foreign maps and related geodetic 
information” with particular regional emphasis on the Soviet Union as well as the United States 
and its Pacific territories since 1969.231 At this time, the Chinese did not have a space-based 
reconnaissance program capable of gathering accurate geodetic or cartographic information 
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though it did have nuclear capabilities and delivery systems. Many of the maps collected 
contained topographic, hydrographic, coastal, and gravitational information. While the report 
does not identify a specific reason for the increased Chinese collection of maps, it speculated that 
the Chinese sought to improve its ICBM targeting capability with better maps and an 
understanding of the gravitational field. In particular, this geodetic information assisted with 
predicting missile trajectories to improve targeting. The Chinese government acquired its 
collection through its embassies in Sweden, Austria, and West Germany by requesting 
cartographic catalogs available from the USGS, a Vienna-based map company, the US Coast and 
Geodetic Survey, as well as the London Geographic Society, Japan Geological Society and 
Geological Survey Institute, and the Australian Geological Survey. The Chinese representatives 
used intermediaries, such as map dealers and trading companies in Europe and Asia to acquire 
these sources. CIA report also speculated that the Chinese would try to acquire USAF 
Aeronautical Chart and Information Center navigation charts and concluded with a list of each 
major map acquisition since 1969. With the Landsat launch scheduled for the following year, its 
data became a potential new avenue for foreign acquisition of maps of the U.S. and other 
strategic locations which became a national security concern of CIA and NASA. 
In August 1973, the CIA produced a brief, classified study, “Probable Chinese Collection of 
U.S. Satellite Imagery” which evaluated the ways in which Chinese agents acquire U.S. 
scientific data and how it may be translated into strategic information. Prior to this CIA report, 
the EROS, where Landsat data was processed, stored, and distributed, was contacted by an 
Asian-based contact in six letters sent between September 1972 and July 1973. The 
correspondence noted that “ a [redacted] on behalf of an unidentified client, has ordered broad 
coverage that includes China and neighboring countries to a distance of about 1,000 miles from 
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the Chinese border.”232 Specifically, the letters also requested data samples, images across 
Landsat-1’s four spectral bands of the Sino-Soviet border region, and very low cloud cover 
image specifications. The CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence investigated and hypothesized that it 
was a Chinese client based upon a “review of previous activities of the [redacted] who originated 
the ERTS order.”233 The CIA study cited cases back to the 1950s that a redacted actor gathered 
“US civil defense plans…and a series of US patents for the PRC” in addition to “topographic, 
gravity, aeromagnetic, and hydrographic, maps and charts,” with offers of $5,000 for 
topographic maps of the Sino-Soviet border region, and returned them to an Eastern bloc 
agent.234 Chinese agents also requested US-based scientific publications. EROS eventually 
received a July 1973 letter urgently requesting about 800 images and a check payment totaling 
$9,463. The CIA and EROS recognized that, despite potentially data-limiting variables such as 
cloud cover, poor ground control point identification (using terrestrial features as a reference 
point for identifying other locations on a map), poor resolution, and lacking orbital track 
information, the aforementioned 800 images “would be particularly valuable for identification 
and positioning of specific targets in the USSR, where the PRC has probably had limited success 
in acquiring adequate maps.”235 NASA and USGS, under their open access policy, were 
compelled to fulfill the order despite CIA’s concerns. However, Landsat data could be 
transferred as print-out images or as magnetic tapes, which could easily be digitally enhanced if 
the buyer had the appropriate technology and technical expertise. Sioux Falls opted not to supply 
                                                          
232 Central Intelligence Agency report, “Probable Chinese Collection of U.S. Satellite Imagery,” August 1973, The 
George Washington University National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB404/docs/01.pdf, date accessed: 1 October 2014 
233 CIA report, “Probable Chinese Collection of U.S. Satellite Imagery,” August 1973, GWU-NSA, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB404/docs/01.pdf, date accessed: 1 October 2014 
234 CIA report, “Probable Chinese Collection of U.S. Satellite Imagery,” August 1973, GWU-NSA, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB404/docs/01.pdf, date accessed: 1 October 2014 
235 CIA report, “Probable Chinese Collection of U.S. Satellite Imagery,” August 1973, GWU-NSA, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB404/docs/01.pdf, date accessed: 1 October 2014 
130 
 
image-enhancement techniques but still fulfilled the 800 image order with images alone in late 
1973. 
The CIA undertook a more robust study of Landsat data’s strategic intelligence potential for 
foreign users in 1975. CIA expressed concern that foreign users could derive strategic 
intelligence from Landsat data using Soviet ICBM sites as a case study.236 The CIA Office of 
Geographic and Cartographic Research assisted by the Office of Research and Development and 
the National Photographic Interpretation Center prepared the report. They argued that the  
“study reveals little evidence that foreign countries are exploiting the military and strategic 
potential of purchased ERTS data; but the Peoples Republic of China, which has shown 
interest in ERTS data and has made a considerable effort to obtain geodetic information and 
maps covering the Soviet Union and other areas, appears to be a possible user of ERTS data 
for such applications.”237 
 
CIA analyzed EROS’s top quality Landsat data available in 1975 which were 30m resolution 
Multispectral Scanner data produced in the form of Computer Compatible Tapes (CCTs) which 
EROS made available to all potential users. As mentioned, CIA knew China began gathering a 
substantial amount of Landsat data covering the Soviet Union. China needed Landsat data 
because it “already possess[ed] long-range missiles with nuclear warheads but does not yet have 
access to reconnaissance satellite photography for missile targeting and other military 
purposes.”238 In particular, Landsat data at 30 meter resolution distinguished several land cover 
features, such as cities, roads, and transport hubs making it potentially useful for military 
intelligence which deeply concerned the CIA. 
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In July 1978, EROS received a huge order of Landsat data from an unidentified buyer from 
Hong Kong. In a memo from National Security Council Staff member Samuel Hoskinson to 
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Hoskinson raised concern over the data 
request.239 The order, financed by Hong Kong Bank, requested nearly 2,800 images of the Soviet 
Union at a cost of $105,000. Hoskinson stated the order was far larger than generally received 
and that Chinese agents had been requesting meteorological data for many years to that point. 
For the National Security Council, “the circumstances of acquisition have led US officials to 
believe that agent is acting on behalf of China.”240 The USGS officials, who remained 
anonymous in the press, did not publicly release details of the buyer, but stated “it appears that 
the Chinese, who lack a reconnaissance satellite system of their own, are trying to gain 
information of potential military value about their bitter communist rival, Russia.”241 Yet the 
case of the mysterious Chinese data sale added fuel to the fiery debate between USGS and the 
intelligence community over the military significance of Landsat data. 
At this juncture, NASA had launched Landsat 3in March 1978 with a similar platform to the 
previous two satellites. According to USGS, Landsat’s 30-meter resolution could not provide 
accurate enough imagery for locating particular strategic targets. Most targets, such as tactical 
aircraft, tanks, or ballistic missiles did not reflect a strong enough signature in Landsat imagery 
to be useful. However, terrain mapping and urban infrastructure was well captured by the 
satellite instruments. On the opposite side of the debate was the intelligence community in 
particular, CIA. As noted in the previous case, Landsat imagery “would be suitable for 
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determining areas and complexes and placing this data into the Chinese geodetic network, which 
is necessary for accurate ICBM targeting.”242 As a result, Landsat imagery in Chinese hands 
remained a concern for CIA and moreover, exporting ground receiving and processing 
equipment remained out of the question in 1978. Yet in 1979, the U.S. changed its approach to 
diplomatic relations with China opening up the possibility for a Beijing ground station. 
 On 24 December 1979, Leonid Brezhnev sent the Soviet 40th Army rolling into 
Afghanistan. Within a few months, the Soviets occupied several major cities such as Kandahar 
and the Afghan capital of Kabul and appropriated all of its government ministries. The UN 
passed a resolution 104-18 condemning the Soviet maneuver and, for the United States, 
effectively the move ended détente.243 The invasion also stirred Beijing’s national security 
concerns further given the aforementioned Soviet border skirmishes and now the occupation of 
China’s western neighbor. The U.S. feared that the export of a Landsat ground station to Beijing 
would become a liability either for Chinese military strikes against the US itself or if it struck 
somewhere else (notably the Soviets) since it used American technology. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan increased Chinese national security concerns and prompted talks between 
Washington and Beijing. Thus, American fears for misuse of Landsat data increased. In the few 
months ending 1979 into early 1980, discussions between NASA and DOC identified specific 
technological concerns over Landsat equipment. 
NASA Deputy Anthony Calio identified eight essential characteristics that required 
export licensing. In a November 1979 memo, OEA identified three of those eight components 
required “detailed considerations, cause some licensing delay, and perhaps require equipment 
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design modifications,” especially since their performance levels remained in question.244OEA 
specified that data recorders, data processors, and image enhancement equipment required 
further review. China planned for its station to receive and process Landsat 4 data which 
demanded higher processing capability given the Thematic Mapper’s greater spectral coverage. 
By comparison, the AMPEX 3010 processor used for MSS data processing had a 15 megabyte 
per second capability. To process TM data, 85 megabytes per second was required. The U.S. 
government and CoCom discussed data processing and image enhancement parameters which 
should be commercially available. When the Soviet Union requested comparable equipment for 
Landsat data earlier in 1979, OEA denied their request yet China received positive news towards 
their bid for a Landsat ground station a few months later. By January 1980, the DoD cleared the 
station for export which Defense Secretary Harold Brown announced during his China visit. 
From 8 to 15 January 1980, Brown visited Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping. The two 
officials discussed the strengthening of Sino-American relations. Brown stated “the United States 
and China should coordinate their policies in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union.”245 
The U.S. government no longer felt the need to deal evenhandedly with the Soviets and Chinese, 
which allowed Brown to more easily justify exporting Landsat technology to China. Though the 
DoD and CIA maintained that Landsat data processing equipment and data tapes could be used 
for strategic intelligence, Deng assured Brown and his delegation that China had no intention to 
utilize Landsat data for military purposes. Deng told Brown “China and the United States should 
do something in a down-to-earth way so as to defend world peace against Soviet 
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hegemonism.”246 Furthermore, Deng maintained that China planned to use Landsat data for its 
stated purposes, environmental applications. A Chinese Academy of Sciences spokesman stated 
Landsat data will  
“help analyze China’s geological structure, locate mineral resources and provide data to 
the Departments of Water Conservancy, Agriculture, Forestry and Environment for 
utilization of land, estimation of crop yields, irrigation control, control and prevention of 
plant diseases and insect pests, environmental monitoring and protection, alterations in 
river courses and shorelines, and predict natural calamities.”247 
 
In October 1981, DOC approved the export licenses for equipment necessary to build the ground 
station and in December, the Chinese government awarded a contract to Maryland based 
Systems and Applied Sciences Corporation yet the export licenses were not issued until 1985.248  
By 1982, the Chinese had yet to purchase its Landsat ground station. NASA scheduled the 
launch of Landsat 4 for July 1982 which featured both a MSS and a new, experimental scanner 
called the Thematic Mapper offering improved spectral coverage. Shortly after reaching orbit 
however, two of the satellite’s solar panels and its two downlink transmitters malfunctioned and 
it could not transmit data until the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) became 
operational.249 The first satellite in the TDRSS, abbreviated TDRS-1, became operational in 
April 1983 and was a satellite with several large antennae used to retransmit and relay 
information between the Shuttle primarily, satellites, and ground stations. Amidst Landsat 4’s 
technical problems, NASA readied Landsat 5, which also featured a Thematic Mapper, for 
launch by March 1984. Landsat 5 carried both a downlink transmitter to send data to ground 
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stations and an extra transmitter to use the TDRSS. NASA and USGS officials speculated that 
the Chinese government was reluctant to move forward with its proposed ground station given 
that Landsat 4 experienced the aforementioned issues and sought to gain assurance Landsat 5 
would be successfully operational.250 In 1985, the State Department approved the export 
licensing for the Landsat ground station equipment. The U.S. Systems and Applied Sciences 
Corporation based in Maryland served as contractor and began to build the station near Beijing. 
In April 1986, 8 years after discussions first began, the station began to receive data from 
Landsats 4 and 5.  
China’s Landsat data receiving capability consisted of an antenna site in a small town outside 
Beijing called Miyun and a processing facility in Beijing. The entire facility cost $11 million, 
built by ST Systems Corporation of Lanham, Maryland (same company mentioned above but it 
adopted a new name). NASA and USGS’s IC that governed the receiving station was the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, an arm of the Chinese government, which also developed plans 
for a station in KaShi, Urumqi, though it did not receive data until 2008. According to executive 
vice president of ST Systems Corporation Ashok Kaveeshwar, “the Landsat ground station 
hardware was the first large U.S. aerospace export to China allowed by the State Department 
following the normalization of relations.”251 When Landsat became a commercial entity 
(discussed in the following chapter), China also signed an agreement with Earth Observation 
Satellite Company (EOSAT) to market data internationally. EOSAT, Dai Zixin, the China 
ground station deputy director and image processing chief, and sales manager Li Chuan Rong led 
the effort to develop a user base of local and state ministries, urban planners, and national 
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government users. Li stated “many people are amazed at the imagery from a cosmetic point of 
view, but to explain the usefulness of the pictures to a customer we must know something about 
their business.”252 The Chinese government and local ministries in Yunan, Heilongjiang, and the 
Yellow River basin began numerous investigations into mineral and petroleum geology, 
pollution monitoring, agriculture, and flooding. EOSAT’s contract with China to sell data 
internationally began in June 1987 and expected revenue of $1-3 million. 
In addition to growing a user community, the Chinese Landsat station had to cultivate 
technical expertise. As mentioned, the marketing staff at EOSAT and the Beijing processing 
facility had to learn what the capabilities of the imagery was to reach out to users as mentioned 
above. The Landsat processing facility, staffed entirely by an indigenous workforce, was 
comprised of a Floating Point System AP180 array processor, two Digital Equipment 
Corporation VAX 11/780 computers a VAX 750 film-generation subsystem, and supporting 
hardware and software. The staff of 22 Chinese technicians, including station deputy Dai, all 
trained in the United States “in different Landsat training programs at various locations across 
the country.”253 They learned how to properly use the equipment as well as maintenance 
strategies. In particular, Beijing’s dry climate initially caused the processing equipment to 
produce faulty imagery due to static electricity present in the laboratory. The array processor’s 
rollers produced images with blotches resembling lightning. The Chinese staff learned to correct 
that problem and maintain as dustless of a laboratory environment as possible. Kaveeshvar also 
visited the site continually for quality assurance for the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The 
Beijing and KaShi stations continue to operate successfully. 
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NASA, USGS, and its government agency partners experienced both success and failure in 
the creation of an international ground station network. In several cases, funding issues 
hampered development of several stations while poor diplomatic relations dashed hopes for a 
station in Iran. The China ground station presented several cases which complicated the ground 
station development process. Export control, strained diplomatic relations, and funding shortfalls 
all made the expansion of a Landsat IC network increasingly complicated. Yet despite these 
difficulties, NASA and USGS broadened Landsat data usage on the world stage in the late 1970s 
across five continents. Simultaneously, NASA sought to bring Landsat data to countries in the 
developing world through its government agency partners and contractors. 
 
 
Expanding Use through Application: Training Seminars and International Workshops 
 
 As mentioned above, the response to Landsat through the UN was generally positive as 
numerous countries sought to build indigenous ground stations to receive Landsat downlinks and 
either undertook or sought to undertake scientific investigations with Landsat data. UN Members 
from Jamaica to the Philippines began projects using the imagery to survey natural resources, 
produce hydrological maps, and oil prospect, among other applications. Several countries 
established ground stations but for those without the immediate interest or financial means, open 
access to data allowed other states to utilize the growing archive of Earth remote sensing 
imagery. In addition to the UN facilitating use of remote sensing data, NASA coordinated 
bilaterally with interested users in the developing world to provide imagery and, in particular 
cases, funding and expertise to assist with scientific investigations. Nearly a year after Landsat’s 
launch, NASA formed partnerships which it could foster greater Landsat data use abroad in 
countries where a Landsat ground station was not feasible. NASA forged a partnership with the 
138 
 
USAID, the U.S. government agency established in 1961 under President John Kennedy tasked 
with administering civilian foreign aid and assistance often to developing countries. NASA also 
relied on several contractors to facilitate the use of Landsat data abroad. In Part 2, I concentrate 
on the third component of my argument that NASA, through its partnerships with federal 
agencies and contractors, expanded Landsat data use in the 1970s. This third expansion fostered 
data availability and use largely in the developing world where space remained largely 
inaccessible. Furthermore, I suggest that land remote sensing provided an entrée into the space 
community at low cost to interested countries in the developing world. 
 President Gerald Ford sought to strengthen relations with Africa. In 1976, Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger traveled to Lusaka, Zambia to deliver a speech about America’s 
commitment to African development. In particular, Kissinger’s speech committed the U.S. 
government to an “expanded role for remote sensing in Africa.”254 NASA, USAID, and their 
contractors accomplished this vision throughout the 1970s through the establishment of training 
seminars, grant packages, and technical assistance. Below, I highlight two cases: a major remote 
sensing training seminar held in Bamako, Mali and a grant package and technical assistance 
project that supported a major hydrological study based on Landsat imagery in Lesotho. 
 
Making Maps in Mali 
 
NASA, among other US federal agencies, also facilitated the flow of remote sensing 
expertise to the developing world through both domestic and international seminars, workshops, 
and symposia. Domestically, NASA, in conjunction with the USGS, held the annual, month-long 
training course, the International Remote Sensing Workshop and Seminar at the EROS Data 
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Center in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. This seminar instructed representatives and scientists 
representing roughly 20 states each year “how to use and interpret satellite photographs taken by 
the two Landsat Earth resources spacecraft.”255 Within five years of Landsat 1’s launch, “a total 
of 185 representatives from 57 nations attended the seven previous international remote sensing 
workshops,”256 with at least one country from every continent. The USGS Office of International 
Geology and USAID’s Technical Assistance Office coordinated with its contractor ERIM to 
provide domestic, bilateral, and regional training programs to teach promising individuals in 
Africa how to apply Landsat data to environmental issues in the developing world. USAID and 
USGS held numerous workshops in the United States and abroad to facilitate remote sensing 
expertise. However, in order to reach other developing states, USAID provided funding for 
workshops to be held abroad, such as the Sahelian Zone Remote Sensing Seminar and 
Workshop. 
Within a year of Landsat 1’s launch, the Malian government hosted the USGS and 
USAID to address “ERTS Experiment Data Acquisition and Processing, the EROS Program, and 
Applications of ERTS Data in Cartography, Geology, Geography, Hydrology, Agriculture, and 
Forestry.”257 Specifically, USAID’s Office of Science and Technology provided the funding 
while USGS’s Office of International Geology presented the conference at the École Normale 
Superieur in Bamako. In April 1973, USGS officials Maurice Grolier, Raymond Fary, and 
Stephen Gawarecki flew from Washington to Bamako, Mali to conduct a training seminar hosted 
by the Government of Mali. Nine countries and nine commissions represented by a total of 35 
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scientists and project managers gathered in Bamako to explore land remote sensing applications 
and learn techniques.  
The seminar “provided instruction in principles and techniques of remote sensing; most 
emphasis was on the application of Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) data to the 
evaluation and development of resources in the African Sahel environment.”258 Mali initiated the 
seminar through its proposal to participate in NASA’s ERTS program. U.S. Ambassador to Mali 
Robert O. Blake as well as Mali’s Department of Mines and Geology head Cyr Samake 
requested an initial visit be performed by NASA and USGS officials two years prior to the 
seminar. Through the embassy in Bamako, John Fry of USAID, Dr. Norman Macleod of 
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, and John Dorr of the USGS met with Malian government 
officials. The US representatives discussed “ERTS-1 Experiment, the satellite, expected 
characteristics of the data to be obtained, uses to which the data might be put, and nature of 
resources problems in Mali that might be amenable to use of ERTS data.”259 The Malian 
government cordially approved the US proposal designating Mamadou Konaté of the 
Department of Mines and Geology in Mali as principal investigator. The US arranged for Mr. 
Konaté to then visit the corresponding US government agencies while receiving briefings on the 
multidisciplinary applications of ERTS data. Mr. Konaté’s month long visit in 1972 led to the 
decision to host a conference in Mali for West Africa the following year.  
The US then staffed its team while many participants from across West Africa accepted 
invitations to the seminar. Dr. Maurice Grolier became project director having both worked 
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extensively with remote sensing as he had worked in ERTS development, his familiarity with 
geology and hydrology, and his fluency in French. Jack Palgen of Terratek Incorporated, a 
geomechanics and analysis service company, also joined the seminar leadership for his 
familiarity with ERTS technology, land use remote sensing, and fluency in French. The 
contingent presenting the seminar had backgrounds broadly in the earth sciences and 
cartography. Thirty-one participants attended at least part of the seminar representing a range of 
backgrounds, from ecology to business administration but heavily favoring the earth sciences260. 
The educational backgrounds of participants favored science and engineering universities in the 
US, Europe, the USSR, China, Egypt, and Mali. The attendees “however, with the exception of 
the Malian and American instructors, only the participant from France had significant exposure 
to remote-sensing techniques prior to the seminar.”261 Three Malian scientists served as 
instructors alongside the Americans, Mr. Dembélé taught hydrological applications while Mr. 
Konaté and Mr. Zuboye conducted geology and forestry applications, respectively. The 
American and Malian scientists addressed two key aspects in their lessons: the technology and 
the environmental applications.  
The scientists provided lectures concerning the basics of remote sensing, the sensor 
characteristics, and the data acquisition process. The attendees then utilized imagery data to 
interpret ERTS color prints and transparencies. As mentioned, the spectral bands allowed 
Landsat to distinguish among aspects of the Earth’s surface. A field trip to Forêt Classes de la 
Faya near Bamako led by the three Malian scientists served as an example to compare ERTS 
data to subjects in the field. This provided the basis for the “attendees to recognize the 
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relationships between tonal variations on the ERTS imagery and actual environmental conditions 
on the ground,” such as “contrasts among the appearance of the forest, savannah, and degraded 
savannah, and the influence of leaf litter in the forest on the tones of the forest area.”262 The 
Sahelian Zone report included a survey of the participants following the seminar addressing 
critiques. Workshop feedback from participants indicated that the most successful sessions 
included the agriculture and forestry applications while the problems of land-use classification 
and drought control should have been further addressed.263 This seminar effectively addressed 
“the needs and desires of the officials and scientists of the Sahel countries for training that would 
be valuable… to the independent application of ERTS data by any of the West African 
countries.”264 This seminar highlighted the utility of Landsat data in not only addressing 
environmental issues but also in the developing world.  
 
USAID Grant Program, 1973-1976 
 In 1974, USAID sponsored ten grants to explore Landsat’s role in foreign assistance. 
Bolivia, Chile, Pakistan, Peru, and Zaire received the initial round of grants. The success of 
seven of the ten initial grants inspired program growth to a “three-year 50 million dollar program 
with activities in 32 developing countries” during which participants undertook “crop inventories 
and estimates, ground water location, geological mapping and resource inventories.”265 The 
proposals were evaluated by the AID Grant Program which had representatives from 
                                                          
262 USAID. “The Sahelian Zone Remote Sensing Seminar/Workshop,” Maurice J. Grolier et. al., Washington: NTIS, 
March 1974 (1974 PB-236 657) pg. 9 
263 USAID. “The Sahelian Zone Remote Sensing Seminar/Workshop,” Maurice J. Grolier et. al., Washington: NTIS, 
March 1974 (1974 PB-236 657) pg. 9-11 
264 USAID. “The Sahelian Zone Remote Sensing Seminar/Workshop,” Maurice J. Grolier et. al., Washington: NTIS, 
March 1974 (1974 PB-236 657) pg. 7 
265 Report, “Civil Land Remote Sensing System,”  Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications to Committee 
on Science and Technology, 97th Congress, First Session, December 1981, Untitled Folder 6097, NASA Historical 
Reference Collection, NASA HQ, Washington, DC, pg. 13 
143 
 
government, academia, and industry.266 Specifically, USAID’s Office of Science and 
Technology and Africa Bureau, NASA’s Office of International Affairs, and EROS represented 
government while NASA contractors Environmental Research Institute of Michigan (ERIM) and 
Systems Planning Corporation (SPC)  also had members on the AID Grant Program. University 
of Michigan’s Center for Research on Economic Development (UMCRED) also sent a member. 
Among all the members, Donald Lowe, Deputy Director of the Infrared and Optics 
Division at ERIM, played a significant role selecting proposals for the USAID Grant Program 
and coordinating with principal investigators abroad. Lowe held a Master’s degree in Physics 
from Duke University, was an active member with the Optical Society of America and the 
American Society of Photogrammetry, and had worked for the Naval Ordnance Laboratory. He 
then moved to the private sector researching and developing airborne spectroradiometric 
instruments and remote sensing systems. Many of the members on the USAID Grant Program 
had similar technical backgrounds.  
USAID and its contractors (AID/cm/ta-73-38), ERIM, and SPC, assessed “the economic 
value of ERTS Data Utilization by Developing Countries” which led the Office of Science and 
Technology after twelve months of study to initiate a grant program “designed to provide funds 
and technical assistance to selected countries who desired to develop or expand their capability 
in ERTS data utilization.”267 First, USAID commissioned its contractors to assess the cost and 
benefit of data use in development. From August 1973 to August 1974, ERIM, SPC, and 
Mathematica Incorporated qualitatively evaluated four case studies of ERTS data use by Bolivia, 
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Thailand, Botswana, and Kenya through interviews with UN officials, USAID missions, and 
ERTS Principal Investigators.268 Each country presented an opportunity to study different 
applications of ERTS data, such as hydrological, geological and cartographic uses of Landsat 
data. 
ERIM and USAID hoped to develop state-by-state plans which would maximize public 
welfare through “political and economic feasibility of change via new technology, investment, 
and social and economic reorganization.”269 In 1974, NASA, USAID, SPC, and ERIM partnered 
to create a grant program to both foster Landsat data use internationally and to assist developing 
states. The AID Grant Proposal Panel270, comprised of members of the aforementioned outfits as 
well as the USGS and UMCRED, met on 22 and 23 January 1975 to evaluate fifteen applications 
from developing states. Dr. Robert Summers of SPC hosted the evaluation team in Arlington, 
Virginia which had developed a scoring process to that favored several key criteria.  The criteria 
included technical validity, probability of accomplishment, impact of derived information, 
national need for economic development based upon USAID’s priority, and evidence of national 
interest.271 The committee also strived for geographic diversity among its awardees. From this 
pool of applicants, six were selected to receive approximately $20,000 in funding, some 
technical expertise, and Landsat data to undertake original scientific investigations that would 
ultimately demonstrate an innovative application of Landsat. One of the six awardees was 
Lesotho. 
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 In November 1974, Dr. J.V. Hepworth of the Lesotho Geological Survey and Mines 
Department sent a cable to Donald Lowe, then Deputy Director of the Infrared & Optics Division 
at ERIM expressing interest in submitting a proposal for a USAID grant. As mentioned, the AID 
Grant Program convened in January 1975 to evaluate proposal from several countries seeking 
financial assistance to conduct an investigation using Landsat data, after having allowed a period 
in which potential applicants expressed interests and inquired about the grants. The AID Grant 
Proposal Panel selected six of the fifteen grant proposals, one of which was awarded to the 
delegation from Lesotho. A. A. ‘Tony’ Jackson of the Department of Biology at the University 
of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (UBLS) in Maseru submitted an application as principal 
investigator to study “snowfall patterns in Lesotho in order to obtain previously inaccessible 
water run-off data of importance to the agricultural development of the country.”272 The project 
emphasized “soil, drainage, and vegetation mapping for conservation purposes” noting that “soil 
erosion is a major critical problem in Lesotho.”273 Snowmelt, rising rivers, and lose top soil 
disrupt Lesotho’s agriculture and often cause unanticipated flooding in many parts of the 
country, which the investigation sought to understand better. To address these drainage concerns, 
the faculty at UBLS produced data analyses that led to a map representing drainage patterns to 
resolve the central issue of soil erosion across most of the country.  
 In April 1975, SPC sent Robert Summers, another member of the AID Grant Program, to 
Maseru to meet with the Lesotho Landsat principal investigator Tony Jackson and his team 
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members as well as Government of Lesotho officials as the project was getting started. The team 
discussed procuring new equipment after having sent one of the Lesotho Landsat team members 
to EROS for data processing training. A major component of the investigation is snowmelt 
drainage and the need for more “trees and terracing to limit soil erosion.”274 Furthermore, heavy 
snow falls and subsequent melts stress the agricultural extension service since livestock need to 
be moved from major drainage areas.  
The Lesotho project team used Landsat data of the entirety of the country in CCT form in 
addition to aerial photography. The project scientists also conducted ground truthing field trips to 
ascertain the veracity of their cartographic imagery. UBLS had Hewlett-Packard processing 
equipment on campus that experienced difficulties at times and processed map scales incorrectly, 
which also led to problems with digitization. The project team mitigated the issues by 
reprocessing data at the same scales and fixing apparent hardware problems. For Jackson, 
discerning topographical relief was critical to producing a useful drainage map of Lesotho. The 
team revealed that eastern Lesotho has a higher drainage density than western Lesotho and thus 
has a “higher catchment area in the relatively flat lowlands than a stram of the same order in the 
mountains.”275 The asymmetric drainage basins demonstrated how rivers and streams are 
captured by the landscape informing the project’s goal of understanding water-run off. The 
Lesotho project team concluded its study in early 1976 having successfully created a nationwide 
drainage map using Landsat data. 
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Figure 2: Lesotho Drainage Map 
 
Landsat imagery of Lesotho river drainage basins, 1976. NARA, College Park, MD 
The project in Lesotho, among numerous other initiatives in East and West Africa caught the 
attention of the State Department and USAID. In essence, the AID Grant Program and the use of 
Landsat imagery qualified the United States for a stronger role in the developing world through 





 The Landsat program underwent significant transformation in the 1970s as its data 
quickly became available to users around the world via efforts by NASA and its government and 
contractor partners. Both the UN and bilateral cooperation facilitated the expansion of Landsat 
data availability and use through the establishment of a legal regime, a growing network of 
ground stations, as well as training seminars and funding for states with fewer means to access 
space technologies. Despite the goal of NASA to distribute data widely, it and its partners 
experienced a number of difficulties that problematized data availability as well. Initially, 
Landsat appeared to a few UN Member States, particularly Australia and Sweden, as a 
technology that could plausibly be used to compromise national sovereignties. In particular, 
Landsat data potential enabled certain users to conduct natural resource prospecting and 
economic espionage. This possibility conflicted with domestic law in Australia and Sweden 
expressed similar concerns. However, the overwhelming interest in Landsat at the UN indicated 
that its data held high scientific value. As a result, several countries approached NASA about 
establishing ground stations to receive data directly and many more, many in the developing 
world in Africa, sought to use Landsat imagery for development. Canada, followed by Brazil and 
ESA, became the first to receive data outside the U.S. and set precedents for foreign use. The 
move by NASA and USGS to negotiate and see the establishment of foreign ground stations was 
a significant expansion of Landsat data use. However, there were limits as demonstrated by the 
case of the Chinese station. The politics and national security concerns of the U.S. federal 
government fueled by the Cold War complicated the export of a ground station to Beijing. ITAR 
regulations, Munitions List items, and potential use of Landsat imagery for military operations 
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against the Soviets all prompted the defense and intelligence community to block the Chinese 
from acquiring a Landsat data ground receiving station. Diplomatic tensions with Iran, economic 
hardship in Zaire, and uncertain political commitment elsewhere all compromised the 
establishment of stations. Thus, while Landsat data use expanded abroad via ground stations, it 
was by no means internationally ubiquitous. 
 NASA and USGS expanded Landsat data use through training seminars and international 
aid as well, especially in Africa. In 1973, the USGS sent officials to Mali to conduct a training 
seminar to assist West Africans with the technical uses and applications of Landsat imagery. 
West Africa, geographically characterized by the Sahel, was an area prone to desertification and 
low agricultural yields. The training seminar instructed participants how to use Landsat imagery 
for land-use classification, which they applied to issues of drought and forestry. Training 
seminars and grant packages helped facilitate the use of Landsat data abroad but they also had 
their limits. The users in Mali and Lesotho both did not always possess the requisite technologies 
required for Landsat data processing. Expertise in remote sensing also had to be developed in 
much of Africa. Both equipment and expertise required investments and foreign aid to enable 
these investigations, which also were difficult to sustain once foreign aid packages ended, such 
as the AID Grant Program. Pamela Mack recounts that the “U.S. Embassy in Mali reported that 
the ‘U.S. government has gained a million dollars worth of Malian political mileage’ from 
Landsat.”276 Despite its limits, both Lesotho and Mali saw Landsat data use as a success. 
Landsat’s user community, produced through state agencies at NASA, USGS, and 
USAID in particular, was about see the program change drastically. The low-cost nature of the 
data sharing, a major incentive for the user community, began to create problems for the 
                                                          




longevity and stability of Landsat. Shortfalls in funding threatened the program, especially while 
President Carter looked to cut government costs. Also, the American monopoly of remote 
sensing, through Landsat began to dissolve as other states launched satellites of their own. 
Funding issues and international competition began to transition Landsat in late 1979 into 
commercialization. 
In the next chapter, I demonstrate how the scientific value of Landsat data transforms into 
commercial value. At this juncture in 1978 into 1979, Landsat as a program began transitioning 
from an experimental project into a commercial program managed by the DOC and operated by 
the private sector. This transition profoundly changed the availability and use of Landsat data 





Chapter 4: Landsat For Sale: Commercializing Civil Remote Sensing 
Operations, 1978-1989 
 
Introduction: Commercializing Space 
 
 In the previous chapters I demonstrated how NASA, USDA, and USAID fostered use of 
Landsat data domestically and abroad through grant programs, agricultural applications in 
particular, and the establishment of an international ground station network. Government 
agencies, industry, and scientific users conducted investigations around the world with 
affordable, relatively easy access to continuous, repetitive, and timely data produced by three 
Landsat satellites, EROS, and international cooperators by 1978. However, these operations 
made it apparent to the White House that Landsat was no longer experimental, a program 
characterized by research and development only. To the Carter Administration, Landsat was not 
only an operational system, but one that was ripe for commercialization. The Carter and Reagan 
administrations and Congress began to bring sweeping changes to the Landsat program as it 
entered the 1980s. For the executive and legislative branches, the “principal reasons for 
transferring remote-sensing services to private hands are that the private sector excels both at 
innovation and at developing markets.”277 In addition, the federal government sought to reduce 
its expenditures and foster Landsat use through new spacecraft and an expanded market. 
This chapter chronicles the process by which Landsat first transitioned from an 
experimental program under NASA to an operational program under NOAA and became a fully 
commercial venture owned and operated by EOSAT. However, historians of technology 
demonstrated the difficulties of transitioning such a space technology from experimentation to 
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operations. Pamela Mack argued, with regards to NASA that it “has generally been very 
successful as a research and development agency, but the agency has shown less skill in working 
with the ultimate practical users of space technology.”278 John Krige presented a similar 
European case with regards to ESA’s difficulty transferring the European Meteorological 
Satellite (Meteosat) “across the interface” from a research and development phase to an 
operational program run by users.279 Also, the Swedish Space Corporation, a public-private 
entity, formed Satellite Image to commercialize  remotely sensed land and meteorological data 
obtained via Landsat and SPOT but “struggled as a nonprofitable subsidy…despite the fact that 
images produced were actually used.”280 These studies depict American and European state 
space agencies as unable to foster commercial use of remotely sensed data. My chapter 
demonstrates that indeed commercially viable data sales proved out of reach in the 1980s. 
However, I show that NASA’s role was minimal in the commercialization process.  I diverge 
from the aforementioned literature regarding Landsat since it was a combination of NOAA, 
Congress, and EOSAT, rather than NASA that failed to foster commercial use of land remote 
sensing data. 
In the Landsat case, neither the government nor EOSAT offered the funds necessary for 
the program to operate and distribute data sending the program into turmoil. Ultimately the 
program required an emergency Congressional bailout in 1989 to sustain operations. In this 
chapter, I argue that Landsat mismanagement led to increasing data prices, fewer data products 
available to users, reduced government subsidies, and insufficient private investment drove away 
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users. Landsat data evolved from a public good into a private commodity which constrained 
Landsat use. Between 1978 and 1985, the White House and Congress swiftly commercialized 
Landsat in a way that changed its use significantly in the latter 1980s. 
  
Carter’s Call for Commercialization, 1978-1979 
 President Jimmy Carter brought sweeping space policy changes that redefined Landsat as 
a commercial entity over several years. The process began on 11 May 1978 when Carter issued 
PD/NSC-37, “National Space Policy.” It emphasized maintaining American leadership in remote 
sensing, data continuity, and advancing “the interests of the United States through the 
exploration and use of space,” while also reiterating provisions of “Open Skies,” the Space Act 
of 1958, and DoD reconnaissance programs classification.281 First among its objectives for civil 
space programs, “the United States shall encourage domestic commercial exploitation of space 
capabilities and systems for economic benefit.”282 However, PD/NSC-37 also stated that Earth 
remote sensing satellites are subject to Government regulation. 
 Later in 1978 on 10 October, Carter released PD/NSC-42 which provided further detail 
about the commercialization process. It defined Landsat as a developmental and experimental 
program. However, the Carter Administration viewed data usage as an operational process. The 
directive also placed Landsat, as well as weather and ocean satellite systems, on a timeline. 
Carter called for these satellite programs to be “addressed in the FY 1980 budget review,” that 
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would “examine approaches to permit flexibility to meet the best appropriate technology mix, 
organizational arrangements, and potential to involve the private sector.”283 Carter also sought to 
integrate the various remote sensing programs by building upon the partnerships between NASA, 
USGS, and USDA commissioning an interagency task force that consulted with OMB to 
recommend methods to amalgamate US remote sensing programs before FY 1981. These 
considerations guided the formation of the third of Carter’s Landsat-related Presidential 
Directives. 
 On 16 November 1979, Carter released PD/NSC-54 “Civil Operational Remote Sensing,” 
which was unlike the other two in that it was particular to Landsat. PD/NSC-54 brought two 
sweeping changes to Landsat. First, the directive moved Landsat management from NASA to 
NOAA which was already responsible for atmospheric satellites and potential oceanic satellites. 
This move built off the partnership between NASA and the Environmental Science Services 
Administration (reorganized as NOAA) which played a key role in the TIROS weather satellites. 
As mentioned, OMB reviewed U.S. government meteorological programs under DOC and DoD 
and recommended that they remain as “dual polar orbiting meteorological programs, with joint 
development and procurement to maximize technology-sharing and minimize cost.”284 The 
second change in PD/NSC-54 to Landsat was that it set commercialization in motion. The 
directive stated the White House’s “goal is the eventual operation by the private sector of our 
civil land remote sensing activities.”285 It directly targeted Landsat and removed weather and 
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ocean satellites from consideration. Effectively the White House tasked DOC with managing 
Landsat until it formulated what type of arrangement Landsat became commercially.286 
 The Carter administration Presidential Directives moved Landsat away from NASA’s 
control. At the time of PD-37, NASA was responsible for nearly all of Landsat’s operations 
including: management, research, development, launches, guidance/tracking, data reception, and 
processing. USGS handled data distribution at EROS and the international ground stations 
received their data, but NASA handled everything else. As a result, NASA HQ became keen to 
start reducing its Landsat budgeting. With the transfer of Landsat to NOAA, it became the 
managerial outfit for Landsat but NASA still handled technical maintenance of satellites 
presently in orbit as well as research and development of Landsat 4 and 5. NOAA Administrator 
Richard Frank testified before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space in mid 
1980 to present two options for private operation of Landsat.287Frank postulated that both 
options cost over $1 billion and occur over a ten year period, concluding in 1989. The first 
option was to select a “private corporation or consortium to own and operate all or part of the 
system and to sell data to Federal agency users under a guaranteed purchase contract” and the 
second was to set up a legislated for-profit entity, similar to the COMSAT arrangement from the 
1960s.288 Frank warned that either commercial venture would not “be self-sustaining before the 
end of this century, even with a fivefold increase in fees and an annual ten percent growth in the 
market.”289 Despite the precedents set by TIROS for environmental satellite operations to 
transition from NASA to NOAA and the COMSAT episode for communications satellites, 
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neither this transition nor the commercialization effort proceeded smoothly. The White House 
not only earmarked Landsat for commercialization but also weather satellites already under 
NOAA operation and potential ocean remote sensing satellites. 
 
The Reagan Administration’s Vision for Landsat 
 President Ronald Reagan took the oath of office 20 January 1981 and within a few 
months brought rapid changes to the Landsat program. Originally, Carter’s FY1982 budget 
“included $123.8 million for NOAA’s initiation of the program in order to assure program 
continuity” as well as funds for Landsats 6 and 7 appropriated to NASA. However, Reagan 
slashed the NOAA budget significantly and eliminated funding for Landsats 6 and 7 entirely.290 
For the new White House, the Landsat program was not only operational, but also an enterprise 
to be developed entirely by the private sector. Reagan tasked OMB and DOC with carrying out 
this directive. In February 1981, Reagan reorganized the presidency by setting up “a network of 
six Cabinet councils to serve as the formal bodies for debating and shaping the major policies of 
his Administration.”291 Since Landsat formally came under NOAA management, the newly 
formed Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade (CCCT), headed by Secretary of Commerce 
Malcolm Baldrige, assumed the commercialization policy issue. OMB Director David 
Stockman’s request to Secretary Baldrige that the CCCT  “determine the best mechanism for 
transferring Landsat to the private sector as soon as possible, and whether the government’s four 
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operational civil weather satellites should be transferred at the same time,”292 encapsulated 
President Reagan’s vision for the Landsat program. In addition to CCCT, Baldrige formed two 
more committees to address Landsat commercialization implementation. What followed was six 
years of heated debate between Congress, the Executive, industry, and users with regards to the 
reshaping of Landsat and its use entering the 1980s.  
Baldrige also played a pivotal role establishing two more groups that formulated Landsat 
commercialization policy. Within DOC, Baldrige approved the formation of the Program Board 
for Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing from Space. The Board’s goal was to “provide the 
continuing Federal coordination and regulation needed by DOC to manage the operational 
Landsat system to be implemented by NOAA in 1983and its membership included Assistant 
Secretary-level federal employees.293 Baldrige also formed the Land Remote Sensing Satellite 
Advisory Committee to  
“advise the Secretary on matters pertinent to the implementation and management of the 
operational Landsat program…[and] provide advice and make recommendations in such 
Landsat areas as those having to do with data requirements, priorities, data and product 
pricing, and proposals for private sector ownership.”294 
 
This committee included fifteen members from non-Federal user communities, including state 
and local governments, the value-added service industry such as data analysis companies, 
university representatives, and potential investors such as those in the aerospace industry. 
 The CCCT, Program Board, and LRSSA met between 1981 and 1984 to form 
commercialization policy. These are the groups that pushed commercialization on behalf of 
                                                          
292 Kathleen Eisenbeis, Privatizing Government Information: The Effects of Policy on Access to Landsat Satellite 
Data, (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1995), pg. 8 
293 NOAA, September 1981, “Information Update for Users of NOAA/NESS Satellite Data,” Folder 6097: “Landsat 
Corp,” NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA HQ, Washington, D.C. 
294 NOAA, September 1981, “Information Update for Users of NOAA/NESS Satellite Data,” Folder 6097: “Landsat 
Corp,” NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA HQ, Washington, D.C., pg. 2 
158 
 
Secretary Baldrige and President Reagan. In 1981, NOAA and USGS operated Landsats 2 and 3 
and maintained seven international ground stations. The government terminated Landsat 3 
operation in 1983, Landsat 4 launched in 1982 and 5 in 1984. Over the course of several years, 
CCCT’s role was to commercialize Landsat 4 and 5, encourage later Landsats to be paid for by 
private operators (essentially to enforce Reagan’s cutting of Landsat 6 and 7 from FY1982 
budget), and also commercialize weather satellites. A proposal from COMSAT in 1981 quickly 
began to reveal the serious complications of commercialization remote sensing satellites. 
  
Conceptualizing Commercialization: Contacts with COMSAT 
 The Carter administration’s effort to commercialize remote sensing met sharp criticism 
from the DOC regarding weather and ocean satellites. NOAA operated weather satellites, such as 
the TIROS and Nimbus series, and distributed their data as a public good. In 1979, no distinct 
ocean remote sensing satellites flew. As mentioned, the Carter administration dropped weather 
and ocean satellites from commercialization, however, the issue reemerged as a NOAA Request 
for Information solicited for proposals from industry. Congress received several proposals, via 
hearings and testimonies, but deemed Communications Satellite Corporation’s (COMSAT) 
proposal to buy both NOAA weather satellites and Landsat as a commercial package strongest. 
In 1962, Congress passed the Communications Satellite Act which created the federally 
subsidized COMSAT to establish an American commercial space communications presence 
which it grew successfully through mobile communications, television broadcasting, and to a 
lesser extent, domestic communications.295 Ronald Reagan won the Presidency and renewed 
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efforts to commercialize all remote sensing satellites despite the recommendations made ahead 
of PD-54. 
 In August 1979, COMSAT proposed Stereosat, a stereoscopic remote sensing apparatus 
akin to Landsat to NASA Administrator Robert Frosch. NASA welcomed the proposal but could 
do little with it once PD-54 moved Landsat to NOAA control. In November 1979, COMSAT 
CEO John Johnson contacted Carter’s NOAA Administrator Richard Frank about Stereosat 
encouraging funding and agency support of the project in return for adherence to Landsat 
policies such as non-discriminatory data access and accessible data pricing as well as to help 
“accomplish the space policy goals established by the President for your Agency.”296 Frank 
responded that NOAA began working on a transition plan in 1980 for an operational Landsat 
system and he hoped for COMSAT’s views as the plan materialized.297 Essentially COMSAT 
had come to the table too early. 
COMSAT returned to the negotiating table in earnest. COMSAT Chairman Joseph 
Charyk lobbied hard throughout 1981 in support of his corporation’s proposal to win Landsat 
and the meteorological satellites. On 9 April 1981, COMSAT General proposed to OMB to buy 
Landsat and all NOAA weather satellites in operation and later did so publicly before a joint 
House-Senate Committee. COMSAT’s proposal called ‘EarthStar’ attempted to accelerate 
commercialization, develop new sensors, and provide new data products. Charyk’s plan would 
“include near-term product and service-oriented R&D, but that the government would continue 
long-term high-risk technology development.”298During the congressional hearing, Charyk stated 
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“if implemented, we believe our plan could substantially reduce overall federal expenditures and 
increase the federal tax base as a result of new companies entering the market, as well as from 
increased earnings from existing companies” and he reminded the Joint Committee of 1962 
when the government set up COMSAT as a means of promoting private sector satellite 
development.299  
 On 23 July 1981, Charyk testified before a Joint Committee of the Senate Subcommittee 
on Science, Technology and Space and the House Subcommittee on Space Science and 
Applications. The hearing welcomed several from industry, including University of California, 
GE, and Resources Development Associates in addition to COMSAT in order to gather 
information about commercialization issues. The other industry agents raised concerns about 
subsidies and market size while David Simonett, Dean of University of California’s Graduate 
School advocated university access to “lower-than-market price, or for NASA or NSF to budget 
for university access to use of data.”300 Charyk took a much different approach in the hearing 
describing COMSAT’s ‘EarthStar’ as “’uniquely qualified’ to meet the responsibilities entailed 
in private sector transfers” to answer both Congressional and industry concerns such as 
developing new applications and overall profitability by combining land meteorological satellites 
but did not comment on data pricing.301  
 In December 1981, COMSAT’s formal proposal went public during a Subcommittee on 
Space Science and Applications hearing. Charyk testified that “COMSAT is the logical entity to 
assume such a responsibility [becoming the private sector operator of Landsat]. If so designated, 
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COMSAT is prepared to proceed to dedicate the resources necessary for the successful 
development of such a system.”302 When asked about combining systems and which types of 
observations require satellites, Charyk proposed combining instruments on a single COMSAT 
operated satellite platform that included ocean, weather, and land imaging sensors. With regards 
to timely, uninterrupted data service, Charyk warned that Landsats 4 and 5 do not guarantee 
service beyond the 1980s but that “COMSAT has studied ways to continue and improve a 
Landsat-type service,” and Congress should pass legislation designating an “an appropriate 
private entity with a proven record of performance both domestically and internationally” to 
operate Landsat commercially.303 For Congress and potential operators alike, the development of 
a market for land remote sensing data was a pressing concern. However, for the Subcommittee 
and those testifying, there appeared to be an established meteorological data market anchored by 
NOAA-operated weather satellites. Thus, Charyk proposed that both weather satellites and 
Landsat commercialize as a package since “an operator could assume ownership and operation 
of the Landsat system for incremental costs and use the meteorological business to leverage the 
development of the market for Landsat data.”304 Charyk also strongly supported the non-
discriminatory data access policy given a lack of resistance from the international community 
and it does not constrain potential entrepreneurship. 
 Throughout 1982, Congress, DOC, and the White House wrestled over weather satellite 
commercialization, which greatly complicated COMSAT’s plan to take over Landsat, polar-
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synchronous weather satellites, and the GOES systems.  COMSAT also began to search for a 
successor to Joseph Charyk in March 1982. Among COMSAT’s potential candidates was Guy 
Fiske, a Department of Energy undersecretary who received a transfer to DOC. Fiske met with 
COMSAT executives and lobbyists in addition to exchanging letters and phone calls throughout 
1982. Fiske “described his role as that of an ‘expediter’” despite Baldrige’s testimony that he had 
no policymaking authority.305 As a result, the COMSAT ‘EarthStar’ bid became more precarious 
in May 1983 when it came under further scrutiny by the Department of Justice. The investigation 
revealed that then-Deputy Secretary of Commerce Fiske, who played a key role advocating 
commercialization, also had been “meeting privately with COMSAT representatives about 
becoming president of COMSAT.”306 Commerce General Counsel Sherman Unger “concluded 
that Mr. Fiske had violated the agency’s stands of conduct” which a Department of Justice 
investigation confirmed citing Fiske’s four meetings with Comsat executives.307 As a result of 
the conflict of interest investigation, Fiske resigned his DOC post that month as the debate 
continued. The Fiske hearings revealed “a long pattern in which Comsat gained a pipeline of 
information into, and private meetings with, DOC officials that no other company or even 
Congress had during the decision making on the satellite proposals.”308 
 
Capitol Hill Comes In: GAO Reports, 1977-1982 
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 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) played a role in the commercialization 
debate since it published numerous reports that informed Congressional policymaking. Kathleen 
Eisenbeis argued that these reports “established the conceptual framework for Congressional 
studies on Landsat for the next decade.”309 The GAO studied the political, economic, and 
national security ramifications of commercializing Landsat data with particular attention to how 
it impacted federal agencies. Reports published in 1977, 1982, and 1984 steadily demonstrated 
federal and private resistance to commercialization due to the fear of cost prohibitive data and 
data discontinuity. 
 The initial report in 1977 called for cost benefit analyses that ultimately suggested 
Landsat commercialization policy issues remained inconclusive which was corroborated in a 
1978 report on Landsat 4’s budget eclipsing $650 million and LACIE’s “mixed success in 
achieving its performance goals.”310 In 1982, Ronnie Flippo (D-AL), House Subcommittee on 
Space Science and Applications chair, directed GAO to report on federal agency use of Landsat, 
which in FY82 was about 25% of all Landsat products distributed and in a 1984 report revealed 
“most federal users believed that ‘an increase in the cost of Landsat data would either prevent 
them from continuing to buy the data or reduce the amount they could buy.’”311 The states 
agreed, by December 1981 “fifteen states have routine operational capabilities to use Landsat 
data; state use of Landsat data has grown 61 percent since 1978.”312 The GAO also disclosed 
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private and university opposition to commercialization since “cost-cutting would also ‘affect the 
availability or continuity of data and investment in research and development.’”313 
 Despite the opaqueness of the evolving land remote sensing policy towards 
commercialization, GAO revealed considerable opposition due to potential price hikes and data 
continuity. Nonetheless, President Reagan’s administration continued to pursue the policy given 
the billion-dollar cost to the government of Landsat 6 research and development and program 
costs. Despite the users’ concerns coming forth via GAO, NOAA went forth with its Request for 
Proposals (RFP). 
 
Calling for Contractors: NOAA’s RFP and Resistance, March - November 1983 
 In March 1983, NOAA officially released its Request for Proposals (RFP) to solicit for 
commercial operators of Landsat and weather satellites. The RFP signaled that, despite a lack of 
legislation, considerable opposition, and myriad unresolved policies, Landsat would become a 
commercial entity. Thus, I argue the NOAA RFP was less a mechanism for soliciting proposals 
and more a political (rather than policy) instrument meant to accelerate Landsat 
commercialization. However, it elicited strong opposition from the House of Representatives and 
international cooperators which led to the removal of weather satellite, and very nearly Landsat 
itself, from the commercialization process. 
 In line with Reagan’s vision for Landsat, the White House charged Commerce Secretary 
Malcolm Baldrige with soliciting for commercial operators. DOC did so by forming a Source 
Evaluation Board (SEB), headed by William P. Bishop of NOAA in May 1983. Secretary 
Baldrige tasked this in-house group with both soliciting and evaluating proposals from private 
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sector parties who sought to operate Landsat and weather satellites, after having issued a request 
for proposals.314 The RFP required all potential operators are American, communicate directly 
with DOC, abide by all relevant laws and regulations (such as the Export Administration Act, 
Arms Export Control Act, Sherman Anti-Trust Act, etc.), and ensure no employment conflict of 
interests. Furthermore, the RFP had three basic objectives: 
 
1. “to develop a commercial system based on the present Landsat operational satellite 
system capabilities; 
2. to maintain U.S. leadership in remote sensing data from space; and 
3. to foster the economic benefits of such data for the private sector and public good.”315 
 
In order to accomplish these objectives, NOAA sought an operator that could distribute data and 
data services, operate Landsat 4 and 5 throughout their lifetimes, and develop subsequent 
Landsats. The RFP also presented a number of issues that complicated the commercialization 
process and it also elicited strong resistance from the House of Representatives. 
The first major issue was that the White House insisted on commercializing both Landsat 
and weather satellites, despite the aforementioned resistance. The COMSAT episode mentioned 
above demonstrated the issues with weather satellite commercialization, however, the issue 
continued to manifest since DOC received more industry proposals to operate weather satellites 
in addition to Landsat. From March to November, the RFP went through more iterations and an 
18 November 1983 draft had cut all meteorological and oceanic satellites from its language, 
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which originally included the Polar Meteorological Satellites and the Geostationary 
Meteorological Satellites (GOES). Without certainty regarding the weather satellites’ status, 
potential operators did not have a clear notion of what they proposed for. The SEB was unable to 
jettison weather satellites entirely for several more months. Below, I discuss how Congress 
intervened with legislation to resolve the weather and ocean satellite issue. 
A second issue presented by the RFP to potential operators and the user community was 
its myriad unresolved details and opacity. The November 1983 iteration of the RFP had yet to 
identify which type of contract arrangement most suitable for civil remote sensing. The 
government anticipated a Cost Plus Fixed Fee contract which paid the operator a fixed fee while 
the government assumed research and development risks. The RFP did not specify a fee or a 
time-scale. Also, what remained unclear was the “the transition from Government to private 
ownership and operation [which] will involve some considerable period of time. The terms and 
conditions of an actual sale are expected to be part of a separate contract.”316 A separate chart on 
page IV-5 of the RFP anticipated that NOAA continue operating Landsat for eighteen more 
months before the actual transition period initiated in mid-1985 extending into 1986. The 
government’s commercialization plan under Section V of the RFP’s Contract Schedule Articles 
remained reserved and would be “inserted after negotiations.”317 The RFP stated that the 
contracting period last 10 years but dependent upon the performance of Landsats 4 and 5, but 
given no hard start time, it was unclear when those 10 years began.  
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Another difficulty for potential operators was national security provisions. This section of 
the November 1983 RFP was classified and not discussed in other sections. Unless the potential 
operator had staff with security clearances, they did not have a competitive edge to vie for the 
contract. Lastly, The RFP’s ‘Commercialization Plan’ section left many details to potential 
operators. In particular, the Landsat data pricing schedule for eleven products left prices to 
potential operators.318 Despite the lack of developed market, NOAA left data pricing to potential 
operators to decide the cost of Landsat data, a cause for great concern discussed below. 
Opposition emerged on the House and voiced its frustration with civil remote sensing 
commercialization. To be clear, NOAA and the House agreed that weather and oceanic satellites 
should remain public assets but disagreed on Landsat. By November, the House put the weather 
satellite commercialization issue to rest. Public Law 98-52, the NASA FY1984 authorization bill 
prohibited Baldrige from transferring civil land, weather, and ocean satellites to the private 
sector.319 Weeks later, Representative Thomas Daschle (D-SD) announced that “by a vote of 377 
to 28, the House went very strongly on record in opposition to any attempts to transfer this 
country’s civil weather satellites and land natural resource satellites.”320 The vote passed House 
Concurrent Resolution 168 which became an expression of House opposition to 
commercialization since H.Con. Res. 168 did not have any binding legal authority over ending 
commercialization. The Senate indefinitely postponed their vote on the resolution. Daschle also 
claimed on record that numerous committee and subcommittee chairs (controlled by Democrats 
in the 97th Congress) opposed land and weather satellite commercialization. The House 
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Committee on Government Operations also reported evidence of resistance to commercialization 
from Landsat international cooperators.  
On September 28, 1983, J. Dexter Peach, Director of the GAO Resources, Community, 
and Economic Development Division, testified before the House Subcommittee on Legislation 
and National Security on international reactions to Landsat commercialization.321 The GAO 
report surveyed several countries in Europe, Asia, and South America as well as the World Bank, 
Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Institute of Technology, and UN agencies. These 
agencies corroborated the arguments of the aforementioned GAO reports from the late 1970s, 
arguing that a commercial market has yet to be realized but also they disagreed with defining 
Landsat as an operational program. These agencies told Peach that Landsat data “is used mostly 
on a research and development or demonstration basis rather than an operational basis.” 
Furthermore, Landsat commercialization threatened “investments made by developing countries 
in acquiring the capability to receive and use Landsat data [which] represent significant 
commitments of their governments’ resources.”322 Landsat commercialization also deeply 
threatened international ground station operators’ investment in Landsat since the MOUs they 
signed with the U.S. government provided “for termination upon cessation of U.S. Government 
operation of the Landsat system.”323 Essentially foreign operators and users saw 
commercialization as a termination of the non-discriminatory data access policy. Furthermore, 
the foreign representatives Peach spoke with argued private operation of Landsat placed them “at 
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an unfair economic disadvantage” and “the satellites could be used to acquire and distribute 
military intelligence harmful to their national interests.”324 Without guaranteed non-
discriminatory data access policy, foreign representatives feared for both their countries’ 
economic development initiatives and their national sovereignty.  
Congressional and GAO concerns alongside NOAA’s continued RFP revisions began to 
shape civil remote sensing policy and the future of Landsat use. At the behest of both the House 
and NOAA, the SEB eroded the possibility of weather and ocean remote sensing satellite 
commercialization by striking them from the RFP. NOAA kept Landsat on the table at the White 
House’s urging despite House disapproval. Effectively the NOAA RFP attempted to set 
guidelines for a potential operator to foster commercial land imaging data use and define the 
segments of the satellite system ripe for private operation. However, the RFP continued to evolve 
into 1984as Congressional reports and legislation kept Landsat in transition. Similar to GAO’s 
reports, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment published a report in 1984 that 
expressed the similar concerns of data discontinuity and cost prohibition, but expressed further 
concerns regarding Landsat commercialization. 
 
Congressional Concerns: OTA Report, March 1984 
 In March 1984, OTA published a technical memorandum addressing remote sensing 
issues for the House Science and Technology Committee and the House Government Operations 
Committee. The report was “designed to help Congress determine the appropriate requirements 
and conditions for private sector ownership of the U.S. land remote-sensing system,” to better 
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inform legislation.325 Having eschewed the meteorological satellite issue, OTA framed the 
question of Landsat’s future as either an operationally appropriate Government program, 
transition to the private sector or discontinue the program entirely. OTA assessed several key 
issues pertaining to commercialization that redefined Landsat use. 
 The memorandum began by critiquing the SEB RFP from 1983. The aforementioned 
report became the basis for soliciting offers from potential Landsat operators. However, the OTA 
memo revealed that the RFP left some policy precedent to be set by the private sector. Given the 
lack of direction regarding satellite operations, “the private offeror runs an awkward and 
expensive risk of offering to invest and become involved in ways that could later be changed by 
policymaking legislation.”326 At the time of the report, Congress continued to debate government 
versus private operation of Landsat. The OTA memo also addressed five broad policy areas that 
commercialization overlaps with: foreign policy, domestic public goods, federal data regulations, 
national security, and foreign competition. 
 As mentioned, several states around the world received Landsat data via ground stations 
through partnerships with NASA and USGS.  In addition, countries without ground stations also 
used Landsat data through data purchases. Given Landsat’s vast international presence, the 
government could not compromise its international obligations. The OTA postulated that a 
potential Landsat operator might not be able to assume those obligations and remain profitable. 
OTA also recommended that a nondiscriminatory data sales policy remain in place, just as it had 
during Landsat’s experimental years given its obligation to open skies and “the powerful 
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message to send to all governments, especially those opposed to the open interchanged 
of…Landsat data [which] are available even to our political and economic adversaries.”327 The 
government remained wedded to ‘Open Skies’ which Landsat data fell under its jurisdiction. 
OTA also recognized the government’s need to maintain strong relations with the developing 
world, a significant user of Landsat data. Despite the Reagan administration’s desire to see a 
competitive market emerge, data distribution and value-added services under commercial 
management potentially could drive up prices prohibiting developing countries from data use. 
OTA recommended that “it may be appropriate for the United States to restrict he private data 
distributor from entering into the value-added business, or to regulate it closely to prevent such a 
company from exerting unfair economic leverage over others.”328 In the previous chapter I 
argued USAID became a huge federal user of Landsat data for development projects. OTA 
recommended that, should commercialization bring about cost prohibitive data for federal users, 
“it will therefore be important to assure the appropriate Government funding is continued for 
these projects, and that access to data will also continue.”329 Similarly, the Government needed 
to ensure that commercialization did not compromise NASA and USGS ground station 
agreements. In essence, OTA cautioned against compromising foreign policy and international 
agreements while maintaining legality under ‘Open Skies’ and the nondiscriminatory data access 
policy. 
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 OTA also argued that Landsat data served as a domestic good. The memo raised many of 
the same concerns for developing countries as it did for federal agencies, universities, and state 
and municipal governments. Cost prohibitive data and computing hardware and software 
threatened to drive away users domestically as well. OTA also stated the importance of 
continuing research and development on more advanced instruments. While NASA prepared to 
launch Landsat 5 in 1985, having just launched Landsat 4 in 1982, neither NASA nor NOAA 
made any commitment to research and development on subsequent Landsat instrumentation. 
OTA recommended research and development could become a function of university 
involvement not only to develop new sensor capabilities but also with broadening the market 
through researching applications of remote sensing data. Commercialization’s potential effects 
on EROS data distribution also became a domestic issue. Since data continuity and 
nondiscriminatory access were major concerns, it became crucial to preserve EROS financially 
and ensure that data copyrights remained within the Government. 
 Civilian federal requirements also complicated the commercialization plot. The OTA 
report did not offer solutions but raised three particular issues. First, Landsat 4, and the eventual 
launch of Landsat 5 added a new form of data provided by the TM. TM data proved to be more 
difficult to process and, as a result, more expensive. TM data was far more detailed since the 
sensor detected across seven spectral bands, as opposed to only four on the MSS. OTA vaguely 
recommended developing Federal applications for TM data, suggesting that the satellites’ 
instruments may be well ahead of the user community’s adaptation to the new data. OTA stated 
“for Federal mission agencies, data equivalent to MSS in format, spectral and spatial 
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characteristics will satisfy most civilian Federal needs for the rest of the 1980’s.”330 OTA also 
argued that a single federal agency oversees all US remote sensing activities, but that it should 
not conflict with private entrepreneurship except to “demand improved service and products.”331 
This is in partial reaction the French SPOT system (discussed later in this chapter) which 
planned to fly higher resolution instruments in 1986 and will compete with American companies 
for data and services. Lastly, OTA recommended cost cutting in operations but sustain 
government sponsored research and development efforts. 
 The fourth broad area the OTA report addressed is national security. Landsat’s status as a 
government entity allowed for easier control over data distribution, yet OTA speculated that a 
private entity would be more difficult to regulate with regards to data sales and that the defense 
and intelligence community may launch their own moderate-resolution system. Meanwhile, DoD 
restrictions on satellite instrumentation and data processing imposed limits on potential operators 
as well as the value-added data analysis industry. OTA suggested that Congress must strike a 
balance between establishing national security policies and fostering a remote sensing market. 
 Lastly, potential foreign competition diminished American leadership in remote sensing. 
The announcement of SPOT signaled the end of Landsat’s monopoly in 1986. SPOT reinforced 
OTA’s argument that data continuity alongside research and development would sustain U.S. 
leadership in remote sensing technology.  
The broad, unresolved Landsat policy areas of international obligations, domestic issues, 
federal regulations, national security, and foreign competition reported on through NOAA, GAO, 
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and OTA reports were hotly debated until these issues reached the House chamber floor and took 
legislative form in 1984.  
 
Congress Votes Commercialization: Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 
 In 1984, two significant changes promised to expand data use and sustain the Landsat 
program for the next decade. On 1 March 1984, Landsat 5 left Vandenberg AFB on a Delta 3920 
launcher vehicle successfully reaching Sun-synchronous orbit. This satellite became the longest-
operating of all Landsats at present, producing nearly 2.5 million images over 29 years, far 
outstripping its 3 year design life.332 Landsat 5’s longevity proved fortuitous given President 
Reagan’s 1982 decision to cut all Landsat satellites after it, dropping Landsat 6 and 7 from the 
federal budget. 
At that time, Congress continued to debate new legislation that ensured sustained 
funding, management, and new technology that expanded data use. President Reagan signed into 
law the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 a week ahead of Landsat’s twelfth 
anniversary on 17 July 1984. This legislation attempted to change the nature of Landsat use 
through privatization, however, this new management regime struggled and nearly ended 
American land remote sensing entirely. 
The aforementioned efforts of the Carter and Reagan administrations to commercialize 
Landsat took legislative form in early 1984. Representative Don Fuqua (D-FL) sponsored H.R. 
4836, the “Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984.” This began a discussion 
between Congress and the Executive branch regarding best practices for implementing 
commercialization. When President Reagan entered office in early 1981, he directed OMB 
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Director David Stockman to cut Landsats 6 and 7 from the budget immediately, originally 
provided for under Carter’s FY1980 budget. Stockman “was philosophically opposed to any kind 
of ‘operational’ activity by the government. Once Landsat D [4] dies in 1985 and D’ [5] in 1987 
says the OMB, that will be the end.”333 Reagan and OMB wanted the U.S. government out of the 
remote sensing industry as soon as possible. As mentioned, NASA’s role diminished since it 
only built, launched, and maintained the satellites’ orbits at this point. It played no role in data 
collection, distribution, analysis, or marketing. The DOC now managed Landsat and raised a few 
key issues in response to H.R. 4836 via the SEB.  
  The SEB began to study the weather satellite issue further and commercialization still 
required legislation from Congress. SEB studies led its Chairman William Bishop to argue 
against the commercialization of weather satellites since “the only customer big enough to 
support them was the government.”334 In a response to OMB’s request for DOC’s views on H.R. 
4836, Bishop argued that the scope of the bill needed to narrow. Bishop dispensed of ocean 
remote sensing from commercialization, stating that  
“there is no generally recognized operational capability in ocean remote sensing at the 
present time [1984]. Including ocean sensing within the scope of the bill will have the 
effect of specifying the government’s conditions for commercialization of ocean remote 
sensing long before the parameters of such a system – or the need for commercialization- 
have been established. This may have the effect of inhibiting innovation in this area.”335 
  
William Bishop continued to work against commercializing ocean and weather satellites in his 
response to H.R. 4836 and his work as SEB Chairman. The SEB recognized the problematic 
nature of commercializing weather satellites. Congress and the SEB both opposed weather 
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satellite commercialization since weather data had become so important for public safety, 
namely in storm forecasting. Several members of Congress speculated that data companies could 
inflate data prices in a time of domestic emergency, which they argued was outside the national 
interest. As arguments against packaging Landsat with the weather satellites piled on, members 
of Congress began legislating against it. By fall 1983, both chambers of Congress passed 
resolutions opposing the transfer of weather satellite operations to the private sector, a position 
which was solidified in November 1983.  
Congress passed an appropriations bill specifying that no funds will be allocated for 
NOAA “to transfer the ownership of any meteorological satellite or associated ground system to 
any private entity.”336 In addition, Don Fuqua (D-FL) chairman of the House Committee on 
Science and Technology recognized that commercializing weather satellites further impeded 
Landsat commercialization. As an added measure, Fuqua sponsored House Concurrent 
Resolution 168 which defined weather satellite data as a public good and prohibited weather 
satellite operation from commercialization. The resolution identified “the Federal Government as 
the principal user of data gathered by civil meteorological satellites” which are implemented in 
federally provided weather forecasts.337 Furthermore, in Fuqua’s support of the resolution on the 
House floor, he reiterated a joint NASA/DoD study’s conclusion that “there is considerable 
financial, policy, and program risk to the Government in commercializing weather satellites and 
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there is no clear policy or financial benefit to be realized.”338 The resolution overwhelmingly 
passed 377-28. Subsequent legislation passed in March 1984 by Congress and signed by 
President Reagan in July 1984 officially prohibited the commercialization of weather satellites, 
under the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 (Landsat Act). Congress 
officially defined weather satellite data as a public good, but had yet to do so with Landsat data. 
 Accordingly, the SEB promptly revised its request for proposals after Congress released 
its FY1984 appropriations. It released a new request on 3 January 1984 and received seven 
proposals over the subsequent three months including COMSAT, Fairchild Industries, Eastman 
Kodak, and an RCA/Hughes consortium. However, the SEB could do little with the proposals 
since several proposals included weather satellite operations, a policy yet unresolved. Landsat 
commercialization also required legislation, the potential operators could not seize control of 
Landsat despite a DOC offer. 
Even though DOC solicited for proposals and began to select a winning bid, Secretary 
Baldrige needed legal authority to award a commercial contract for Landsat operations. The 
efforts of both the Carter and Reagan administrations as well as DOC coalesced first on the floor 
of the House of Representatives. On 9 February 1984, Representative Don Fuqua (D-FL) 
introduced H.R.4836, the “Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984” (Landsat 
Act). The bill attempted to answer policy questions regarding Landsat data continuity and use.  
 
• Maintain American leadership in remote sensing, preserve national security, and meet 
foreign obligations 
• Promote private sector involvement in remote sensing 
• Minimize Government subsidy (duration and amount) 
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• Open access data policy 
• Prohibit meteorological satellite commercialization 
 
H.R. 4836 revealed several knowledge gaps between policymakers and lawmakers regarding 
Landsat use. As mentioned, the White House pressured DOC and Congress to commercialize 
weather satellites and ocean satellites, but against numerous policy recommends, Congress 
removed these applications satellites from the bill altogether. Ocean remote sensing referred to 
satellites that mapped oceanic bathymetry, currents, and other maritime variables. The bill 
included ocean remote sensing satellites for commercialization. However, the Committee on 
Science and Technology had overestimated American space capabilities since no such satellite 
existed nor was Landsat designed for marine observations beyond coastlines. The SEB chairman 
William Bishop raised this concern on 2 March 1984. Bishop remarked “including ocean sensing 
within the scope of the bill will have the effect of specifying the Government’s conditions for the 
commercialization of ocean remote sensing long before the parameters of such a system –or the 
need for commercialization have been established,” further stating it may stifle innovation.339  
Another gap between DOC’s RFP and H.R.4836 regarded Landsat data marketing. I 
demonstrated that NASA, USGS, and AID and their contractors undertook initiatives to expand 
Landsat use through development projects, ground station exports, and transferring remote 
sensing expertise, but no agency actively marketed Landsat data to users. H.R. 4836 Section 
201(A) called for the Commerce Secretary to contract out marketing services which the SEB’s 
RFP did not require. Thus, Bishop stated “if the successful bidder in the RFP process does not 
undertake to market the data, an additional procurement action would be required for the 
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marketing component.”340 This gap between DOC and the House, Bishop stated, further 
extended and complicated the commercialization process by requiring yet another contractual 
procurement costing more time and dollars. At this juncture, Bishop encouraged Congress to 
include data marketing as a formal objective of the potential Landsat operating contractor. 
The Commercialization Act addressed concerns raised both by private industry and the 
scientific community. Fuqua, chairman of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 
recognized that slow market development meant that private industry and potential research 
outfits would not be able to plan long-term, multi-year studies without a guarantee of data 
continuity and a competitive market which could provide numerous data products. Ironically, the 
bill sought to maintain nondiscriminatory data access to broaden Landsat use, which private 
industry did not favor. Pam Mack explained this irony stating “customers who would pay a high 
price for the exclusive use of Landsat data would not be interested if it were available to their 
competitors as well.”341 H.R. 4836 essentially tried to reconcile the open access policy through 
fostering a remote sensing data market with a competitive industry. 
 The House revised H.R. 4836 as H.R. 5155 which cleared the House by voice vote, then 
the Senate also by voice vote as S. 2292, and it made its way to President Reagan’s desk on 17 
July 1984 as the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984. At the bill’s signing, 
Reagan reiterated his motivations for Landsat commercialization stating the bill is “in the 
national interest,” that it reduced “burdensome governmental regulation,” and that it encouraged 
competition.342 Reagan also stated “we will make every effort to minimize the duration and 
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amount of any Federal subsidy,” a promise which plagued the very policy he promoted and the 
Landsat program itself over the next five years.343 
 
Commercialization to Contract: NOAA takes Landsat to Market, 1984-1985 
The Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 provided the legal precedent 
necessary to officially offer Landsat to private sector operation. Initially, DOC received eighteen 
inquiries from firms interested in Landsat and weather satellite operations and data sales. These 
firms were diverse in practice, a combination of engineering firms, data systems and analysis 
companies, and applied sciences. However, the long process, described above, that removed 
weather satellites from the commercialization equation prompted all but two potential operators 
to remove themselves from the competition following the Commercialization Act’s signing. 
COMSAT, in particular, was one of the first to withdraw from the competition. Between July 17, 
1984 and September 25, 1985, the DOC essentially conducted a process of elimination to 
ultimately select the commercial operator for Landsat.  
By September 1985, only two proposals remained on the table for the SEB to consider. 
Eastman Kodak Company, an optics and imaging services firm that had been involved with 
developing cameras for the classified joint CIA/USAF reconnaissance satellite series named 
Corona. A consortium named EOSAT which included RCA Astro-Electronics, Hughes Aircraft’s 
Santa Barbara Research Center, and Computer Sciences Corporation presented the other 
remaining proposal. However, Eastman Kodak withdrew their proposal in mid-1985. 
Thus, EOSAT won the bid for Landsat operations. As a consortium, the EOSAT proposal 
divided labor among three subcontractors. The Hughes Santa Barbara Research Center took 
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responsibility for developing Landsat 6 and 7 instruments which included a Thematic Mapper 
and Multispectral Linear Array Sensor, similar to the multispectral scanner. RCA Astro-
Electronics operated the “spacecraft bus and satellite operations control center” while Computer 
Sciences Corporation controlled “ground operations and ground receiving and processing facility 
design and Earthsat for market development and data enhancement.”344 The U.S. government 
finally completed the commercialization process on September 27, 1985 with the signing of the 
contract between Anthony Calio representing the DOC and EOSAT President Charles P. 
Williams representing EOSAT. In addition to the aforementioned division of labor, the contract 
obligated the federal government to operate the EROS Data Center, retain rights to the data 
without any guarantee of data purchases, turn over operation of Landsats 4 and 5 (the only 
satellites in operation at that time), subsidize EOSAT up to $250 million paid out over five years, 
and subsidize Landsat 4 and 5 operation up to $20 million. The contract divided the $250 million 
among ground system development and Landsat 6 and 7 construction, launch, and integration. 
Lastly, the contract assumed EOSAT grew their revenue from $19 million in 1986 to $45 million 
in 1989.345 In this way, EOSAT required fewer subsidies each successive fiscal year. The 
government and EOSAT clearly defined the division of labor and developed a collegial working 
relationship throughout the bidding process, but quickly the arrangement fell into disarray as the 
DOC withheld portions of the $250 million promised to EOSAT. President Reagan’s promise to 
reduce federal expenditures began to complicate the vision his very administration championed. 
 
Commercialization Collapses: EOSAT Contract and Issues: 1986-1989 
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 Under the Commercialization Act, NOAA formally relinquished control of the Landsat 
program on September 30, 1984 and EOSAT assumed operations a year later as contractor. Once 
EOSAT controlled the Landsat program and data marketing, it set about commercializing the 
satellite data. However, its agreement with Congress included a pledge of “up to $250 million for 
capital investments and other costs during a 10-year transition to private ownership” provided for 
under the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 and the OMB had “not yet 
released the $69.5 million in government funds that EOSAT says it needs” for new ground 
stations and for the development of additional satellites.346 The dispute began between OMB and 
the House Science and Technology Committee. Legally, OMB could not release funds until the 
DOC approved the $27.5 million authorized by Congress for FY1987, still short of EOSAT’s 
needs. Furthermore, President Reagan’s proposed budget included no funds for Landsat. Still, 
Rep. Bill Nelson (D-FL) urged OMB Director James Miller III to authorize Congressional 
funding stating “it would be a significant detriment to the country if this falls apart. We need 
remote sensing capability up in space for many reasons, not the least of which is national 
security” and EOSAT President Charles Williams informed the Washington Post how the 
elimination of Landsat and its data would deleteriously “affect U.S. foreign relations, hand over 
technological leadership to the French, and destroy the first U.S. attempt to commercialize 
space.”347 However, both OMB Director Miller and predecessor David Stockman opposed 
Landsat subsidies arguing the satellite costs ran too high. Both Rep. Nelson and Williams linked 
Landsat use to broad implications such as U.S. foreign relations, since so many linkages had 
been put in place even prior to launch, and to technological leadership, a goal of American 
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spaceflight endeavors both scientifically and commercially. EOSAT received its subsidy behind 
schedule for FY 1986 but the funding issues continued. 
In January 1987, unpaid FY1987 funds for EOSAT forced the company to terminate its 
efforts to build Landsats 6 and 7. As mentioned, EOSAT began receiving its $250 million 
subsidy but “pressure from the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit exercise led the White House 
OMB to delete the fiscal year 1987 installment of EOSAT’s subsidy – $69.5million.”348 In 1985, 
Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act which required cuts in 
federal spending to reduce the federal budget deficit that had developed under the Reagan 
Administration. The Balanced Budget Act’s policies filtered down to all federal agencies and 
their contracts which made fulfilling the EOSAT subsidy far more difficult for NOAA as federal 
expenditures remained high in the late 1980s. Congress restored only a fraction of what EOSAT 
was owed, about $27.5 million. Meanwhile, NOAA and EOSAT continued to negotiate its 
subsidy rate, despite the contractual obligation of $250 million and two new satellites, NOAA 
planned for $209 million and one new satellite. For EOSAT, the funding issue delayed 
construction of Landsat 6 and 700 employees faced potential layoffs or reassignments.  
In August 1987, the USGS feared EROS Data Center closure due to the federal budget 
shortfall extending from recent legislation and EOSAT’s woes. USGS “stated that a more likely 
solution would be for the facility to expand its scope to include collecting and analyzing remote 
sensing data for other branches of government. Currently, the EROS Data Center has lost about a 
third of its workload to EOSAT, a private company, as part of the government’s move towards 
during certain elements of the space program. In the process, EROS will lose about $7 million of 
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its annual federal budget by 1989. EROS processes Earth images received from the Landsat 
program’s two-satellite system.”349  
 Shrinking federal budgeting and inadequate private investment did not simply doom 
EROS, but the Landsat program itself in 1988 and into 1989. In 1988, the annual operational cost 
of Landsat totaled $18.8 million, but NOAA spokesman Bud Littin announced in early 1989, 
“we’re out of money, that’s all. The situation’s pretty bleak.”350 In late 1988, NOAA ran short 
$9.4 million for EOSAT subsidies.  The news angered science advocate Representative George 
Brown (D-CA) who stated “this is a damned outrage, and I’m going to do everything in my 
power to stop it from happening.”351 Brown, along with 103 other Congress members, authored a 
letter addressed to President Bush and Vice President Dan Quayle to President Bush and Vice 
President Dan Quayle “urging them to find a way to keep the Landsat remote sensing satellites in 
operation.”352 Quayle, as head of the National Space Council, explored several options for 
keeping Landsat aloft through 1989. Quayle, working with Congress, explored a number of 
options such as moving appropriated funds from NOAA’s other programs to Landsat or 
amending the Commercialization Act to draw funding from NASA’s budget. Landsat’s situation 
was precarious, if Quayle and the National Space Council could not find funding for the 
satellites, NOAA threatened to “turn off Landsat 4 and 5 on March 27 [1989].”353 In addition to 
the satellite shutdown, EOSAT speculated the end of its data distribution services, effectively 
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closing access to over 2 million Landsat images collected to date. EOSAT continued Landsat 6 
development since Congress appropriated $36 million for construction, but not yet for launch. 
 The funding issue was the result of friction between DOC’s order to limit funds for 
Landsat and the satellite’s advocates at NOAA, the Hill, and Dan Quayle of National Space 
Council. The House Subcommittee on Space, Science and Technology held a hearing on March 
7, 1989 but little came of the meeting except for numerous Representatives coming to Landsat’s 
defense. NOAA’s frustration grew with DOC’s obdurate funding attitude as well, one unnamed 
official lamented “they [Commerce] don’t give a damn about Landsat” and that “it is a very 
awkward situation – the user community should raise hell,” which the DoD responded to.354 Dan 
Quayle met with OMB Director Richard Darman and proposed that DoD provide emergency 
funds to NOAA and EOSAT to resume Landsat operations for FY1989 and eventually adopt 
Landsat 7 construction (this issue will be addressed in the next chapter). Through Quayle’s 
discussions with DoD, NASA, and Congress, he secured funding for Landsat until the end of 
FY1989 in September. Beyond 1989, Landsat’s fate rested on the Hill. 
On 6 September 1989, the House began negotiations to provide emergency funds to 
EOSAT for Landsat under a bill designated for NOAA appropriations. The bill for Landsat 
funds, H.R. 2427, originated in the House Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agricultural 
Research and Environment and received bipartisan support. Rep. Bob Roe (D-NJ), House 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology chairman, put forth H. Res. 230 and Rep. Jimmy 
Quillen (R-TN) spoke on its behalf. He acknowledged the funding crisis Landsat had been facing 
and the imminent threat to use. Quillen stated  
“the loss of these Landsat satellites would interrupt the availability of remote sensing data 
for key government, scientific and foreign users; abandon the substantial Federal 
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investment ($1.5 billion) in a highly valuable data acquisition system; and severely 
damage, if not destroy, the Landsat commercialization initiative.”355 
 
Robert Walker (R-PA), Chairman of the House Science Committee, continued to support 
Landsat by elucidating more of its recent uses. Walker stated that Landsat “is absolutely critical 
to oil, gas, and mineral exploration, agricultural planning, global environmental monitoring.”356 
More representatives rose in support of Landsat mentioning uses in several states. In all, Quillen 
and Walker urged their fellow Representatives to continue funding Landsat and secured a 380 to 
1 vote in favor. 
 President Reagan and the DOC’s commitment to Landsat commercialization plunged the 
program into severe financial problems. Despite the introduction of new data forms from Landsat 
4 and 5’s Thematic Mapper and EOSAT’s Landsat data archive, its profits struggled. Landsat 
advocates at NOAA, on the Hill, and the Vice President secured just enough funds for Landsat to 
live another fiscal year into 1990, which will be discussed in the next chapter. As the Landsat 
program seemingly unraveled domestically throughout the 1980s, EOSAT also lost its 
competitive edge internationally. 
 
Remote Sensing Becomes a Market: SPOT and SPOT Image 
About six months after NASA, NOAA, and EOSAT signed their contract to 
commercialize Landsat, France became the second country to launch a land remote sensing 
satellite. Pierre-Marie Adrien, a member of NASA’s Space Applications Advisory Committee, 
argued that American investment in Landsat “stimulated heavy remote sensing investments 
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exceeding US$90 million in Japan, US$500 million in France’s SPOT programme and a 
projected US$280 million from Brazil by 1990.”357 India also began funding remote sensing 
research and development in the 1980s. Thus, he concluded that in order to maintain American 
leadership in remote sensing, a goal from the beginning of the Landsat program, the US 
government must remain involved with land remote sensing, at least financially. Adrien directed 
his plea for government support of remote sensing to OMB, in reaction to the emerging global 
competition in land remote sensing which threatened to further discourage use of Landsat data. 
The capabilities and applications of Landsat led other states to develop satellites of their 
own. France presented the first challenge to the virtual monopoly held by the Americans. Over 
the early years of the 1980s, the French government declassified its high-resolution 
reconnaissance satellite imagery which was far superior in detail to that of Landsat. The U.S. 
remained reluctant to release its deeply classified reconnaissance data produced by Corona, 
Gambit, and Hexagon. Likewise, the French also launched the Système Probatoire d’Observation 
de la Terre (SPOT) which produced highly detailed imagery with resolutions superior to Landsat. 
The French began planning the satellite for commercialization in 1978 and used a Toulouse-
based company, SPOT-Image to market its data. Based in France, SPOT-Image developed 
interest in Europe, but competed with Landsat through its Washington, D.C. based subsidiary for 
the U.S. market. By 1983, SPOT-Image sold its experimental data to the U.S. government, 
establishing itself as legitimate competitor. This data came from “a successful series of tests 
from high-altitude aircraft over the United States designed to simulate the data from the SPOT 
system.”358 These tests returned data at resolutions of 30 meters or better, more detailed than 
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Landsat. The French government committed US$ 400 million while SPOT- Image “mounted an 
aggressive world –wide marketing campaign to promote success of their venture.”359 France 
launched a series of SPOT satellites beginning in 1986. SPOT was received well, particularly by 
the time of its launch with the aforementioned troubles facing EOSAT and the life span of 
Landsats 4 and 5 supposedly beginning to expire (Landsat 4 was retired, Landsat 5 actually 
remains in operation presently). In these ways, SPOT became not only viable competition but 
also penetrated the American remote sensing market. 
Interest in remote sensing also expanded to Asia where two programs emerged. India 
began using Landsat data early in the 1970s at the behest of scientists such as P.D. Bhavsar, 
Vikram Sarabhai, and P.R. Phisaroty.360 These scientists worked received American training, 
developed remote sensing applications, and worked in remote sensing laboratories to build 
India’s remote sensing capacity in the 1970s. Following the launch of India’s first satellite, 
Aryabhata, the Indian Space Research Organization began working on a satellite for Earth 
resources called the Satellite for Earth Observation (SEO). India meant for it to serve two 
purposes: “‘management of natural resources through remote sensing technology’; and it should 
also satisfy national pride in that it uses 85% indigenous technology.”361 The satellite, launched 
in 1988, reflected much of Landsat’s objectives for agriculture, forestry, and hydrology but as 
the satellite series continued, it expanded its applications. India launched a series of satellites 
after IRS-1 and maintains the program to present. The Indians launched Oceansat for studying 
biomass in the oceans and currents. Likewise, Cartosat produces three-dimensional mapping at 
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resolutions superior to Landsat. The Indian remote sensing series has expanded beyond the 
applications of Landsat yet was not the only Asian state to develop remote sensing. 
Japan also began competing in remote sensing through its space agency. In January 1979, 
the Earth Observation Center of the National Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) began 
work on its Marine Observation Satellite -1 (MOS-1). Landsat was largely incapable of 
observing marine phenomena since its purpose was to scan land cover, thus Japan looked to 
address an emerging market. Japan’s MOS satellite was capable of both land remote sensing as 
well as ocean sensing at slightly better resolutions than the first three Landsats at about 50 
meters. The Japanese government launched the satellite in 1987 and added another satellite in 
1990. India’s involvement has been more robust than Japan’s, yet both challenged Landsat’s 
monopoly, especially in ocean mapping and in resolution.  
The aforementioned domestic funding issues in addition to the emergence of international 
competition seriously threatened the future of Landsat data usage. The effects of 
commercialization policy had a profound impact upon the satellite program’s use throughout the 
1980s. In order to meet the cost recovery requirement, EOSAT raised the prices of Landsat data 
which, in turn greatly decreased data sales. I argue the sunken data sales reflected constrained 
use of Landsat data which stood in contrast to the non-discriminatory data access policy set forth 
early in Landsat’s history. 
 
Commercial Consequences: Data Sales and the Problem of Use 
 In the previous chapter, NASA fostered use abroad but could not achieve non-
discriminatory data access for all potential users given the constraining nature of American 
foreign policy and obligations. In this chapter, domestic politics and international competition 
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constrained Landsat data use, which is best represented by falling sales of data due in large part 
to increased prices. As mentioned, the Landsat program underwent sweeping changes towards a 
commercial program which altered the availability of data to users in two ways. Full cost 
recovery mandated by OMB in conjunction with legislation and NOAA policies required 
EOSAT to raise its prices on Landsat data. Just as USGS did so previously, EOSAT generally 
offered two types of products: CCTs and printed imagery. Printed imagery was the preferred 
product for a majority of users since it was cheaper and did not require expensive, cumbersome 
processing computers. However, EOSAT discontinued offering printed imagery and raised CCT 
prices. Furthermore, the introduction of the Thematic Mapper (first launched aboard Landsat 4) 
produced even higher quality data with its added spectral bands. With new data products and 
higher quality data to sell, EOSAT in accordance with government raised prices. As a result of 
price hikes and less product availability, Landsat data became cost prohibitive for many users 
and the satellite program ultimately suffered.  
Two academic studies in particular connect Landsat data pricing to data usage. Donald 
Lauer, formerly Chief of EROS, and several colleagues published a 1997 article in PE&RS 
demonstrated that U.S. Government policies played a significant role shaping Landsat data 
pricing and availability.362 Kathleen Eisenbeis’s book argued that cost prohibitive data pricing 
resulted in a reduction of academic users.363 In this section, I present several data sets and argue 
that Landsat data pricing ultimately constrained the use of satellite data and went against the 
non-discriminatory data access policy. 
                                                          
362 William C. Draeger, Thomas Holm, Donald Lauer and R.J. Thompson, “The Availability of Landsat Data: Past, 
Present, and Future,” PE & RS, Vol. 63, No. 7 July 1997, pp. 869-875 
363 Kathleen Eisenbeis, Privatizing Government Information: The Effects of Policy on Access to Landsat Satellite 
Data, (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1995) 
191 
 
In the following chart, Lauer et. al. demonstrated how average Landsat data prices 
inceased tenfold for film products and CCTs quintupled. While CCT sales increased steadily 
over 10 years before and after commercialization, film items dramatically decreased. EOSAT 
focused on selling more CCTs than film, but the sheer volume of film items sold constituted 
broader Landsat data use. 
Table 3: Domestic Landsat Data Sales 
Landsat Data, from Lauer et. al., 1997 
 
As mentioned, NOAA released its Landsat commercialization RFP in 1983, the same year film 
prices jumped $10 and CCTs doubled in price. EOSAT fully assumed control of Landsat in 1986 
when film item prices jumped from $60 to $125 (and accordingly sold 20,000 fewer scenes) and 
CCTs doubled from $500 to $1000. Film prices hiked one more time in 1987 as its user base 
diminished further. Thematic Mapper data in particular, introduced with Landsat 4, was 
especially problematic as its prices fluctuated wildly and it was less desirable from the user 
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community since it required higher processing power. The next chart depicts the price fluctuation 
of TM data between $2800 and $4500 from 1983 to 1991. The final chart demonstrates the 
aggregate number of Landsat scenes sold between 1979 and 1989, the scope of this chapter. The 
downward slope occurs ahead of the EOSAT contract in 1985 as the aforementioned policy 
uncertainties and price hikes drove away users. 
Table 4: Thematic Mapper Imagery Price Fluctuations 
Thematic Mapper Scene Prices, courtesy, Raymond Byrnes, USGS, Reston, VA 
 
 
 In the following chart, I aggregated the total scenes of Landsat film and CCT products 
sold out of EROS and EOSAT, according to data from Lauer and USGS. Data sales held steady 
into 1981 but began to drop off in 1982 when both film and CCT prices went up. From 1982 to 
1984, the most serious plunge in data sales occurred when film prices tripled and CCT prices 
doubled. Sales recovered very modestly after the launch of Landsat 4 in 1984 but continued to 
decline after DOC and EOSAT signed their contract in 1985. 
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Table 5: Landsat Scenes Sold, 1979-1989 
Landsat Scenes Sold 1979-1989, Brian Jirout 
 
This huge drop off in products sold did not necessarily mean lowered revenues. 
Table 6: Film and CCT Product Sales, 1979-1989 




















































Between 1979 and 1989, film revenue hovered around $2 million before dropping below $1 
million in 1989. CCT revenue soared after commercialization to just over $9 million. Film 
revenue averaged $1,914,890 and CCTs averaged $4,181,127.  
Table 7: Landsat Scene Average Revenue, 1979-1989 
Landsat Scene Average Revenue, USGS data, courtesty, Raymond Byrnes, USGS, Reston, VA 
 
Revenues grew throughout the 1980s since EOSAT had to maintain cost recovery. Even at its 
peak revenue in 1986, at just above $10 million, EOSAT did not recover the nearly $18 million, 
mentioned above, that Landsat operations cost annually. EOSAT also generated very modest 









































Table 8: Global Landsat Data Revenues 
Worldwide Revenues, from Lauer et. al., 1997 
 
USGS, and later EOSAT, generated modest revenues from abroad by charging a $200,000 
operating fee to all international cooperators. In Brazil, INPE paid that sum to USGS to receive 
data to its station in Cuiaba, whereas the CCRS paid three installments of the sum for its three 
ground stations across Canada. EOSAT received anywhere from five to fourteen payments of 
$200,000 between 1979 and 1989. All revenues generated by a ground station in Brazil kept its 
own revenues, however. EOSAT simply collected the operating fee. Thus, over 10 years from 
1979 to 1989, total revenues from Landsat data and ground station fees did not exceed the cost 
recovery policy set forth by OMB. Without NOAA appropriations in FY1989, Landsat nearly 
ceased to operate. 
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 Lastly, international competition from the aforementioned SPOT program began to 
outperform EOSAT. 
Table 9: SPOT and EOSAT Sales Comparisons, 1986-1990 
SPOT vs EOSAT Data Sales, 1986-1990, courtesy: John Faundeen,  USGS EROS Data Center, Sioux Falls, SD 
 
The above chart demonstrates not only the static data sales of EOSAT against the increasing 
revenues of France’s SPOT system. In 1988, their revenues were nearly identical, but within two 
more years, SPOT’s revenues outpaced EOSAT by over $10 million. By 1989, EOSAT’s 
troubles extended beyond Washington. 
 
Concluding Commercialization 
 The commercialization policy introduced by President Carter and championed by 
President Reagan nearly ended Landsat data use altogether. PD-54 moved Landsat operations 
from NASA responsibility to NOAA, under DOC. Furthermore, NASA received no funds to 
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continue research and development on Landsat satellites beyond Landsat 5. Thus, NOAA 
assumed two tasks: operate the Landsat program until it found a private-sector operator. Part of 
its broad platform for the United States and its federal government, the Reagan Administration 
pursued Landsat commercialization in the national interest in order to reduce government 
regulation, promote competition in an emerging market, and reduce federal subsidy. The White 
House pushed hard for commercialization, Congress passed major legislation to authorize 
commercialization, and after a bidding process, DOC signed a contract with EOSAT. However, 
the arrangement quickly unraveled when OMB clamped down on Landsat subsidies and 
NOAA’s funds dried up. OMB required cost recovery with regards to Landsat data revenues. 
However, EOSAT failed to achieve the revenue benchmarks in its contract. Essentially, Landsat 
commercialization drove data prices to cost prohibitive levels for users and EOSAT did not 
receive its subsidies in a timely manner. This combination led NOAA to announce a program 
shutdown and only the actions of Congress and the Vice President in 1989 saved Landsat from 
elimination. The transformation of Landsat data from a public good to a private commodity went 
against the non-discriminatory data access policy set forth during Landsat program formation 





Chapter 5: “Commitment to Continuity: The Formation of a National Land 
Imaging Program, 1990-2008” 
 
Introduction: Landsat  
 The previous three chapters demonstrated how the federal government, Congress, and the 
private sector attempted to foster use domestically and abroad through accessible data and 
applications, only to have its momentum stifled by commercialization. The policy set into place 
by President Carter and overseen by President Reagan promised to foster use through a growing 
market in remote sensing data and imagery with Landsat at the forefront. OMB’s cost recovery 
policy alongside the price hikes instituted by NOAA and EOSAT pushed many users away, 
despite the growing number of applications in agriculture, forestry, geology and others. In the 
late 1980s, the Landsat program faced elimination as data use waned. The commercial 
arrangement had failed to foster, and rather, restrict Landsat data usage. The White House and 
Capitol Hill took action to reverse this trend and revise its legislation and policies to achieve a 
truly non-discriminatory data access policy. The government began to roll back 
commercialization after the budget and revenue shortfalls of 1989. The early 1990s became a 
period of transition for the Landsat program as much as it was for NASA, the federal 
government, and the world. 
On 25 December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed with the resignation of Mikhail 
Gorbachev and the lowering of the hammer and sickle over the Kremlin. The global landscape 
changed quickly with the Soviet dissolution as the United States assumed its role as the sole 
superpower. Accordingly, many of its policies began to change. The end of the Cold War 
prompted an overhaul of America’s space policy, which had played a crucial role in America’s 
efforts to be the global leader in science and technology. Presidents George H.W. Bush and 
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William Clinton alongside Congress made significant changes to space policy through executive 
orders, presidential decisions, and legislation. In particular, Congress passed two key bills and 
Presidents Bush and Clinton used presidential directives to make data more available. When 
President George H.W. Bush entered the White House, he adopted a robust space policy regime 
that sought to sustain American leadership into the post-Cold War era by promoting cooperation 
between the public and commercial sectors to cut costs. 
Policymakers sought to find ways to conduct spaceflight more cheaply without 
sacrificing reliability or safety using advanced technology and efficient management methods. In 
1992, NASA executives had designed and implemented an agency reform that emphasized 
inexpensive and reliable spacecraft development called the “Faster, Better, Cheaper” initiative. 
NASA’s objectives were to “cut costs, take greater risks, and dispatch spacecraft that actually 
flew…through changes in technology and project management.”364 The agency sought to 
diminish cost overruns often experienced during research and development, especially during its 
planetary exploration missions to Mars as well as in launches. NASA, the spaceflight advocacy 
community, and the aerospace industry believed that launch costs would drop with reliable 
vehicles such as the Titan IVB, the reusable Shuttle orbiter, or, later on, commercial vehicles. 
While Faster, Better, Cheaper emphasized launch costs and planetary exploration, I argue here 
that the initiative also affected the Landsat program. NASA’s drive to lower costs caused the 
agency to nearly abandon the satellite series altogether. However, the agency remained 
committed to land remote sensing data and attempted to make Landsat data more accessible on a 
more non-discriminatory basis. 
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During the 1990s, federal government agencies and Congress sought to adopt a policy 
regime and legislation that would make Landsat data more accessible again. These decisions 
amounted to greater emphasis on commercializing certain activities in space, declassifying 
reconnaissance programs and their associated photography, and preserving the collection of 
remote sensing data. The highest levels of government displayed a commitment to Landsat 
continuity, yet the commitment came in many forms due to the changing managerial structures 
of Landsat, such as the inclusion of the DoD, removing NOAA from Landsat management, and 
the movement away from commercialization.  
In the early 1990s, the defense community began using Landsat data for tactical purposes 
during the First Gulf War and the DoD briefly raised its involvement with the satellite program. 
The combination of civilian and defense agencies as well as Congressional support led to new 
commitments to the Landsat program and the planning of the Landsat 7 satellite. Despite this 
initiative, several key challenges plagued the Landsat program and threatened its longevity. The 
program experienced technical setbacks, commitment issues from federal agencies, funding 
concerns, and an emerging domestic and international market for remote sensing data that 
threatened to make Landsat obsolete. 
After the DoD’s involvement, USGS and NASA collaboratively explored ways to pursue 
new satellites and access to continuous Landsat data. The agencies experimented with several 
managerial structures and even attempted to commercialize the program a second time. With the 
failure of Landsat 6 and an unsettled management and funding profile, the program seemed to be 
at its end. But in 2001, out of the tumult of the commercialization years and nearly a decade of 
policy changes, these agencies organized the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM). LDCM 
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led to the launch of Landsat 7 and an amalgamated data archive that sought to sustain Landsat 
and its data into the 21st century. 
In this chapter, I argue that USGS and NASA worked towards and eventually achieved 
the non-discriminatory data access policy originally proposed by Nixon in 1969. 
Commercialization, gaffes in management, and funding shortfalls generated a storm that pushed 
Landsat to the brink throughout the 1990s. I show how the federal government passed legislation 
that brought Landsat back under its control but had difficulty implementing and sustaining a 
funding and management profile for Landsat until 2001. Also, the federal government tried to 
foster a remote sensing industry which slowly began to materialize. However, a major distinction 
emerged: Landsat data was considered moderate resolution data (30 meters) which was useful 
only for civilian government purposes and academic institutions whereas the defense, 
intelligence, and industry groups valued high resolution (finer than 10 meters) imagery. Thus, 
remotely sensed imagery markets became more nuanced and the market for moderate resolution 
Landsat data was unable to prosper commercially without government involvement. NASA and 
USGS recognized this reality in 2001 when it initiated LDCM. I demonstrate how the adoption 
of new federal imperatives and a second failure of commercialization in 1998 stimulated the 
formation of LDCM which made Landsat data widely available and accessible. The move back 
to federal operation began with the White House. 
 
Presidential Directives for Remote Sensing, 1990-1992 
Following the example of President Carter, President Bush established in November 1989 
his National Space Policy through a directive. National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-
1) articulated Bush’s vision for space which included the goal to sustain American leadership in 
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space, strengthen national security, obtain economic, scientific, and technological benefits, 
encourage private sector involvement, and international cooperation.365 President Bush 
reaffirmed these central tenets from the NASA Act for the post-Cold War era. It also increased 
the emphasis on establishing a commercial space sector. Bush’s NSPD-2, the Commercial Space 
Launch Policy of 1990, specifically sought to foster a market for space launches and launch 
vehicles. NSPD-3 and 4 both released in 1991 provided the guidelines for commercial space 
policy and launches. 
“U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines,” or NSPD-3 released on 11 February 1991 
stated that in order for the United States to remain the leader in space and stay competitive in an 
international environment, it must promote “commercial use and exploitation of space 
technologies and systems for national economic benefit.”366 Among several space technologies 
including satellite communications, launch vehicles, and materials processing, NSPD-3 also 
identified remote sensing. The directive promoted “private development, manufacture, and 
operation of remote sensing satellites and the processing and marketing of remote sensing data” 
as imperatives of commercial space policy.367 Bush proposed cost effective use of commercially 
available products by government agencies, government transfer of technology, avoid 
regulations that stifle commercialization, and cooperation between the private and public sectors 
in research, development, and operations. While promoting a private sector, President Bush also 
addressed public space operations.  
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 The president specifically sought to revise the federal government’s commitment to 
Landsat itself and data continuity. The Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy (NSPD-5), released on 
13 February 1992, acknowledged the capabilities of Landsats 4 and 5 and how they “benefit the 
civil and national security interests of the United States and makes contributions to the private 
sector which are in the public interest” and thus will “seek to maintain continuity of Landsat type 
data.”368 The White House’s vision for Landsat was that it would provide sufficiently consistent 
data for its various applications, make data available to address concerns of national security and 
environmental research and those of federal users, and promote commercial opportunities.369 The 
directive also called for continuity of data archiving, minimizing regulations on private sector 
remote sensing, and most importantly, called for a Landsat 7 satellite. 
 President Bush called for several agencies to implement the directives guidelines. In 
1992, EOSAT had developed Landsat 6 for a 1993 launch date under its contract with DOC as 
well as sustain Landsat 4 and 5 operations via EOSAT. The directive also suggested a move 
away from the private sector as it charged NASA and DoD, not EOSAT, with developing the 
Landsat 7 satellite, discussed in more detail later in this chapter. However, NSPD-5 stated that 
funding, management, operations, and data archiving and dissemination would be a coordinated 
effort among various agencies. While the White House sought to revise policies and laws to 
sustain Landsat, so too did Capitol Hill through two major pieces of legislation in 1990 and 
1992. 
 
The Global Change Research Act, 1990 
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 When President Bush entered the White House, he initiated a government program for 
tracking and understanding the global environmental change. In 1990, Congress followed suit 
and passed the Global Change Research Act of 1990 creating “a comprehensive and integrated 
United States research program which will assist the Nation and the world to understand, assess, 
predict, and respond to human-induced and natural processes of global change.”370 The act 
quickly passed the House by voice vote and a full 100-0 vote in the Senate and President Bush 
signed it into law on 16 November 1990. Under Title I, the Global Change Research Act formed 
the United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) overseen by the Subcommittee 
on Global Change Research and the Executive Office of the President. The act called for 
participation from twelve government agencies, including NASA and USGS. Congress tasked 
USGCRP with “understanding and responding to global change, including the cumulative effects 
of human activities and natural processes on the environment.”371 In particular, the act itself 
called for “new developments in interdisciplinary Earth sciences, global observing systems, and 
computing technology make possible significant advances in the scientific understanding and 
prediction of these global changes and their effects.”372 Further, the act required USGCRP to 
consult the National Space Council with regard to larger projects. 
 One of USGCRP’s main functions was to produce scientific assessments and research 
reports and plans. For some of its projects, it relied on satellite data from various environmental, 
meteorological, and land remote sensing satellites. Accordingly, Landsat data was a critical 
component of USGCRP’s efforts to carry out its objectives. The program recognized that 
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Landsat was crucial and advocated on its behalf to fund it and ensure data continuity. Shortly 
after the Global Change Research Act, Congress addressed USGCRP’s recommendations to 
sustain Landsat. 
USGCRP’s concerns played a significant role in the writing of the Landsat Policy Act. 
The Landsat Policy Act addressed the cost prohibitive data issue raised by USGCRP. In Chapter 
3, I demonstrated how Landsat prices rose under the Commercialization Act and made data 
unavailable to potential users. Under Section 5601 of the Landsat Policy Act, Congress declared 
“the cost of Landsat data has impeded the use of such data for scientific purposes, such as for 
global environmental change research, as well as for other public sector applications.”373 Since 
Landsat became critical for government operations mandated by law, the USGCRP 
recommended that the Policy Act made data more available to government and scientific users. 
Moreover, members of Congress recognized that the bill should transfer the satellite program 
from a commercially contracted entity under the DOC to an managerially integrated program of 
DoD and NASA and “unenhanced Landsat 4 through 6 data be made available, at a minimum, to 
United States Government agencies, to global environmental change researchers, and to other 
researchers who are financially supported by the United States Government” according to user 
demands.374 The bill also included unenhanced Landsat 7 data. In 1992, the Hill passed even 
more sweeping legislation that sought to sustain Landsat continuity into the 21st century. 
 
Passing the Policy Act: The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 
 As EOSAT struggled to recover its costs and Landsat faced shut down, Congress began 
to enact legislation that would profoundly change the nature of Landsat and the data it produced. 
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The cleavages of the Landsat Act of 1984, addressed earlier in Chapter 3, became apparent on 
Capitol Hill. Representative George Brown (D-CA), who played an important role sustaining the 
Landsat program in the previous chapter, came to Landsat’s assistance again in October 1992. 
Brown introduced H.R. 6133 as the 102nd Congress was closing its session. The main purpose of 
the bill was to repeal the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 given its 
inability to foster a commercial remote sensing market and to sustain Landsat operations. In so 
doing, it significantly altered the managerial structure of Landsat. Joanne Gabrynowicz, a 
Professor Emerita and Director of the National Center for Remote Sensing, Air, and Space Law 
at the University of Mississippi School of Law, identified several main changes H.R. 6133 
brought to Landsat including:  
“Landsat 7 procurement, Landsat 4 to 7 data policy, transfer of Landsat 6 program 
responsibilities, regulatory authority and administration of public and private remote 
sensing systems, federal research and development, advanced technology demonstration, 
Landsat 7 successor systems, data availability and archiving, and the continued 
prohibition of weather satellite commercialization.”375 
 
At the time of H.R.6133’s introduction, NOAA managed Landsat, which had been contracted out 
to EOSAT. The proposed Policy Act also sought more coordination among agencies and 
integration of managerial responsibilities. The bill transferred Landsat management from DOC to 
NASA and DoD and called for a the “establishment of an integrated program management 
structure,” which became known as Landsat Program Management.376 
 The NASA Administrator and the Secretary of Defense jointly headed Landsat Program 
Management in addition to other program heads where the President saw appropriate. Their main 
goal was to establish a management plan that included agency roles and responsibilities as well 
                                                          
375 Joanne Gabrynowicz, “The promise and problems of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” Space 
Policy (1993) Vol. 9, Issue 4, pp. 319-328 
376 Congressional Research Service Summary, “H.R. 6133 (102nd): Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992,” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/hr6133/summary, date accessed: 28 September 2016 
207 
 
as develop a funding profile. Its main goal was to secure “the continuity of unenhanced Landsat 
data through the acquisition and operation of a Landsat 7 satellite as quickly as practicable” and 
funding was the responsibility of NASA and DoD for the research and development as well as 
the operations phase.377 The federal government procured the first five Landsats directly through 
NASA and its contractors and the sixth through NOAA’s contract with EOSAT. However, 
H.R.6133 questioned “whether such a spacecraft should be funded by the United States 
Government, by the private sector, or by an international consortium.”378 This essentially left the 
future of Landsat undecided as far as a follow-on satellite system and did not construct any 
strategy for Landsat 7 procurement and beyond. It specified that although commercialization was 
not feasible in the short term, it was a long-term goal to promote a commercial remote sensing 
market. The bill only allowed for private industry involvement with satellite operations and data 
preprocessing. H.R. 6133 carried over the ban on a commercially run weather satellites from the 
Commercialization Act of 1984. 
At the time of the bill in late 1992, EOSAT built Landsat 6 with roughly $250 million in 
subsidies from DOC and NASA providing launch services for a 1993 launch. Landsat 6 featured 
an Enhanced Thematic Mapper (ETM), built by Hughes Santa Barbara Research Center (part of 
the EOSAT consortium), which was integrated to a Lockheed Martin spacecraft bus. Thus, 
Landsat 6 was the first Landsat whose scanners and payload were developed primarily by the 
private sector. However, H.R. 6133 transferred Landsat 6 from EOSAT’s management to NASA 
and DoD. This section was crucial as it effectively brought the Landsat program back into the 
federal government. USGS carried out data archiving and dissemination, but research, 
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development, technical operations, and procurement had been run by EOSAT. In practice, the 
bill acquired Landsat 6 from EOSAT for NASA but the EOSAT continued to operate Landsats 4 
and 5 under its previous contract. However, the bill was unclear as to how the Landsat program 
would proceed beyond its sixth satellite. 
 H.R. 6133 generally received bipartisan support but had fiscally conservative opponents. 
Ernest Hollings (D-SC), one of the architects of the aforementioned Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act which restricted government spending, opposed the bill arguing that the failure of 
privatization was not fully understood. On the other hand, Al Gore (D-TN) “said for years that 
that [commercialization of Landsat] was a nonsensical idea.”379 After little debate, the bill passed 
the House and Senate, both by voice vote, within two days and President Bush signed the Land 
Remote Sensing Policy Act into law on 28 October 1992. Among the significant revisions to 
Landsat data policy and program architecture was the increased role the White House and 
Congress attributed to the DoD. As these measures passed and were implemented, the DoD put 
Landsat data to the test on the battlefield. 
 
Landsat at War: Defense Mapping Agency, 1990-1991 
In 1990, Iraqi tanks rolled across the Kuwaiti border in what became the first post-Cold 
War armed conflict in the Middle East. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein sought to invade and 
appropriate the vast oil supply central to Kuwait’s economy. In response, Coalition forces 
spearheaded by the United States sought to repulse the Iraqi Republican Guard Army in what 
became codenamed Operation Desert Shield. Naval and aerial bombardment expelled the Iraqi 
occupying force but not before Saddam Hussein ordered the destruction of petroleum extracting 
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infrastructure through the torching of oil wells. The Iraqi army set fire to roughly 650 oil wells 
and damaged nearly 75 more causing widespread leaks across the Kuwaiti desert and Persian 
Gulf.380 Over the next 10 months, Kuwaiti emergency responders, firefighters, and scientists 
attempted to quell the environmental disaster. Landsat 5’s Thematic Mapper captured infrared 
signatures of the 1300 degree Fahrenheit fires raging across the Kuwaiti landscape. The worst 
environmental damage occurred in the Alburoan and Umm Gudair oil fields south of Kuwait 
City. Subsequent studies of the Kuwait oil fire disaster have estimated that “25 to 40 million 
barrels ended up spread across the desert and 11 million barrels in the Persian Gulf.”381 The 
military began using Landsat data extensively in June 1991 to mitigate the ensuing oil fire crisis. 
 On 26 June 1991, the Director of the Defense Mapping Agency Major General William 
James of the USAF testified before a joint hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee. General James was an 
experienced pilot who logged over 6,500 hours of flying time and held an undergraduate degree 
in geology.382 Despite his lack of experience with remote sensing, his leadership made 
transformed DMA from a producer of maps into a critical organization that made geographic 
information readily available to military commanders across the Unified and Specified 
Commands. DMA produced imagery products as both compact disks and paper maps (akin to 
USGS production of Landsat imagery). DMA products “are all characterized by cartographic 
representations of natural and cultural features found on the earth’s surface or beneath the 
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ocean’s surface.”383 The DMA discussed its uses of Landsat and recommended “modifications to 
the system that would make it more suitable for mapping, charting and geodetic (MC&G) 
production.”384 General James described DMA’s need for both broad area image coverage as 
well as high resolution (finer than 10 meters) imagery. In addition, DMA required continuous, 
routine imagery collection in order to identify and track natural and cultural change over time. 
High resolution imagery taken from classified reconnaissance satellites primarily supported 
weapon systems guidance, particularly Tomahawk cruise missile guidance. General James 
claimed the Tomahawk cannot fly without high resolution imagery since they provide 
coordinates for strategic and tactical targeting as well as elevation information. Imagery for 
guidance purposes needed to be 10 meters resolution or finer, which Landsat could not provide 
but General James made the case that Landsat complemented and supplemented DMA’s 
products. 
 As mentioned, Landsat provided the broad image coverage DMA needed for 
hydrographic, bathymetric, and terrain categorization using Landsat’s multispectral capabilities. 
DMA began using Landsat to map coastal hazards and water depths. NASA had not designed 
Landsat’s scanners for bathymetric applications, but DMA found that Landsat imagery detected 
hazards, such as rocks, in coastal waters. This allowed DMA to alert the Navy, Coast Guard, and 
others to navigational risks. General James cited two large DMA mapping projects in which it 
was using Landsat data in the two years leading up to the hearing. In 1982, Vice President 
George H.W. Bush enrolled the military and CIA in America’s counternarcotics “war on drugs” 
campaign to interdict illicit drugs entering the United States, discussed in Chapter 1. DMA 
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sought to map the source of the drugs by gathering 192 Landsat images of Bolivia, Colombia, 
Panama, and Peru.385 The other project is mentioned in part above in which 122 Landsat images 
provided topographic information of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait for Operation Shield/Storm. 
DMA also used Landsat routinely for terrain analysis, soil studies, and vegetation classification, 
much the same way NASA, USDA, and CIA did in their crop forecasting experiments discussed 
in previous chapters. Accordingly, DMA used Landsat as an additional source of terrain analysis 
data for understanding soil composition and moisture to classify vegetation. These applications 
assisted the military with its operations since Landsat imagery covered such broad geographic 
areas, but General James also expressed Landsat’s limits.  
Despite these examples, three key components limited Landsat’s ability to be useful to 
DMA. Landsat imagery was too low of resolution and it lacked stereoscopic coverage and 
precise metric positioning data. Without these variables, DMA would be unable to precisely 
locate targets and calculate elevation. General James expressed a need for broad area imaging 
but with higher resolutions, broader spectral coverage, and stereoscopic coverage in order to 
improve the imagery products provided by DMA. Essentially DMA’s use of Landsat was limited 
to interim special purpose and crisis support products in the case of the Gulf War and 
counternarcotics, but the agency found little use elsewhere. General James found that Landsat 
data met too few of DMA’s requirements for its purposes. DoD’s interest in Landsat began to 
wane until the dissolution of the Soviet Union created a new imperative. 
When the Soviet Union dissolved, fifteen new states emerged and the defense community 
sought to gather imagery of those regions. This initiative was written into law as the DoD 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994 required the DMA “to evaluate and procure available 
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imagery photographs and materials from successor states of the former Soviet Union.”386 Under 
the Appropriations bill, Congress required DMA to acquire imagery of the newly independent 
states from Landsat, the French SPOT remote sensing system, commercial, and Russian sources. 
The DMA report expressed doubt that Russian imagery would be difficult to acquire as it was a 
not a free market economy and declassification rules were unclear. The Russian government 
made some military imagery, civilian cartographic resources, and remote sensing data available 
through an agency called Priroda (which was also the name of a Russian Earth resources 
experiment module that flew on the Mir Space Station in 1996). Priroda screened projects and 
served in a contractor role to sustain control over the imagery used by DMA and its contractors. 
DMA obtained Landsat imagery as a baseline for comparison with Russian-based imagery as 
part of the broader Russian imagery acquisition project. DMA’s comparative study of Landsat 
with publicly available Russian remote sensing data revealed that Landsat had courser resolution 
and comparable pricing and areal coverage. However, the advantage of Landsat was that it 
covered a broader spectral range and its data was available digitally whereas only two of 
Russia’s nine publicly available sensor systems were digital. DMA also conducted the project to 
secure Russian scientific data for USGS, NOAA, and the Bureau of Land Management. 
Moreover, the Russian comparative project also proved useful since “it may be useful as a 
stopgap if Landsat fails,”387 suggesting the DoD’s concern the program might continue to 
languish. 
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Expanding the U.S. Data Archive through Industry and Intelligence, 1992-1995 
 Following the passage of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act in 1992, the Clinton 
Administration sought to expand American remote sensing data access to foreign users. 
President Clinton, in consultation with National Security adviser Sandy Berger and many other 
Cabinet members, handed down Presidential Decision Directive-23/NSC-23 (PDD23) in March 
1994 with the goal to remove barriers to foreign use. President Clinton also made significant 
changed to commercial remote sensing policy. PDD23 acknowledged classified military 
reconnaissance programs that, like Landsat, provided imagery to the defense and intelligence 
communities which are “among the most valuable US national security assets because of their 
high quality data collection, timeliness, and coverage and the capability they provide to monitor 
events around the world on a near real-time basis.”388 As mentioned previously, Landsat had 
become a critical national security asset after the crop forecasting experiments and Gulf War. 
Moreover, other countries were beginning to develop indigenous reconnaissance programs and 
satellites of their own or sought imagery from the United States, Soviet Union, and France 
primarily. As a result of this growing international demand and continued emphasis on national 
security in remote sensing, the PDD23 reconciled those interests. President Clinton sought to 
both “enhance US industrial competitiveness in the field of remote sensing space capabilities 
while at the same time protecting US national security and foreign policy interests.”389 The 
directive did so by effectively changing the licensing procedure for American firms who sought 
to operate land remote sensing satellite systems. 
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 The 1994 directive, in accordance with the LRS Policy Act of 1992, relinquished the 
government’s monopolistic control of remote sensing and allowed an industry to open up. 
Despite the failure of EOSAT to turn a profit, the government saw a potentially lucrative, robust 
industry primed to grow. Part of the issue was licensing and operation; the technology worked 
well. PDD23 maintained that certain technologies, such as scanners, lenses, or image processing 
equipment, would remain under control on the US Munitions List and the Commerce Control 
List. The United States government sought to control the industry though through licensing 
which the directive defined. A potential company applied for a license from DOC and would be 
favorably considered if it was willing to sell imagery on a global marketplace and abided by 
eight principles in the directive. Among them, a licensee would still need export licenses on top 
of its commercial license, allow US government inspection, and limit distribution or data 
collection if deemed a national security contingency. Licenses also had expiration dates. 
Technology transfer was a main concern as well. Foreign recipients of American technologies 
were beholden to U.S. government rules and regulations in areas such as data sharing and 
technological restraints such as resolution, spectral coverage, coverage, and data processing. The 
U.S. government reserved the right to reject licenses if they did not ensure oversight or enabled a 
competitor to surpass the United States in remote sensing capability. The LRS Policy Act and 
PDD23 sought to open an industry of which Landsat was the centerpiece, yet they created 
numerous issues as well. 
 Kenneth Thompson’s dissertation and Gabrynowicz highlighted a major cleavage 
between space policy and foreign policy apparent in the two aforementioned policies.390 The 
Policy Act of 1992 did not provide clear language for industry to begin investments in 
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commercial remote sensing. Thompson stated the Policy Act “simply provided an opportunity 
for CRS [commercial remote sensing] satellite companies to seek licenses, but it did not 
encourage the US government to purchase CRS imagery to help the CRS industry in its early 
stages.”391 For example, in 1992 WorldView Imaging Corporation applied for and received a 
license from the DOC. The license offered no subsidies and rather than unenhanced data being 
released to all potential users, instead the Policy Act required companies to make “unenhanced 
data available to the governments of sensed states.”392 Thus, if a company gathered imagery of 
another country, the US government had no way to directly acquire that data. In effect, this went 
against the non-discriminatory data access policy subject to Landsat and became a significant 
difference between Landsat and commercial remote sensing systems, such as WorldView’s 
EarlyBird-1. 
 The non-discriminatory data access policy fit well into foreign policy as it provided a 
mechanism for international cooperation in science and technology, but commercialization 
stifled its use abroad. As demonstrated, Landsat data became expensive during 
commercialization and cost prohibitive for foreign users, especially in the developing world. 
During the Policy Act debates, Congress attempted to “strike a balance between international 
treaty obligations to maintain non-discriminatory data access [and the] interests of private sector 
firms.”393 The concern was that private sector remote sensing data would be too expensive to 
serve as an instrument of cooperation for foreign policy and that Landsat data would have to be 
available on a non-discriminatory basis. With Congress committed to Landsat data continuity, 
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the US government could also foster a competitive remote sensing industry by not subjecting it 
to non-discriminatory data access.  
 Within a few months of the Policy Act’s passage, DOC received several applications 
from private satellite operators for a license to fly remote sensing satellites. As mentioned above, 
WorldView Imaging Corporation was the first to successfully apply for a license and eventually 
launch a remote sensing satellite. It also won the first high resolution (finer than 30 meters) 
remote sensing satellite license. WorldView merged with Ball Aerospace and Technologies 
Corporation in March 1995 and changed its name to DigitalGlobe, to conduct research and 
development on what became the Earlybird-1 spacecraft launched in 1997 and the first high 
resolution remote sensing satellite, DigitalGlobe’s IKONOS in 1999. Lockheed Martin and 
Orbital Sciences also submitted applications to DOC for licenses as well. In addition to industry 
sources of remote sensing data becoming more available, the intelligence community also 
released nearly 30 years’ worth of imagery to public use. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the intelligence community made use of Landsat data and was a 
large purchaser of imagery.  In 1995, President Clinton made signed an Executive Order that 
directed CIA and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to declassify imagery collected 
from the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD missions.394 In fact, the NRO itself had only 
recently been declassified itself. The agency remained secret until its existence was declassified 
in September 1992 at the behest of the Director of Central Intelligence.395 Much of this imagery 
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was high resolution, black and white photographs initially collected by the CIA and USAF and 
used by DMA, CIA, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, among others. The sensor 
system was very different from Landsat, however. The cameras returned black and white 
imagery since that scheme offered the highest resolution possible. Color and infrared were only 
used three times as they had lower resolution. CIA and Air Force placed a premium on 
resolution. Eastman Kodak manufactured a unique 70 millimeter film and each satellite carried 
roughly 8,000 feet of film. In the mid-1990s, much of the declassified imagery collected by the 
intelligence community went into storage at EROS and the National Archives and Records 
Administration and became readily accessible in the same way as Landsat imagery.396 
The combination of formerly classified imagery and commercial high resolution imagery 
helped expand the market for land remote sensing data especially given the potential data gap 
should Landsat 5 fail and Landsat 7 delays continue. While remote sensing data ostensibly 
became more available through intelligence community declassification and private industry 
began building a market for commercial satellite data with the passage of the Policy Act and 
PDD23, Landsat’s future had yet to be resolved by the federal agencies and private industry 
slowly developed. 
  
Landsat in Limbo: Technical Failures and Managerial Turnover, 1992-1996 
During the early 1990s, the Landsat program suffered a series of setbacks. In 1992, 
EOSAT withdrew from data processing operations. However, EOSAT’s struggles did not end in 
1992. After years of investment in Landsat 6 and its upgraded MSS and ETM, the satellite failed 
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to reach orbit, plunging the satellite into the Indian Ocean. A Titan II launcher vehicle took off 
from Vandenberg AFB, California on 5 October 1993, but a ruptured hydrazine manifold which 
“rendered the satellite’s reaction engine assemblies useless because fuel could not reach the 
engines. As a consequence, there was a failure to maintain attitude control during the apogee 
kick motor (AKM) burn.”397 Therefore, the launcher did not sufficiently place the satellite in 
orbit since the engine did not burn enough. Both a NOAA review board chaired by Director of 
NOAA’s Systems Acquisition Office Thomas McGunigal and a Martin Marietta Corporation 
review board, the company who had designed Landsat 6, reached similar conclusions. The 
launch failure left both EOSAT and Landsat operations in a precarious position with no 
additional satellite planned for and funds running bare. 
Two months after the Landsat 6 crash, Landsat 4, already plagued with technical 
problems, ceased to function properly. Landsat 4 experienced several technical problems since 
its launch in 1984. Landsat 4 featured a new scanner, the Thematic Mapper (TM), with a broader 
spectral coverage than its predecessors. Despite the TM’s success, much of the rest of the 
payload did not. Within a year of reaching orbit, two of its four solar panels malfunctioned and 
both of its downlink transmitters. Thus the satellite did not downlink any imagery until the 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) became operational in April 1983. Thus, 
NASA and USGS did not received any Landsat 4 for a couple months. For 10 years, Landsat 4 
did not operate optimally yet NASA had built Landsat 4 with a transmitter, the Ku-band 
transmitter, that made it capable of communicating with TDRSS. However, since TDRSS 
handled data relays from multiple satellite systems, as well as the Shuttle orbiter, Landsat data 
sometimes had to ‘compete’ for downlinks. In December 1993, the Ku transmitter gave out 
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entirely on Landsat which brought its data downlinks to an end. With the failure of Landsat 6’s 
launch and Landsat 4’s inability to transmit data, data continuity became precarious. 
The several malfunctions on Landsat 4 prompted the early launch of Landsat 5 in 1984, 
which was an identical payload. The Landsat 4 and 5 platforms also made data continuity 
perilous as neither included a data recorder. The first three satellites carried an onboard recorder 
which allowed them to store data until it came within range of a ground station. Once in range, 
the recorder downlinked its collected data. Without an onboard recorder, Landsats 4 and 5 had 
no way to store data except to downlink or relay data. Rather than have onboard recorders, 
NASA designed Landsats 4 and 5 to be able to dock with the Shuttle, which would allow the 
agency to perform repairs to the spacecraft. However, this required the Shuttle to launch out of 
Vandenberg Air Force Base so as to achieve the same orbit as the Landsats. After a $4 billion 
investment in Vandenberg to add a Shuttle launch facility, the USAF cancelled the project.398 By 
1993, Landsat 6 failed to achieve orbit, Landsat 4 had malfunctioned, and the lack of data 
recorders and ability to repair the satellites endangered the program. In addition to technical 
problems, Landsat management also began to malfunction. 
 In the mid-1990s, a series of White House decisions provided new guidance to the 
Landsat program in the wake of the Landsat 6 accident and subsequent managerial confusion. 
The Landsat management structure began to shift in 1993 with severe budget cuts applied to 
NASA and DoD, the two agencies charged with running the satellite program. The end of the 
Cold War signaled a significant draw down in defense spending in the mid-1990s. Without 
another major superpower to contest America’s supremacy, there was little rationale to fund the 
DoD as profoundly as when the Soviet Union loomed large. As mentioned above, DoD was not 
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especially interested in broad usage of Landsat data and budget cuts caused the agency to 
withdraw its support for the Landsat 7 project to be undertaken with NASA. In May 1994, the 
White House relieved the DoD of its duties with Landsat and transferred its responsibilities to 
NASA per Presidential Decision Directive-3: the Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy. 
 In late 1993, the National Science and Technology Council reevaluated Landsat program 
management and its technical aspects. By May 1994, the White House established a strategy for 
Landsat. The aging Landsats 4 and 5 and the DoD withdrawal prompted the White House to 
promote new policy goals for the satellite program. The Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy 
committed the federal government to continue acquiring Landsat data, make data available at a 
cost of no more than required to meet user requests, and “promote and not preclude private 
sector commercial opportunities in Landsat-type remote sensing.”399 The directive charged four 
agencies with implementing the strategy, first with DoD transferring its duties to NASA and DOI 
with continuing its archiving activities at EROS. The White House also maintained NOAA, via 
DOC, as the managerial outfit for all current Landsats400 and future Landsats and charged it with 
coordinating with NASA to develop Landsat 7 and with USGS to operate it. The White House 
also directed NOAA to seek agreements with foreign ground stations to receive data. NASA’s 
role grew considerably after DoD’s withdrawal. Originally, NASA and DoD would conduct 
research and development on Landsat 7 jointly, but the space agency was left with this 
responsibility and to develop a strategy beyond Landsat 7. The White House provided greater 
clarity with the release of the National Space Policy (NSP). 
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 President Clinton unveiled his vision for space in September 1996. The NSP confirmed 
the White House’s interest in revisiting commercialization as an option for Landsat operations 
while defining certain functions for the government. The NSP maintained the federal 
government’s central space policy objectives which included a commitment to leadership in 
space science and technology and a space program that supports national security, economic 
growth, foreign policy, and, as Clinton’s administration added, environmental stewardship. Thus, 
the NSP placed a greater emphasis on Earth observation “to better understand global change and 
the effect of natural and human influences on the environment.”401 The White House directed 
DOC, via NOAA, to coordinate remote sensing activities across the federal government and to 
acquire data from remote sensing satellites while USGS continued to operate EROS and support 
its functions as the land remote sensing data archive. Thus, in part, NSP supported the 
aforementioned USGCRP’s mission to support and collect environmental data for scientific 
purposes. The NSP also discussed government use of the private sector for remote sensing data.  
 While the Policy Act of 1992 explicitly returned Landsat operations to federal 
government responsibility, the NSP advocated leveraging the private sector as an additional 
source of remote sensing data. As mentioned, the DOC began awarding licenses to potential 
commercial remote sensing satellite operators after the passage of the Policy Act of 1992, though 
no satellites were launched as of 1996. The NSP also committed the federal government to 
pursuing “technology development programs, including partnerships with industry” and 
“providing U.S. Government civil data to commercial firms on a nondiscriminatory basis to 
foster the growth of the ‘value-added’ data enhancement industry.”402 The value-added data 
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enhancement industry began to emerge to offer refined remote sensing data and data analysis 
products. Given its various obligations to both environmental concerns, technological leadership, 
and fostering a private sector, Congress responded to the White House’s NSP and passed another 
major bill to address those issues. By late 1997, Congress took action again to bring stability to 
the Landsat program while also fostering not only a remote sensing industry, but more 
commercial space activity. 
 
Passing the Commercial Space Act of 1998 
 In May 1997, several key senators presented H.R. 1702 to the House floor which went to 
the House Science Committee. The bill, referred to as the ‘Commercial Space Act of 1997’ 
identified several key aspects of American spaceflight activities primed for commercial 
opportunities. With H.R. 1702, Congress sought to promote commercial activities aboard the 
International Space Station, commercial space launches, Global Positioning Systems, and in 
remote sensing. In particular, the bill overhauled policy by encouraging acquisition of Earth 
science data from commercial providers. The bill specified NASA as the agency which would 
“acquire, where cost-effective, space-based and airborne Earth remote sensing, data, services, 
distribution, and applications.”403 The passage of this section of law allowed the federal 
government to procure remote sensing data from the private sector, which had not previously 
been addressed in space policy or law. The bill also provided for a seventh Landsat, also 
previously left unaddressed. 
The bill also put into law that the Landsat program and data be protected by law. H.R. 
1702 rewrote a key section of the Policy Act of 1992 that addressed the design of Landsat 7. 
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Originally, the Policy Act ambiguously legislated that Landsat 7 will be pursued by either the 
government, private sector or an international consortium.404 This language suggested no 
commitment to Landsat or data continuity beyond Landsat 7. However, the 105th Congress took 
action to commit the federal government Landsat. The Commercial Space Act of 1998 stated that 
Congress will ensure “the continuity of Landsat quality data.”405 For the first time, Landsat’s 
future was etched into legislation, albeit ambiguously. The Act prompted NASA and USGS to 
pursue a new goal for data continuity: data purchase rather than collection. In November 1997, 
the House passed the bill by voice vote and it went onto the Senate which did not address the bill 
for nearly a year. By October 1998, the Senate passed the bill by Unanimous Consent and 
President Clinton signed it into law on 28 October. Shortly after its passage, NASA sent the next 
Landsat into space. 
 
Continuity through Cooperation: SPOT and USGS Agreement 1999-2001 
 In April 1999, NASA successfully launched Landsat 7 into orbit, again from Vandenberg 
Air Force Base. The satellite was jointly managed by NASA and USGS and featured new 
scanners offering data across several spectral bands. Landsat 5 remained a commercial operation 
though the satellite had aged considerably. Early on, Landsat 7 experienced trouble of its own as 
the scan line corrector, a critical component of the Enhanced Thematic Mapper, broke and 
returned skewed data. While ETM data was still serviceable through more robust processing 
methods, the component failure made many NASA officials and the user community question 
the longevity of Landsat 7 as fears of a gap in data grew steadily. NASA and USGS sought to 
find ways to make Landsat data more widely available without massive investments in large, 
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singular spacecraft. The two agencies pursued this agenda in two broad ways: they sought to 
procure data and imagery from commercial and international sources and it reexamined 
commercializing Landsat.  
 While NASA readied Landsat 7 for launch in early 1999, it and USGS sought an 
alternative to launching large, singular satellite systems to sustain Landsat. Neither NASA nor 
Congress wanted to commit to more than one Landsat satellite at a time even though this 
threatened data continuity. Thus, NASA and USGS sought a solution predicated on Landsat-like 
data acquisitions from multiple sources even if the source was not a Landsat satellite. They 
recognized that there was a growing market of commercial and foreign land remote sensing 
satellite systems and data from which it could procure imagery. As mentioned, USGS began 
acquiring data from the intelligence community but also sought to leverage the domestic and 
international market of remotely sensed data.  
In 1986, the French launched the first SPOT satellite with several follow-on SPOTs orbited in 
1990, 1993, and 1998 and a fifth SPOT planned for 2002. The SPOT satellites offered 
multispectral image products at six meter resolution across similar bands to Landsat, though with 
less spatial coverage at sixty square kilometers. Essentially its resolution was generally five 
times betters than Landsat but with a viewpoint three times less than Landsat. SPOT was a 
public-private partnership between the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES, the French 
space agnecy) and SPOT Image, a Toulouse-based data and information firm. SPOT Image also 
established a US presence with an office in Reston, Virginia near the USGS Headquarters. In the 
previous chapter, I demonstrated how SPOT image sales outstripped Landsat sales into the 
1990s. USGS recognized SPOT’s success and sought to set up a data acquisition agreement. In 
October 1998, USGS and SPOT Image Corporation signed a cooperative Memorandum of 
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Agreement to acquire, preserve, and distribute SPOT data via EROS. Theodore Nanz, President 
of SPOT Image wrote to Donald Lauer, EROS Chief stating “all of us at SPOT look forward to 
forging a strong mutually beneficial relationship between our two entities.”406  
The agreement served both institutions’ interests: EROS’s mission to collect and archive 
Earth imagery and SPOT’s mission to make imagery available. In particular, the agreement 
ensured “the long-term management and preservation of SPOT satellite data and assist the 
broadest spectrum of users in obtaining timely access to SPOT data for monitoring global, 
regional, and local changes in natural resources and the environment.”407 SPOT made all of its 
acquired data from 1986 to 1998 available to EROS for archiving and preservation, joint use of 
EROS equipment, and open consultation between EROS and SPOT on technical and managerial 
matters. The agreement also stated that both parties will compensate each other for services 
rendered and both will make best efforts to minimize costs. Richard Witmer, Chief of USGS’s 
National Mapping Division and Theodore Nanz signed the agreement on 4 August 1998 which 
took effect in October and lasted for three years. The United States sought to leverage the 
success of the French SPOT series while also encouraging a private sector of its own, despite its 
struggles with EOSAT and Landsat data continuity more broadly. 
 
Commitment to Continuity: Formation of the Landsat Data Continuity Mission, 2001-2003 
Congress and the White House left the particulars of Landsat data continuity to federal 
agencies, but struggled to find a working model throughout the 1990s. But in late 2001, NASA 
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and USGS struck an agreement to jointly manage the Landsat program and ensure data 
continuity and availability, primarily through commercial means.  
The USGS and NASA’s Office of Earth Science entered a partnership to procure 
Landsat-quality data “which meets both NASA and DOI/USGS scientific and operational 
requirements for observing land use and land change, which include supporting the U.S. Global 
Change Research Program” and will be “provided to the Government by the private sector via a 
to-be-determined means, presumably using one or more satellites.”408 The objective of the 
agreement was to sustain continuity and availability of Landsat data while striking a balance 
between the necessity of Landsat data to government and academia with the lack of an 
independent moderate-resolution commercial imagery business. Essentially what NASA and 
USGS proposed as an alternative to a government run satellite series was to purchase and collect 
Landsat-like data from one or multiple commercial providers and make the data available to 
government agencies and academic investigators via USGS. This joint NASA/USGS initiative 
assumed the title of Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM). 
In order to implement LDCM, NASA and USGS agreed to a list of responsibilities and 
work within appropriated funds from Congress. For its part, NASA agreed to calibrate and 
validate data reception and lead data procurement. USGS assumed responsibility for data 
archiving, accessing, processing, and distributing data via EROS. Jointly, the agencies 
established a science team to analyze data and a formulation team for acquisitions, provided 
financial support to for their agency’s personnel, and acquired data through a vendor mutually 
agreed upon. On 25 October 2001, NASA Associate Administrator for the Office of Earth 
Science Ghassem Asrar and USGS Director Charles Groat signed the Initial Implementation 
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Agreement authorizing their participation in the Landsat Data Continuity Mission. First, the 
agencies needed assess private sector interest in land remote sensing. 
EOSAT, nearing the end of its contract with DOC as Landsat 5 aged and expressed no 
interest building Landsat 7. WorldView’s Earlybird had taken flight while other private firms 
readied systems for launch. Moreover, a large industry emerged alongside the satellite systems 
business, the data processing industry. NASA and USGS began to explore methods to acquire 
remotely sensed Earth imagery without major investments in singular satellite systems. In mid-
1999, the two agencies issued a Request for Information and reviewed it in the summer of 1999. 
NASA’s Landsat Program Executive Dr. Charles Wende and USGS Earth scientist Bruce 
Quirk surveyed industry and academia requesting its interest in a commercial data purchase for 
the government.409 The ROI revealed that none of the respondents believed that Landsat data 
itself had an economically viable commercial market and a data purchase was preferable from 
contractor owned space and ground systems, and only one contractor planning to launch a 
satellite met Landsat continuity standards which included 30 meter resolution imagery collected 
continuously and within NASA and USGS specified spectral bands.410 The standards also 
required certain numbers of images collected per day of specific scene sizes. Since industry did 
not view Landsat itself as a commercially viable program, NASA and USGS began to draw up a 
Request for Proposals and organize industry workshops for a commercial data buy, rather than 
pursue government procurement of satellites beyond Landsat 7. 
At the NASA/USGS industry workshops, attended by over 200 individuals and run by 
Charles Wende and USGS Landsat program official Raymond Byrnes, the agencies revealed 
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their findings from the previously mentioned industry survey conducted by Wende and Quirk. 
NASA and USGS found that non-discriminatory data access policy was favorable, that longer 
term deals are preferable such as ten-year data purchases and long-term strategies for satellite 
procurement, and industry favored international collaboration. The survey also revealed to 
NASA and USGS that “there was consensus among data providers that there is no viable 
commercial market for 30m data.”411 Industry players also concurred that longer term plans, 
such as ten year data purchasing plans (rather than five years or less) are preferable in addition to 
a long term land remote sensing program plan beyond Landsat 7. The survey also demanded 
technical improvements to Landsat such as the addition of a thermal imaging band, decrease 
revisit time (Landsat 7 had a revisit time of 16 days), and sustain Landsat’s calibration.  
As these meetings took place, DOC already began awarding licenses for flying remote 
sensing satellites to industry. Among the twenty-four licenses awarded by NOAA for 
commercial remote sensing systems, one went to Boeing for a joint company called Resource21. 
Boeing, alongside BAE Systems, Farmland Industries, and the Mississippi-based Institute for 
Technology Development formed Resource21 as a remote sensing satellite development project. 
Boeing envisioned Resources21 as a remote sensing information project planned to prime the 
market and provide remote sensing data for use in natural resources, national security, and by the 
scientific community. Resource21’s business model primarily targeted agricultural users who 
relied on aerial photography. The consortium also sought to launch a satellite closely based on 
Landsat specifications, and move into data distribution. Ball Aerospace and Technologies 
Corporation agreed to build the proposed spacecraft which would be similar to Landsat with the 
capability of acquiring 30-meter resolution imagery continuously. 
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Colorado-based DigitalGlobe also announced it would compete for the LDCM bid. As 
mentioned, it flew the first commercial remote sensing satellite called Earlybird. In early 2002, 
DigitalGlobe already had QuickBird, a high-resolution remote sensing satellite flying and it sold 
imagery to the U.S. military, especially with combat operations being conducted in Iraq. Given 
their interest in the LDCM bid, NASA awarded both Resource21 and DigitalGlobe a $5 million 
study grant to draw up a business model and technical specifications. NASA ran the LDCM bid 
competition on behalf of USGS and set a deadline of 25 February 2002. 
In February 2002, as Resource21 submitted its bid for Landsat operations, DigitalGlobe 
shocked the industry and pulled its application. The company’s chief executive office Herb 
Satterlee stated that the “the concern was the structure of the contract [which] put all the risk on 
the contractor, much more so than if NASA had just gone out and procured a satellite.”412 
Satterlee believed the contract drawn up by NASA placed too much risk on the company and 
ultimately put them out of business. Satterlee was skeptical that operating Landsat commercially 
alongside QuickBird would turn a profit. Neither NASA nor USGS commented on the 
withdrawal but EROS Director R.J. Thompson feared “what message this might send to 
Congress or [OMB]…the perception that it is not a commercially viable activity could certainly 
have an impact on how a mission or program like this is viewed.”413 This left NASA with only 
the Resource21 bid to consider. 
 By September 2002, NASA notified Resource21 that it had rejected its bid to 
commercialize the Landsat program. The Colorado-based remote sensing firm submitted a $595 
million bid to NASA to fly a Landsat-like satellite and provide 30 meter resolution to the federal 
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government for five years.414 The bid also included a clause stating that Resource21 would 
replace a faulty satellite within two years. By comparison, Landsat 7 cost $700 million plus $20 
million a year for operations. The move by NASA shocked the industry as it left Landsat with 
little clarity as to its future as a program. NASA Associate Administrator for the Office of Earth 
Science Ghassem Asrar and his team of evaluators at NASA “explored every avenue for making 
this partnership arrangement a success and in the end we could not reach that stage.”415 While 
the rejection came despite a lack of competition, Asrar further stated that a commercial data buy 
remained an option that a “government owned and operated satellite remains his ‘least desired 
option’” and that an international consortium was also under consideration.416 Samuel Goward, 
former Landsat science team leader and University of Maryland Professor of Geography 
expressed concerns similar to that of Thompson mentioned above. Goward believed that the 
rejection may send the message to policymakers that Landsat was not desirable as a program and 
added that the rejection was a potentially longer delay on the next satellite in the series that may 
lead to a gap in the data record.417 By the end of 2002, Landsat 5 had aged well beyond its 
expected lifetime and Landsat 7 already experienced difficulties from a broken scan line 
corrector that obscured much of the data it downlinked. Resource21 fought the rejection. 
 Resource21 President and CEO Vic Leonard immediately lobbied the space agency to 
reconsider its decision. Leonard, backed by Boeing Company argued that his offer of $595 
million to provide five years of Landsat data was fair, yet NASA claimed the deal “amounted to 
the government shouldering the entire cost of building and operating a private owned 
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satellite.”418 Resource21 claimed it spent $89 million on research and development, planned 
another $183 million in investments and debt, assumed operational costs, and it offered 
government access to 10 meter resolution data from a separate instrument aboard the proposed 
satellite system.419 Leonard stated that Resource21 offered a $145 million discount to NASA and 
a higher performance system than Landsat 7. However, NASA’s Asrar did not view the discount 
as significant enough and expressed no interest in the 10 meter resolution imagery, without 
further comment. Resource21 led by Leonard disputed the rejection unsuccessfully. By the end 
of 2003, Resource21 ceased operations having failed to secure government funding or contracts 
for data purchases. 
  After the LDCM bid period and Resource21 rejection, the federal government again 
revised its remote sensing policy. The Bush White House authorized the U.S. Commercial 
Remote Sensing Policy in April 2003 (CRS Policy) which superseded Clinton’s PDD-23 from 
1994. While the new policy reinforced many of the United States’ goals for Landsat and 
commercial remote sensing broadly such as American leadership, preserving national security, 
and enhancing industry, it rewrote several key aspects of remote sensing policy. The goal of the 
CRS Policy was to “foster economic growth, contribute to environmental stewardship, and 
enable scientific and technological excellence.”420 The policy required the government to both 
foster and utilize where possible the commercial sector for remote sensing systems and data. But 
the policy still did not make a commitment to a follow-on Landsat satellite. Still, NASA and 
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USGS as well as the Landsat data user community remained concerned about data continuity and 
availability given an aged Landsat 5 and broken Landsat 7. 
 
Concluding the Commitment 
 In the 1990s and early 2000s, the federal government considered many options for 
Landsat operation and management that would meet both user requirements and government 
objectives cost-effectively. After the LDCM bid period in 2003 that yielded no successful bids, 
the DoD returned to the table after having established a relationship with DOC and NASA under 
Clinton PDD-23. In 2003, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
recommended that Landsat sensors be placed aboard a large multi-instrument environmental 
satellite combined with weather satellite sensors. The agencies developed a plan to converge the 
civilian and defense satellites onto one platform called the National Polar Orbiting 
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). Not long after the plan materialized, the DoD 
withdrew from the project to continue operating its own weather satellite constellation. 
Following a technical evaluation, OSTP formally directed NASA to pursue and build an eighth 
Landsat satellite, solidifying the White House’s commitment to LDCM and the Landsat program 
itself. 
 Between 1992 and 2003, the federal government remained committed to Landsat, but 
disagreed over what form it should take whether as a public or private entity or even as a satellite 
program in general. Immediately after the Policy Act of 1992, Landsats 4, 5, and 6 were 
commercial but any future Landsats 7 would be government entities operated by NASA and 
USGS. EROS’s role remained to archive land remote sensing data throughout this time period 
though it began to procure not only Landsat imagery, but also imagery from other environmental 
233 
 
satellites and SPOT. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the federal government also fostered a 
commercial sector that came to separate itself from Landsat in terms of products. EarlyBird and 
IKONOS were some of the first commercial remote sensing satellites, but produced high 
resolution imagery effectively creating a new niche in the remote sensing data market. 
Meanwhile, Landsat filled a market niche of its own with its moderate resolution data with the 
value added component of its multi-decade long archive of imagery held at EROS. Despite 
NASA and USGS collaboration and strong user community interest in Landsat, Congress never 
sought to commit to more than one Landsat satellite at a time. Moreover, constrained federal 
agency budgets complicated commitments to Landsat. Twice between 1992 and 2003, DoD 
participated in planning future Landsats, but ultimately pulled away. NASA’s constrained budget 
broadly partially due to budget cuts and partially due to the ‘Faster, Better, Cheaper’ initiative 
prompted the agency to approach Landsat with reticence. The federal government sought to 
reorganize Landsat as a public-private partnership between NASA, USGS, and a private sector it 
fostered. Throughout this time period, the federal government remained committed to data 
continuity and availability, but sought to cut costs through different management structures that 
leveraged privately obtainable assets. Despite the numerous forms Landsat took in the 1990s and 







Conclusion: Preserving Continuity Through Change 
 
Lessons of Landsat, 1953-2003 
 Historians of technology are producing a growing literature that explores how 
technologies are used in society. The use and availability of a particular technology however is 
shaped by the political forces in which it was developed. I analyzed how politics and policies, 
mostly in the United States but to some extent internationally, shaped the use of environmental 
data gathered by Landsat’s multispectral scanning instruments. In 1969, President Nixon gave a 
speech to the United Nations General Assembly speaking of Earth observation satellites that will 
better humanity and will be available to all. While his speech to the UN was hardly a policy 
initiative, it prescribed a non-discriminatory data access policy for Landsat imagery; a policy 
which would make data available to anyone. Throughout the history of Landsat, NASA and 
USGS sought to provide Landsat data to users as openly as possible. As I argue in this thesis, a 
non-discriminatory data access policy proved immensely difficult to achieve due to many 
political and policy factors. “Farming in the Space Age” demonstrated the limits of the 
technology itself in agricultural experimentation through use by the scientific community and the 
intelligence agencies. “Demonstrating the Value of Remote Sensing from Space” detailed the 
difficulties of fostering use abroad in developing countries and the challenges of ground station 
export. “Landsat For Sale” showed how Landsat failed as a commercial entity and drove away 
use through cost prohibitive data pricing. “Commitment to Continuity” demonstrated how 
funding crises and managerial turnover caused the satellite program to nearly end altogether. 
Furthermore, technical failures corrupted Landsat collection from Landsat 7. Each of these 
challenges limited the extent to which users had access to Landsat data. I contextualized these 
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technical and managerial difficulties within broader political environments that characterized the 
four eras of Landsat history I outlined in this dissertation. 
 The first era of Landsat history is its prelaunch years, largely captured in the first chapter. 
In the first era, the scientific community and Navy became interested in multispectral technology 
since it provided agricultural information detailing the health of crops. From this user base of 
agricultural scientists, multispectral imagery increasingly was used by scientists, the military, 
and the intelligence community across many applications in the environmental sciences. Thus 
the first era, the Pre-Launch Years, is characterized by research and development and finding a 
user community. In the second era I call the Experimental Years, a growing user community in 
the US and abroad experimented with satellite imagery in many applications following the 
launch of Landsat 1 in 1972. NASA, USAID, and private contractors orchestrated foreign 
assistance programs to facilitate use abroad in addition to establishing memoranda of 
understanding for ground stations abroad. “Demonstrating the Value of Remote Sensing” 
showed how NASA and its many partners adopted policies that expanded Landsat data use in the 
1970s. Once it became apparent that the data was useful, the White House saw a satellite 
program ripe for commercialization. During the third era, the Commercialization Years, Landsat 
transforms into a private entity that ultimately fails due to a market still in its infancy, a viciously 
frugal federal government, and poor management and contract oversight. This era is covered in 
“Landsat For Sale” which revealed that Landsat imagery was cost prohibitive to its users. With 
Landsat on the ropes, Congress returned Landsat to federal government operations and began to 
experiment with several program management schemes. The fourth era is the Partnership Years 
in which Landsat endured funding crises, numerous policy and management changes, and more 
commercialization initiatives due to the federal government’s attempts to build a partnership 
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with a growing private sector. Throughout this narrative, NASA and USGS continually made 
Landsat data available and yielded several lessons for historians and policy alike. 
 History of technology often considers the political and economic context of a particular 
technology, but it should also show how it is used. This dissertation considered how politics and 
policies shape the use of a particular technology. Several key governmental outfits including the 
White House, Congress, and federal government, and UN each played important roles deciding 
how Landsat’s data would be used and by whom which informs both history of science given the 
regulation of scientific data and political history given the impact of the presidency and Congress 
on federal government operations. This dissertation also demonstrated how space technologies 
are used in society and made available to the taxpayers that initially funded them. The story of 
Landsat also informs Cold War history and agricultural history, as in Chapter 1, the two become 
intertwined as the intelligence community used Landsat to predict Soviet crop yields to stay 
competitive in the global agricultural market. The policy story also provides four particular 
lessons for policy. 
The first lesson of Landsat is that it is difficult to transition a scientific public good to a 
privately sold commodity. Initially, NASA and USGS made Landsat available publicly through 
various means but as the cost burden of the satellite moved to the private sector, data and 
imagery prices increased to cost prohibitive levels. Thus, Landsat, just as the weather satellite 
constellation has always been, remains a publicly run government operation. A second, closely 
related lesson is that the designations of experimental and operational require careful 
consideration when transitioning a government project from one to the other. In 1978, the Carter 
administration declared Landsat operational, a designation outside the lawful scope of NASA but 
within that of USGS and NOAA. The story of Landsat demonstrates that transition plans require 
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careful coordination of appropriate government agencies, leadership, and managerial and 
budgetary commitment. Landsat’s third lesson is that it demonstrates how commercialization is a 
highly politicized, non-linear process, as opposed to a product. Commercialization became a 
long political process began by President Carter and took the form of legislation and a contract 
between NOAA and EOSAT. When the government reconsidered commercialization in the 
1990s and early 2000s, after a series of presidential directives and a bidding period, industry did 
not meet the requirements of government and was ultimately rejected. Lastly, despite Landsat’s 
broad range of applications, the market for moderate resolution satellite data and imagery never 
fully materialized. While Chapter 4 demonstrates how high resolution satellite imagery steadily 
grew, moderate resolution imagery never became a profitable industry. Moreover, Chapter 3 
demonstrated how the Reagan Administration stifled development in moderate resolution 
imagery since it refused to fund Landsat or provide timely subsidies to EOSAT. The story of 
Landsat provides many lessons as well as future research areas. 
 
Epilogue 
 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the White House revived the Landsat Data Continuity 
Mission and committed the federal government to an eight Landsat satellite. NASA and USGS 
collaboratively managed and operated Landsat 8 and contracted out construction of the satellite 
to Orbital Sciences Corporation and instrument research and development to Ball Aerospace, 
mentioned in Chapter 4. Both Landsat 7 and 8 operate today, downlinking Landsat data to a 
global ground station network every eight days. While the two satellites demonstrate the 




USGS took its most significant step towards fully non-discriminatory data access. 
Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne officially announced that all Landsat data would be 
available via the internet and free of charge. Even though the decision implied a roughly $10 
million loss in annual income, the user community quickly reacted and requested Landsat data 
more than it ever had. 
Table 10: Landsat Scenes Distributed, 1972-2014 
Landsat Scenes Distributed by EROS as of 2014, chart courtesy of John Faundeen, USGS EROS 
 
The above charted, provided by EROS, shows the total number of scenes distributed by EROS 
since its opening in 1973. The chart depicts many major points in Landsat’s history that led to 
either increases or decreases in data usage. Commercialization in the 1980s and the funding 
crises of the early 1990s coincided with decreases in data acquisition. The launches of Landsats 
2, 5, and 7 and the Policy Act of 1992 prompted increased Landsat data acquisition. However, in 
December 2008 with the no-charge free access to Landsat imagery, USGS distributed more 
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Landsat data than ever within a month. Kempthorne’s policy to make Landsat data readily 
available for free via internet download allowed the Landsat data archive to reach all potential 
users, as President Nixon suggested it should in his 1969 speech to the UN. 
 Four years after the DOI opened the Landsat archive to the world free of charge, NASA 
launched the eighth Landsat satellite. It was the conclusion of the LDCM that featured an 
entirely new array of scanners that featured an Operational Land Imager (OLI) and a Thermal 
Infrared Scanner (TIRS) built in partnership with Ball Aerospace and Goddard Spaceflight 
Center. Meanwhile, USGS continues its many Landsat-related data collection, archiving, and 
dissemination practices. In 2010, USGS formalized its data repatriation efforts into a project 
entitled the Landsat Global Archive Consolidation (LGAC). EROS began a project to make all 
Landsat data from USGS International Cooperators available. As a critical component of LDCM, 
USGS and NASA began to repatriate Landsat data from ICs. The project, spearheaded by EROS, 
became known as the Landsat Global Archive Consolidation (LGAC). As previously described, 
EROS housed nearly three decades of Landsat data, in addition to collections of aerial 
photography dating back to 1930 and declassified reconnaissance imagery from the Corona 
satellites. A vast majority of this imagery collection was of the United States and EROS held 
very little international cartography. In Chapter 2, I discussed several details of the Memoranda 
of Understanding NASA and USGS signed with International Cooperators to establish ground 
stations abroad. Even though ground stations received data from American satellites, neither 
NASA nor USGS required the ICs to repatriate data to the United States. A few ground stations 
did so sparingly while EROS collected data through second hand sources, such as scientific 
publications or through collaborative projects. While Canada and ESA repatriated data early on 
in the 1970s, USGS formally set up LGAC in 2010 to build its archive further with a more global 
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data set. As mentioned in the previous chapter, ICs were not obligated to repatriate Landsat 
imagery, but during my visit to EROS, its staff praised the project as a success as many countries 
have returned millions of images. As of January 2015, USGS held 5,532,454 Landsat images and 
approximately 3.2 million of them came as a result of LGAC.421 Just ahead of my visit in May 
2015, EROS received shipments from International Cooperators in China, Indonesia, and 
Pakistan.  
Landsat uses and users have expanded well beyond its original starting point with 
agricultural users in the 1960s. Landsat captured imagery of the receding rainforest in the 
Amazonian basin, the Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union, human rights abuses in Africa and 
North Korea, and melting glaciers in the Polar regions. While the 2008 decision to open the 
Landsat data archive proved to be a boon for scientific research and the Presidency declared a 
commitment to data continuity, some issues remain and new ones emerge. As a publicly funded 
government project and operation, Landsat has long been subject to budget cuts as demonstrated 
in this dissertation, but other political issues as well. Political forces from the political ‘right’ 
deemphasize Earth sciences missions given their association with understanding climate change. 
Some elected officials ‘do not believe’ in climate change and thus are reluctant to fund projects 
that contribute towards a better understanding of the blatantly obvious transformations the 
planet’s environment is undergoing. In addition, there is renewed interest in human spaceflight at 
NASA and on Capitol Hill in the wake of the Shuttle program shutdown and increased use of 
Russian and commercial launch vehicles. In this case, Landsat’s priority dropped below that of 
                                                          
421 Michael Wulder, Joanne White, Thomas Loveland, Curtis Woodcock, Alan Belward, Warren Cohen, Eugene 
Fosnight, Jerad Shaw, Jeffrey Masek, and David Roy, “The global Landsat archive: Status: consolidation, and 
direction,” Remote Sensing of Environment, 2 December 2015, http://landsat.usgs.gov/documents/1-s2.0-
S0034425715302194-main.pdf, date accessed: 27 October 2016 
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other, higher cost and higher public visibility programs. Another potential issue is competition 
and obsolescence from both the private sector and international operators.  
While Landsat has provided moderate-resolution satellite data and imagery, other 
countries began to launch Earth remote sensing satellites of their own. The price hike and 
managerial issues mentioned in Chapter 3 offered an opportunity for the French SPOT satellites 
to break into the remote sensing data market. On 22 February 1986, an Ariane 1 carried SPOT-1 
into sun-synchronous orbit and returned 10 meter resolution Earth imagery to Earth and the 
French have since launched several more satellites mentioned previously in this dissertation. As 
the federal government commercialized Landsat and the French readied SPOT for launch in 
Kourou, Brazil and China collaboratively entered the remote sensing race as well. 
 In May 1984, the China Academy of Space Technology signed an agreement with the 
Brazilian INPE to collaborate in the area of remote sensing technology. The cooperative venture 
came to greater fruition in July 1988 when the two governments agreed to establish the joint 
research and development China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellites (CBERS) program. The 
agreement, the Complementary Protocol on Cooperation on Space Technology has been renewed 
twice in 1994 and 2004. Initially, the China Academy of Space Technology and INPE launched 
two satellites, Zi Yuan 1 launched 14 October 1999 and functioned until August 2003 while Zi 
Yuan-2 was launched 21 October 2003 and retired in January 2009. These satellites, also called 
CBERS-1 and CBERS-2 respectively, were the first two CBERS satellites and they carried 
infrared cameras as well as a global positioning system and an onboard recorder. Both CBERS 
satellites followed the same orbit as Landsat, a sun-synchronous orbit at 98.5 degrees. However, 
with an altitude of roughly 778 kilometers, its repeat time was slower at 26 days. The Chinese 
and Brazilians went on to launch two more satellites under its agreements. 
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 For the Brazilians, it was their first land remote sensing satellite. Brazil’s particular 
interest in CBERS originated from the necessity to monitor the Amazon rainforest. Since 1973, 
the Brazilians relied on Landsat imagery gathered from its indigenous ground station in Cuiaba.  
The Brazilian Science Ministry began using Landsat data to monitor the forest, with particular 
attention to illicit logging, mining, and narcotics trafficking. Governmental changes in 1988 
prompted an expansion in national security imperatives which included the health of the 
rainforest which comprised a third of the Brazilian landscape. CBERS-1 allowed the ministry to 
use domestic high-resolution satellite imagery to combat these activities.422 CBERS was the first 
internationally cooperative remote sensing satellite system followed years later by ESA’s 
European Remote Sensing Satellite in 1991. The mutually beneficial agreement between Brazil 
and China remains in place today. Since the launches of SPOT and CBERS, many other 
countries, such as India, Russia, Japan, among others, began to develop and launch remote 
sensing satellites in the 1990s. 
Since the launch of ERTS-A, or Landsat 1 in July 1972, seven more satellites (nearly) 
flew and five different institutions managed its operations. Over the past 44 years, the US federal 
government and several private sector firms invested billions of dollars to collect, process, 
archive, enhance, and disseminate imagery of the Earth’s surface across multiple spectral bands 
from vendors in the US government and private industry. An ISI Web of Science search with 
‘Landsat’ as a key word returned over 18,000 publications in 930 journals. The journals focused 
in areas such as engineering, physics, geography, information science, and the environmental 
sciences such as hydrology, geology, forestry, and glaciology, among many others. Many were 
international journals and foreign journals from China, France, Brazil, Germany, Saudi Arabia, 
                                                          
422 Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The search for security and development on the final 
frontier, (Routledge 2013) pgs. 117-119 
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and Canada, among others. The use of the satellite series and its data has had a strong impact on 
the environmental sciences as well as on fostering new markets in the aerospace industry through 
use. At the time of writing, NASA and USGS are preparing for a Landsat 9 launch within the 
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